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While mounting environmental issues (e.g., climate change) mean that there is an 
increasing urgency for behavioural change this can be difficult to achieve. This thesis 
applied learning from health psychology to the issue of why pro-environmental 
intentions do not necessarily translate into action. Research had found that people 
working towards health goals were not succeeding or were making slow progress 
because they employed compensatory beliefs to justify succumbing to desires that 
conflicted with their health goals. A compensatory belief is the belief that the negative 
consequences of one action can be compensated for by another action.  
This research investigated whether, when, why and how compensatory beliefs may be 
used in relation to environmental behaviours. This research began with exploratory 
qualitative work using cognitive and semi-structured interviews. These findings were 
then followed up by experimental work. Study 2 found that participants who reflected 
on their negative environmental behaviours expressed significantly stronger 
(compensatory) intentions to be pro-environmental than participants who reflected on 
their positive environmental behaviours. Studies 3-5 explored the influence of 
behavioural history on compensation and licensing across a series of scenarios using 
vignettes. Evidence was found that participants balanced environmental (or pro-social) 
interests with self-interest. Study 6 looked at the effects of goal saliency and construal 
on compensatory behaviours, finding that, participants who inferred good progress were 
more motivated to be pro-environmental. Overall, the research provides some evidence 
(albeit equivocal) of compensation and licensing in relation to environmental 
behaviours. The findings as a whole suggest that prompting feelings of environmental 
guilt is not an advisable strategy to engage people in pro-environmental behaviour. In 
contrast, prompting people to reflect on their existing pro-environmental behaviours or 
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The present thesis is concerned with how people resolve dilemmas that arise when their 
goals (e.g., to be pro-environmental) conflict with their more immediate desires (e.g., to 
take the car, rather than cycle). Specifically, this thesis investigated whether people use 
compensatory beliefs to justify acting counter to their pro-environmental goals. A 
compensatory belief is the belief that the negative consequences of one action can be 
compensated for by another action.  
Study 1 used exploratory qualitative methods to investigate whether, when, why and 
how compensation is used in relation to environmental behaviours. It was found that 
participants used compensatory beliefs: 1) in order to reduce feelings of guilt with 
respect to their (assumed or actual) negative environmental impacts, and; 2) to defend 
their green credentials in social situations. Whether participants considered the use of 
compensatory beliefs to be acceptable depended on moral and social norms and the 
personal cost of the behaviour. Furthermore, the results suggested that the relatively low 
endorsement of compensatory beliefs found by a previous survey study (Kaklamanou, 
Jones, Webb, & Walker, 2015) could at least in part be attributed to differences between 
the way in which participants expressed compensatory beliefs and the way in which 
they were phrased in the measure.  
Based on these findings and the extant literature, Study 2 predicted that people who 
reflected on their negative environmental behaviours would feel motivated to 
compensate, while people who reflected on their positive environmental behaviours 
would feel licensed to undertake negative (i.e., desirable but environmentally 
detrimental) behaviours. Participants provided a written reflection on their 
environmentally significant behaviours after which they were offered the opportunity to: 
1) indicate their intentions to be pro-environmental in future, and 2) volunteer for an 
environmental charity. The analyses found that participants in the guilt condition 
reported significantly stronger (compensatory) intentions than other participants. 
However, no significant differences between conditions were found with respect to 
willingness to volunteer.  
Research into moral balancing suggests that engaging in an ethical or unethical 
behaviour at one point in time reduces the likelihood of subsequently engaging in that 
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behaviour. For example, having just recycled someone may be less likely to also 
conserve water. Studies 3 to 5 used a novel experimental paradigm based on the work of 
Zhong, Ku, Lount, and Murnigham (2010). Vignettes were developed to explore 
compensating and licensing effects across different environmental scenarios. It was 
hypothesised that a “flip-flopping” pattern would emerge if participants indeed 
alternated between more and less pro-environmental decisions. After controlling for the 
extent of participants’ green identities this pattern was identified in Study 3.  
Because Study 3 was quasi experimental (i.e., participants were divided into conditions 
based on their response to the first scenario), Study 4 manipulated participants’ first 
choice by asking them to imagine recycling or failing to do so. It was hypothesised that 
participants’ subsequent choice would contrast with their first choice. However, no 
significant association between the first (imagined) choice and subsequent choice was 
found. Study 5 investigated whether the nature of the scenarios influenced whether and 
to what extent compensating and licensing would be seen. The data, however, did not 
support this hypothesis and neither Study 4 nor 5 replicated the “flip-flopping” pattern 
found in Study 3.  
Study 6 investigated the effects of perceived progress toward goals on licensing and 
compensation. Research by Fishbach, Dhar, and Zhang (2006) led to a number of 
predictions including that compensation would be found among participants for whom 
non-environmental goals were salient and who inferred that they were making poor 
progress towards environmental goals. Unfortunately, it appeared that the manipulation 
of goal saliency was overridden by the progress manipulation (list 3 or 12 pro-
environmental behaviours) making environmental goals salient for all participants. This 
made it difficult to test a number of hypotheses. Nonetheless, Study 6 found that 
participants who inferred that they were making good progress (and presumably, for 
whom, the environment had been made salient by reflecting on their pro-environmental 
behaviours) did not show licensing effects but rather expressed significantly stronger 
intentions to be pro-environmental in future (positive spillover effect).  
Overall, the research described in this thesis provides some evidence (albeit equivocal) 
of compensation and licensing in relation to environmental behaviours. Compensatory 
justifications were elicited by asking participants to reflect on how their behaviours had 
harmed the environment (Studies 1 and 2). Furthermore, evidence of “flip-flopping” 
effects were found in Study 3. In line with the wider literature it appears that 
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compensatory beliefs are associated with feelings of guilt. The findings as a whole 
suggest that prompting feelings of environmental guilt is not an advisable strategy to 
engage people in pro-environmental behaviour. While guilt may prompt a reparative 
action it can also prompt compensatory beliefs and justifications which may be 
inaccurate or not translated into action – thereby, increasing risk to the environment. 
The studies do, however, suggest that prompting people to reflect on their existing pro-
environmental behaviours or to imagine how they would feel after engaging in 
environmental action motivates environmental goals. Therefore, this may be a more 
fruitful avenue for intervention than prompting people to feel guilty about their 







1. Chapter 1 – Setting the scene: can insights from 
health psychology help to inform environmental 
psychology? 
This chapter will broadly set out the context of this thesis research. First, the chapter 
will provide the reader with a basic overview of why the environment is an important 
area for research and, more specifically, why the interplay between humans and the 
environment is an important area for psychological research. It will be argued that 
psychology not only provides insights into why humans cause harm to the environment 
but can also help to better understand the drivers and barriers to engagement in pro-
environmental behaviours. The second part of the chapter will focus on why people 
engage in some pro-environmental behaviours but not others. In short, the question of 
why people are inconsistently pro-environmental will be addressed.  
Finally, the chapter will focus on “compensatory beliefs” – a form of justification for 
engaging in ostensibly harmful behaviours that has been identified within health 
psychology.  The question will be posed as to whether insights into compensatory 
beliefs from health psychology could usefully be employed within environmental 
psychology to better understand why there is a gap between the environmental values 
and intentions expressed by people and how they actually behave. Following on from 
this existing research on ‘compensatory green beliefs’ – namely the “idea that the 
positive consequences of proenvironmental behaviors (e.g., switching to a “green” 
energy tariff) can somehow compensate for the negative consequences of energy-
inefficient or unsustainable behaviors” (or vice versa) will be explored in some detail 
(Kaklamanou, Jones, Webb, & Walker, 2015, p. 3).  
1.1. Environmental challenges and the need for behavioural change 
Human demands for resources are resulting in serious and negative environmental 
impacts including deforestation, pollution and climate change (IPCC, 2014). There is 
serious concern for the future survival of many animal and plant species. Furthermore, 
changing global temperatures also pose a threat to people, particularly, those living in 
poverty who are less equipped to adapt to a changing climate (for example see IUCN, 
2013; Renton, 2009). Because of the scale of the climate change problem international 
action is required to keep warming below two degrees Celsius – a temperature ceiling 
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that is taken to offer hope of avoiding the most serious impacts of climate change 
(European Commission, 2014).1 Within Europe, for example, the European Commission 
has undertaken a number of initiatives to limit carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and 
promote electricity from renewable sources (e.g., solar power) (European Commission, 
2014). Both Member States and the European Community are acting to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as required by the Kyoto Protocol.2 Within the UK 
the government  has set ambitious targets for the national reduction of GHGs, including 
a 34% reduction by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels) 
(2008 Climate Change Act).  
In order to effectively reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions action is required at all 
levels of society – from global corporations to individual citizens. Lifestyle choices, 
particularly, within more economically developed countries are increasingly resource 
intensive. For example, it has been estimated that the ecological footprint per person in 
the UK is 5.4 global hectares. To put this into perspective – if people globally were to 
live like people in the UK then three planets would be required to support the demands 
made by their lifestyles (WWF, 2006).3  In terms of per capita ecological footprint (i.e., 
the number of global hectares demanded per person), Kuwait, Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates are in the top three – being the most resource intensive countries. In 
contrast countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Bangladesh and Timor-Leste are actually 
below the World average bio-capacity (i.e., consuming less than a ‘one-earth’ share of 
resources) (WWF, 2015).  
The resource and energy demands resulting from lifestyles are wide ranging. Within the 
UK, for example, the domestic sector has grown to become the largest electricity 
consumer (113.5 TWh) (DECC, 2014). Furthermore, without intervention this high 
                                                 
1 Plans to achieve a two degree temperature ceiling were drawn up at the Cancun Agreements in 2010 and 
further fleshed out in Durban in 2011. For further details please see: 
http://unfccc.int/key_steps/cancun_agreements/items/6132.php  
2 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement associated with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change which commits its Parties to internationally binding carbon reduction 
targets. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 and entered into force in 2005. For 
further information please refer to the online resources provided by the United Nations: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
3 For over 40 years human demands on natural resources have exceeded the capacity of the planet to 
replenish resources and absorb waste. For further information about ecological footprints and how these 
vary by country please see: 
http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/living_planet_report/ecological_footprint/  




demand is likely to continue because of technological developments, economic growth 
and demographic and institutional factors (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 
2005, p. 274; Faiers, Cook, & Neame, 2007). Within the UK final and direct domestic 
energy use includes: space heating (58%); water heating (24%); lighting and appliances 
(18%) (Adam Faiers et al., 2007). Domestic travel accounted for 25% of UK CO2 
emissions (Committee on Climate Change, 2014).  However, this is still not the 
complete picture. Direct energy use (e.g. gas, electric and motor fuel) actually only 
accounts for around 50% of the total energy demanded by consumers. Significant 
energy use and associated GHG emissions are also being generated by indirect energy 
use such as the embodied energy required to manufacture, transport, distribute and 
dispose of the goods demanded by the public (Kok, Benders, & Moll, 2006; Steg & 
Vlek, 2009). Considering these facts it is perhaps unsurprising that one of the main 
conclusions reached at the Rio Earth Summit4 in 1992 was that “altering consumption 
patterns is one of humanity’s greatest challenges in the quest for environmentally sound 
and sustainable development” (Sitarz, 1994, p. 39 as quoted by Thogersen, 1999).  
While scientific understanding of environmental issues is rapidly advancing, actual 
behavioural change has been slow to follow, with interventions designed to encourage 
better environmental behaviours, often having mixed results (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013).  
The impetus, therefore, for those working to manage and reduce carbon emissions (e.g., 
policy makers, corporations etc.) is on how to better understand and promote pro-
environmental behaviours. Pro-environmental behaviours are defined as behaviours 
which seek to minimise the negative effects of our actions on the natural and built 
environments (see, Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 240) or which benefit the 
environment in some way (e.g., tree planting) (Steg & Vlek, 2009). As outlined 
previously, the energy and resource demands of individuals are not just direct (e.g., in 
terms of gas or motor fuel) but also indirect (e.g., in terms of the embodied energy to 
manufacture and dispose of goods). In order, therefore, to reduce both direct and 
                                                 
4 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) informally known as The 
Earth Summit took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, twenty years after the first global environment 
conference (UN Conference on the Human Environment, 1972). The aim of the Earth Summit was to re-
think economic development in order to take into account impacts on the environment. The Summit lead 
to the adoption of Agenda 21 – a programme for global action for more sustainable development which 
included proposals to address poverty and better manage agriculture and oceans. The Rio Declaration was 
also made at the Summit. This Declaration on Environment and Development constituted a series of 




indirect carbon emissions and other GHGs associated with individual’s lifestyles it will 
be necessary to address a wide range of behaviours.   
The remainder of this chapter will focus on providing an overview of some of the main 
theories about human engagement in pro-environmental behaviours and also on why it 
is that people may be (in)consistently pro-environmental.  
1.2. Understanding engagement in pro-environmental behaviours  
In order to effectively promote the adoption and sustained undertaking of pro-
environmental behaviours, it is advantageous to have a good understanding both of why 
people choose to engage in pro-environmental behaviours and of the factors which may 
promote or prevent behavioural change. A large number of theories from a variety of 
disciplines have been developed in order to address this question but no definitive 
answers have been reached (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Nonetheless, while it is true 
that no one theory is able to provide a complete picture, each provides a lens through 
which to better understand engagement in pro-environmental behaviours. Because 
research on the psycho-social determinants of pro-environmental behaviour is, in fact, 
so extensive only a few of the main works from psychology can be discussed here. The 
reader is, therefore, directed to refer to other sources for a more detailed overview of 
this field such as:  Hines, Hungerford, and Tomera (1987), Bamberg and Möser (2007) 
and Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002).   
In explaining pro-environmental behaviour, theoretical models developed within 
psychology have tended to place emphasis either on self-interest and rational choice or 
alternatively on pro-social theories. Researchers who view pro-environmental behaviour 
as being primarily pro-socially motivated frequently refer to Schwartz’s 1977 ‘Norm 
Activation Model’ (NAM) or the Value-Belief-Norm model (an extension of the NAM) 
(Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). In contrast researchers who view 
self-interest (or ‘rational choice’) as the primary motivator of pro-environmental 
behaviour may favour the ‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’ developed by Ajzen (1991) 
(for further discussion see: Bamberg & Möser, 2007 ). This trend has, however, begun 
to change as a number of researchers have worked to integrate rational and value-based 
accounts of pro-environmental behaviour (for example, Bamberg & Möser, 2007; 
Haarland, Staats, & Wilke, 1999; Kaiser, Hübner, & Bogner, 2005). Bamberg and 
Möser (2007), for instance, argue that pro-environmental behaviour is best understood 
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as a combination of self-interest (e.g. conserving energy in order to save money) and 
concern for others including, for example, future generations or other species. The 
following sections will map out these trends within psychological research showing 
how theories used to explain pro-environmental behaviours have been developed and 
refined. It will be argued that because of the complexity of pro-environmental behaviour 
models which incorporate rational models and self-interest along with pro-social models 
(which emphasise norms and values) may best explain behaviour. 
 The following theories will be discussed:  
 Rational Choice 
o The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 
o The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
o The Model of Responsible Environmental Behaviour  
 Prosocial models 
o The Norm Activation Model (NAM)  
o The Value-Belief-Norm Model (VBN)  
 Integrative Models (combining rational and pro-social factors)  
1.2.1. Review of rational choice models  
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, 1980) has three main 
premises which are as follows: 1) the TRA is concerned with predicting reasoned 
behaviour (by which it is meant that individuals are aware of the consequences of their 
behaviour and deliberately chose to perform the behaviour); 2) that the behaviour is 
volitional (i.e., the individual acts freely); 3) that the theory is “sufficient” –  meaning 
that all relevant variables for behaviour are incorporated in or mediated by the variables 
included in the model (Staats, 2003). The TRA is comprised of four main concepts 
namely, attitude, subjective norm, behavioural intention and behaviour.  
The TRA proposes that an attitude to a behaviour is caused by beliefs about behavioural 
outcomes and weighted by an evaluation of those behavioural outcomes. For example, 
someone might want to go and volunteer to plant trees for an environmental charity. 
Volunteering will give the person exercise and the opportunity to meet new people but 
it will also take up all of their Saturday meaning that they cannot help their housemate 
clean the house. Considering the likelihood of getting exercise and making friends (both 
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very positive prospective outcomes) the person may decide that the cleaning can be 
postponed until Sunday. In addition to behavioural outcomes, subjective norms are also 
seen to play an important role in determining behaviour. Behavioural norms are 
composed of normative beliefs and the motivation to comply. To use the same example, 
the person may take into consideration: a) whether their housemate would approve of 
them going out all Saturday to plant trees rather than helping with housework, and b) 
the extent to which their housemates’ opinion actually matters.  Behavioural intentions, 
themselves, are seen to be the antecedents of behaviour founded on attitudes and 
subjective norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, 1980; Fishbein, 1980; Madden, Scholder, & 
Ajzen, 1992). 
Ajzen and Fishbein precisely defined how the TRA should be applied (see Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1977, 1980). In short, they prescribed that the model should be applied very 
specifically in order to achieve a high correspondence between action, target, context 
and time (Staats, 2003). For example, if one was to investigate recycling using the TRA 
then all concepts in the theory should be specifically about recycling (i.e., intention to 
recycle, attitude towards recycling etc.).  Accuracy of prediction is also enhanced by 
shortening the lapse of time between intention formation and action (the greater the gap 
and the less likely it is that the person will act) and by assessing the extent to which an 
individual has volitional control over the behaviour (Madden et al., 1992).  
The Theory of Planned Behaviour: Ajzen (1985) builds on the Theory of Reasoned 
Action by including the premise of volitional control (Staats, 2003). In short, whether 
someone intends to act pro-environmentally and actually does so is not only dependent 
on their attitude to the behaviour (e.g., whether they view recycling positively) and by 
subjective norms relating to the behaviour (e.g., beliefs about whether important others 
approve of recycling and whether recycling is deemed to be easy) but also by whether 
the person feels they have the necessary resources and opportunities to act (Madden et 
al., 1992).  
Perceived behavioural control is seen to operate in three main ways (see Figure 1 
below). First, when considering a behaviour (e.g., trying to break a world record) a 
person is likely to take into account whether the behaviour is achievable. If the 
behaviour is deemed unachievable (e.g., the person lacks the resources or physical 
capacity to break the world record) it is assumed that an intention will not be formed. 
Perceived behavioural control is, therefore, not only seen to interact with intentions 
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(dashed line 2) but also to directly relate to behaviour (dashed line 1) (Staats, 2003). 
Second, it should be noted that actual control may not be equal to perceived control 
leading to inaction. For example, a person might intend to recycle but once they 
discover that the recycling facilities involve a long walk they may decide that they are 
unable to act after all. Thirdly, therefore, perceived behavioural control is important. 
Someone might realise that in order to perform a complex behaviour (e.g., learning a 
new language) that they will need to invest a significant amount of time, money and 
effort over the course of many months. If the person does not feel that they can invest 
the necessary resources in this exercise they may not act on their intention. In short, the 
inclusion of perceived behavioural control has been seen to significantly improve both 
the prediction of intention and actual pro-environmental behaviour (Madden et al., 
1992) meaning that the TPB is now more widely used than the TRA (Staats, 2003).     
 
Figure 1: The Theory of Planned Behaviour as set out by Ajzen (1991) 
It should be noted that both the TRA and the TPB place a strong emphasis on the 
individual costs and benefits of acting pro-environmentally. Whether someone acts pro-
environmentally or otherwise is seen to be the result of a calculation of the extent to 
which acting would be personally beneficial (e.g., whether one would enjoy recycling or 
whether one would gain social approval by recycling). The TPB assumes that other 
factors such as values, habits or demographics influence behaviour only indirectly via 
attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. While the TPB has been 
used to explain various types of behaviour (e.g., car use), studies have found that the 
predictive power of the TPB is increased when other motivational predictors are also 
included (Steg, Van den Berg, & De Groot, 2013). Haarland et al. (1999), for instance, 
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found that the addition of personal norms5 increased the proportion of explained 
variance. This shows that while the TPB helps us to better understand and predict pro-
environmental behaviour other factors are also likely to be responsible for influencing 
the complex and diverse set of behaviours described as being “pro-environmental”.  
The Theory of Planned Behaviour has been further developed by a number of other 
researchers with the aim of better explaining the determinants of pro-environmental 
behaviour. For example, Hines et al. (1987) developed their Model of Responsible 
Environmental Behaviour using the TPB (see discussion by Kollmuss & Agyeman, 
2002). Hines and colleagues conducted an in-depth meta-analysis of 128 empirical 
studies focusing on environmental behaviours. The majority of the reviewed studies 
focused on the relationship between pro-environmental behaviour and socio-structural 
variables, while a limited number considered the relationship between psycho-social 
variables including attitude, locus of control and moral responsibility (Bamberg & 
Möser, 2007). The research enabled Hines and colleagues to develop a more 
sophisticated model to determine which variables may have the greatest influence in 
motivating pro-environmental behaviours. The following variables were found to be of 
particular importance (see Hines et al., 1987; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 243): 
 Knowledge: in order to respond to an issue people need to be conversant with 
the causes and equipped with the knowledge of how to respond appropriately.   
 Locus of control: people need to feel that they can bring about the required 
change in order to be motivated to act.  
 Attitudes: people with pro-environmental attitudes are more likely to engage in 
pro-environmental behaviours.  
 Verbal commitments: once someone has publically expressed a willingness to 
undertake an action, they are more likely to follow through with the action (e.g., 
because they feel morally accountable to others).  
 Responsibility:  the more responsible people feel for an environmental issue, 
the more likely they are to engage in an environmentally responsible behaviour.  
Hines and colleagues argue, therefore, that in order to act pro-environmentally people 
need to be well informed, feel empowered to act and feel that acting is of some value. 
                                                 
5 “Personal norms” refer to an individual’s beliefs about their moral obligation to take pro-environmental 
action (Steg et al., 2013; Stern, 2000).  
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Being aware of the environmental impacts of behaviours may help motivate individuals 
to take responsibility for their actions, while making a public commitment to do so may 
help to promote feelings of accountability.  
1.2.2. Altruism, empathy, and prosocial models 
Altruism, empathy and pro-social6 models provide another framework by which to 
understand engagement in pro-environmental behaviours. In the models discussed 
above, individuals were seen to act rationally in line with assessments about the most 
personally beneficial course of action. Short term rational decisions which benefit the 
individual, however, (e.g., driving rather than using public transport because it’s more 
convenient) present a social dilemma to the extent that the behaviour may come at the 
expense of others (e.g., contributing to air pollution). However, what these models 
largely neglect is the fact that people do engage in pro-environmental behaviours 
despite their personal cost (Haarland et al., 1999). For example, someone might abstain 
from air travel or from eating meat in order to reduce their carbon emissions or they 
might invest time in sorting waste for recycling in order to reduce landfill. Such actions 
can be described as pro-social or altruistic because they are of benefit to society at large 
rather than to the individual (Lindenberg & Steg, 2013; Steg et al., 2013). The extent to 
which individuals subscribe to altruistic or self-transcendent values (as opposed to 
egocentric/self-interested values) has been found to be positively associated with their 
likelihood of engaging in pro-environmental behaviour (Steg & Vlek, 2009; Stern, 
2000).  
The role of moral obligations in promoting pro-environmental behaviours are explored 
in the following prosocial theories which are discussed below: 
 The Norm Activation Model (NAM) 
 The Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) Model 
 Put simply, the basic premise of the Norm Activation Model 7 is that personal or moral 
norms are the direct determinants of pro-social behaviour. The theory proposes that 
                                                 
6 Pro-social behaviour is defined here as a voluntary and intentional behaviour that benefits another, the 
motive for which is unspecified and may be positive or negative (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).  
7 The Norm Activation Model was proposed by Schwartz (1977) and further developed by Schwartz and 
Howard (1981) and tested by Steg and De Groot (2010). 
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personal norms are activated by four variables. The first of these variables is problem 
awareness. Before a person can act on an environmental issue they first need to know 
that there is an issue (e.g., that there is localised air pollution). Second, the person needs 
to feel a sense of personal responsibility for the problem (e.g., that their driving is 
contributing to local air pollution). The third variable is outcome efficacy, namely the 
ability to identify an appropriate course of action in response to the problem (e.g., to use 
the tram rather than driving). Fourth, the person requires self-efficacy and recognise that 
they can do something to help solve the problem.  
Like the NAM, the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory (Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, 
Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999) also focuses on moral obligations to act pro-
environmentally. The VBN theory links a person’s ecological worldview8 and 
environmental values with the NAM theory outlined briefly above.  
Stern et al. (1999) draw together the findings from the wider literature to argue that a 
number of factors are important determinants of pro-environmental behaviours and 
more specifically of environmental activism and citizenship, policy support and private 
sphere behaviours (e.g., conserving energy).  Stern at al. (1999) present a causal chain 
of factors predicting environmentalism which include the following variables:   
1. First in the chain is values. Three value orientations are seen to be important, 
namely, biospheric values (altruism towards other species), egoistic values (self-
interest) and altruism directed at humans. In an earlier paper, Stern, Dietz, and 
Kalof (1993) provide some further insights into the role of these three value 
types on pro-environmental behaviours arguing that all three are present in 
individuals to varying extents. However, the extent to which any one value 
predominates within an individual is likely to shape their motivation to engage 
in environmental behaviours. It should be noted that egoistic values may 
sometimes motivate pro-environmental behaviour but will only tend to do so 
when acting pro-environmentally is seen to be in the individuals best interest 
(e.g., when taking the train rather than the car is perceived to be more relaxing or 
cost effective).  
                                                 
8 Ecological worldview is measured by the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale developed by (Dunlap, 
Kent, Mertig, & Jones, 2000).  
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2. Second in the chain come beliefs. These beliefs include a persons’ ecological 
worldview, for example, the extent to which they believe that the environment 
has intrinsic value or to which they believe that human behaviour is causing 
environmental damage (usually measured by the New Ecological Paradigm 
Scale scale). Beliefs about the negative consequences of human behaviour on the 
environment and about an individual’s own responsibility for having caused 
detrimental impacts on the environment are also seen to be important in 
predicting behaviour.  
3.  Third in the chain are personal norms which have an important role and directly 
affect how support for the environment is manifested (i.e., as activism, 
citizenship, policy support or private sphere behaviours). 
 In this chain of variables each individual variable is seen to strongly relate to the one’s 
to which it is directly attached.  The model is illustrated below in Figure 2:  
 
Figure 2: Schematic Model of the variables in the Value-Belief-Norm Model. (Image 
sourced from Stern et al., 1999, p. 84) 
Both the Norm Activation Model and the Value Belief Norm models have been used 
successfully to explain a range of low cost pro-environmental behaviours including 
energy conservation (Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985), reduced car use (Abrahamse, 
Steg, Gifford, & Vlek, 2009) and also political behaviour (Gärling, Fujii, Gärling, & 
Jakobsson, 2003). The NAM, however, has been far poorer in explaining engagement in 
high cost pro-environmental actions (Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). In this respect 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour has been found to be superior in predicting pro-
environmental behaviour (Steg & Vlek, 2009) 
16 
 
1.2.3. Integrating rational and pro-social models 
A number of researchers have attempted to draw together and integrate the concepts and 
variables from the different theories explaining pro-environmental behaviour. The first 
study combining the TPB with personal norms was conducted by Haarland et al. (1999). 
Haarland and colleagues set out to investigate why attitude appeared to be a stronger 
predictor of intention than did subjective norms. They hypothesised that personal norms 
(i.e., internalised values) might lay behind the predictive power of attitude and 
furthermore that inclusion of personal norms in the model would increase understanding 
of environmental behaviours. The study included 305 Dutch citizens who had enlisted 
to participate in a behavioural change study. The reason for having a pro-environmental 
sample was that people enlisted in a program designed to help them live more pro-
environmentally ought to have activated personal norms to perform environmental 
behaviours (Haarland et al., 1999). The study confirmed that personal norms did in fact 
increase the proportion of variance explained by the TPB. 
Kaiser (2006) also brought rational and pro-social models together by combining the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour with moral considerations. The results of the cross-
sectional survey study involving 1394 German residents was that the inclusion of affect 
(in this case - anticipated guilt) did uniquely and significantly contribute to the 
explanatory power of intention increasing the proportion of explained variance to 
between 70-92% (Kaiser, 2006). It should be noted, however, that even when moral 
considerations are not explicitly addressed the TPB is still capable of accounting for a 
large proportion of variance in pro-environmental behaviours and that adding a moral 
dimension merely slightly increases the model’s power (Kaiser, 2006). Evidence shows 
that there is considerable overlap between attitudes and moral norms meaning that 
people’s attitudes to the environment are determined by their moral and altruistic norms 
(Kaiser, 2006; Kaiser & Scheuthle, 2003).  
Bamberg and Möser (2007) replicated and further developed the work by Hines et al. 
(1987) (see, Model of Responsible Environmental Behaviour discussed above). While 
Hines et al. (1987) increased the complexity of the TPB by including additional 
variables, Bamberg and Möser (2007, pp. 243-244) argue that the associations between 
knowledge and attitudes, attitudes and intentions and intentions and behaviour are still 
weak. In other words, many more factors seem to influence pro-environmental 
behaviour. Taking a theory-driven multivariate meta-analytical approach to 57 studies 
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dated between 1995 and 2006, Bamberg and Möser (2007) estimated the predictive 
power of various factors in explaining pro-environmental behaviour. The study 
provided evidence supporting the work of Hines et al. (1987) and confirmed that pro-
environmental behavioural intention mediates the impacts of the other psycho-social 
variables on behaviour (27% of variance explained). Furthermore, the study established 
that in addition to attitude and behavioural control, moral norms were a predictor of 
behavioural intention (52% of variance explained). While problem awareness was 
important, it was found that its effects were indirect – operating via moral and social 
norms, guilt and attribution processes.  
Goal Framing Theory, developed by Lindenberg & Steg (2007), also attempts to 
integrate different theories about engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. Goal 
Framing Theory proposes that goals ‘frame’ the way in which people process and then 
act upon information.  Lindenberg & Steg (2007) propose that there are three goal 
frames: 1) hedonic goals (e.g., “to feel better now”), 2) gain goals (e.g., “to guard one’s 
resources”) and, 3) normative goals (e.g., “to act appropriately”). The theory further 
proposes that multiple goals may be active at any one time. The currently activated goal 
is known as the ‘goal frame’ and this may be strengthened or weakened depending on 
whether the background goals complement or conflict with the goal frame. It can be 
seen that the three goal frames correspond with other psychological theories explaining 
pro-environmental behaviour. For example, models focusing on affect correspond with 
hedonic goals, the TPB corresponds with gain goals and the NAM and VBN correspond 
with normative goals (Steg et al., 2013). The theory, therefore, offers an integrative 
framework for understanding pro-environmental behaviour. 
The research briefly outlined above helps to address the possible imbalance in earlier 
models by showing that both self-interest and pro-social motives have an important role 
in explaining pro-environmental behaviour.  In short, including pro-social and 
moralistic factors has been found to promote a better understanding of people’s 
engagement in pro-environmental behaviours. 
1.2.4. Summary  
To summarise, from this brief review of some of the main theories explaining 
intentional engagement in pro-environmental behaviour it can be seen that engagement 
is dependent upon complex personal, social and contextual factors. Furthermore, it can 
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be seen that many of the theories have aspects in common. For example, individual 
differences such as outlook (e.g., egoistic orientation), knowledge, values and feelings 
of responsibility along with social (normative beliefs) and contextual factors are likely 
to combine to influence the extent to which an individual is willing and able to engage 
in pro-environmental action. 
The models of pro-environmental behaviour can be seen to fall into two broad 
categories, namely, those which are rational-choice-based models such as the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour and those which include moral norms as a separate predictor of pro-
environmental behaviour such as the Value, Belief Norm Model. More recently, 
research has attempted to combine these two models in order to try and more effectively 
predict engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. Nonetheless, even models that 
recognise morals do not account for all variance in behaviour – indeed, people seem to 
engage in some behaviours but not in others. People may be better informed about the 
environmental consequences of some behaviours, for example, but not others or may 
knowingly trade-off one action with another. The reasons for these seemingly 
inconsistent environmental behaviours are explored in section 1.3 below.   
1.3. Behavioural inconsistency 
The theoretical frameworks discussed above all attempt to explain the gap between 
people’s environmental awareness, values and attitudes and their actual undertaking of 
pro-environmental behaviours. In short, these models help to explain why people 
undertake some behaviours (e.g., recycling) but not others (e.g., cycling) or may engage 
in environmental behaviours but irregularly (e.g., only when doing so is easy). This is 
problematic because in order to make significant reductions to the energy and resource 
intensity of peoples’ lifestyles it is essential that a wide range of pro-environmental 
behaviours are adopted and integrated into people’s lifestyles. An important objective 
for policy makers, therefore, has been to identify the most effective methods and 
behaviours to promote environmentally sustainable lifestyles:  
We need to promote a range of behaviours as entry points in helping different 
groups to make their lifestyles more sustainable – including catalytic (or 
“wedge”) behaviours. (DEFRA, 2007, p. 22)  
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One popular idea has been that of “positive spillover” – the idea that certain behaviours 
may be carried over from one area of life or activity to another (Austin, Cox, Barnett, & 
Thomas, 2011). For example, it might be anticipated that introducing a recycling 
scheme at work might induce employees to also recycle at home. There are a number of 
theories which lead us to expect ‘spillover’ effects. Research has shown, for example, 
that people generally desire to act consistently (e.g., Bem, 1967; Festinger, 1957). We 
would expect, therefore, that someone who has sorted and recycled their waste at work 
might experience dissonance (e.g., guilt) if they then go home only to dispose of the 
very same materials with the general waste. Studies have shown that in order to avoid 
unwelcome feelings of dissonance an individual might change their behaviour in order 
to achieve consistency with their values (e.g., Thøgersen & Ölander, 2006). It has also 
been found, for example, that having conceded to a relatively undemanding request 
(e.g., placing an advert in one’s window) that people are subsequently far more likely to 
concede to a far more demanding request (e.g., erecting a large sign in one’s garden). 
This behavioural change technique known as a “foot in the door” approach (Freedman 
& Fraser, 1966) suggests that people have a preference for acting consistently.  
It is likely that the person who observes that they are undertaking increasingly 
demanding steps for a cause goes on to infer that they must be very committed to the 
cause, thus, shaping their self-perception (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Someone, for 
example, who saves energy in their home and subsequently invests in a solar panel, may 
deduce that: a) they have a positive attitude to the environment, and b) that having 
undertaken these actions signifies that they are a pro-environmental person. Indeed, 
coming to see oneself as “pro-environmental” has itself been found to be an important 
antecedent of behaviour change (e.g., Sparks & Shepherd, 1992). Furthermore, simply 
taking an initial action may serve to enhance a person’s perception of their own self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1977). Having succeeded in recycling once, for instance, a person 
may infer that not only are they able to recycle again but they can also manage their 
green waste by composting.  Finally, increased knowledge (e.g., Thøgersen, 1999) and 
the development of personal (moral) norms (see, Schwartz, 1977) have been seen as 
important in developing consistent behaviours. Participating in recycling, for example, 
could increase a person’s awareness of waste related issues (e.g., pollution) and feelings 
of personal responsibility resulting in them taking further actions (e.g., buying loose 
rather than packaged vegetables); while undertaking pro-environmental actions may 
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also make environmental concerns more salient and eventually lead to habitual 
behaviours (Meijers, Noordewier, & Avramova, 2014). 
There is some evidence providing insight into the possible mechanisms behind 
spillover.  For example, the adoption of one new behaviour has been found to encourage 
the uptake of other new behaviour. For instance, following the introduction of traffic 
congestion charging in Stockholm it was found that the policy not only directly 
mitigated traffic congestion but also affected other pro-environmental behaviours, such 
as, increasing energy and resource conservation (Kaida & Kaida, 2014). Perhaps having 
a greater awareness of the impacts of their commuting habits also made people consider 
other ways their lifestyles were adversely affecting the environment (Kaida & Kaida, 
2014). Studies also suggest that existing behaviours may result in spillover effects. A 
study of 1,450 UK households, for instance, found self-reported increases in waste 
prevention activities over the course of two years, with 50% of participants accounting 
for the change as a ‘natural step’ i.e., a behavioural spillover (Tucker & Douglas, 2007).  
Situational factors are a third potential mechanism for spillover, with behaviours in one 
domain influencing those in another domain – as illustrated by the example of recycling 
described above (see, Rashid & Mohammad, 2012).  
While, there are good theoretical reasons to expect positive spillover, in practice, quite 
the opposite effects are sometimes seen (Austin et al., 2011). “Negative spillover” 
describes the phenomenon whereby engaging in one pro-environmental behaviour 
actually decreases the likelihood of someone performing a subsequent pro-
environmental behaviour (Truelove, Carrico, Weber, & Raimi, 2014). The mechanisms 
or catalysts which determine whether positive or negative spillover occur are currently 
not well understood making it difficult to design effective interventions to promote pro-
environmental behaviours (see Austin et al., 2011).  Furthermore, relatively little 
research has been undertaken to directly test for negative spillover with much of the 
reported evidence being generated as side effects of main studies (for reviews see, 
Austin et al., 2011; Truelove et al., 2014). A number of theories are currently in use to 
explain the phenomenon of negative spillover including neo-classical economic theories 
such as  rebound (Jevons, 1865; Sorrell, 2009) and psychological mechanisms such as 
moral licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) which can be seen as a type of justification for 
desirable but environmentally detrimental actions. Compensatory beliefs have also been 
proposed as a specific type of justification – allowing people to reason that they can 
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undertake fewer pro-environmental behaviours on the basis that they have acted, or 
indeed, could act pro-environmentally in the future to compensate (Kaklamanou, Jones, 
Webb, & Walker, 2015). Currently, further research is required to better understand the 
specific mechanisms (psychological and/or economic) which underlie positive and 
negative spillover effects in order that more effective behavioural interventions may be 
designed. At present it is uncertain, for example, the circumstances under which one 
pro-environmental behaviour will encourage or inhibit another. 
The following sections will provide an overview of some of the main theories and 
mechanisms which attempt to explain negative spillover effects, namely: 
 Economic Theory: Rebound Effects 
 Psychological Mechanisms:  
o Licensing Effects 
o Entitlement to Reward 
o Prior Restraint  
o Prior Success or Failure  
o Compensatory Beliefs  
A more in-depth overview of the literature on Compensatory Beliefs will be provided 
because: 1) extensive research within health psychology has associated Compensatory 
Beliefs with slow or unsuccessful goal attainment, and 2) because Compensatory 
Beliefs are a relatively new and unexplored potential psychological mechanism 
underlying rebound effects.  
1.3.1. Rebound, a neo-classical economic account of negative spillover 
The roots of the ‘rebound’ debate lie in a work produced by Jevons (1865) entitled: The 
Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and the Probable 
Exhaustion of our Coal-mines. Jevons’s claim was that more efficient steam engines 
would not result in the more economical use of fuel but would actually accelerate 
overall coal consumption. Jevons considered the case of the early Savery engine which 
was intended to pump water from mines. Initially the Savery engine had required so 
much coal to run that it was impractical. However, once steam engine design was 
improved the technology became viable. This allowed for more coal to be extracted 
more economically, thus reducing the price of coal. Lower priced coal was then used in 
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a range of other steam engines including those which pumped air into furnaces. This in 
turn meant that less coal was required to make iron, thus, reducing the cost of iron 
production and, thereby, making it more economical to produce even more steam 
engines. The increased efficiency of the mine pumps could be seen to creating a positive 
feedback cycle (Sorrell, 2009). Jevon’s argument, therefore, was that increasing 
efficiency accelerated demand meaning that overall coal consumption was vastly 
increased.  
More recently, ecologically orientated economists have raised concerns over 
environmental sustainability strategies which focus on efficiency gains (Alcott, 2005). 
The concern is basically the same – namely that efficient equipment designed to reduce 
energy consumption will also lower energy prices, eventually lowering the cost of 
making or using the equipment or services and making it more economical to increase 
production or use. For example, an individual may be able to afford to increase their use 
of lighting services because they have switched from inefficient incandescent bulbs to 
efficient LEDs or they may be able to drive further because they have invested in a 
more efficient car (Berkhout, Muskens, & Velthuijsen, 2000). These adjustments in 
behaviour are described as a “direct” rebound effect. Examples of “indirect” effects 
might include an individual using the financial savings achieved through home 
insulation to fund travel abroad resulting in more fuel use and carbon emissions than 
would have been generated prior to the efficiency measure being taken. The sum of 
these direct and indirect effects are thought to result in economy wide impacts with 
more energy, services and materials being used than before (Sorrell, 2007).  
Actual estimates of the magnitude of rebound effects are subject to considerable debate 
because of complexities in defining and measuring the resulting efficiency losses 
(Sorrell, 2007). This is because rebound effects span a variety of technologies, sectors 
and income groups on local, national and even international levels (Sorrell, 2007). The 
quantification of rebound effects is further complicated by limitations in data, effects 
which are trans-boundary and uncertain causal relationships (see Druckman, Chitnis, 
Sorrell, & Jackson, 2011; Sorrell, 2007). In light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
estimates of rebound show considerable variation depending on the factors included and 
the scale of the study. For example, while Berkhout et al. (2000) argue that rebound 
effects are probably small (0-15%), other studies argue that rebound effects can be 
sufficiently large in some cases to completely undermine efficiency savings and actually 
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result in increased energy use ―  a phenomenon known as ‘backfire’ (Sorrell, 2007, p. 
v). Where rebound effects are quantified, they are usually presented as a percentage of 
the expected efficiency savings. A rebound effect of 20%, for instance, signifies that 
80% of the expected energy savings were achieved (Sorrell, 2007). Perhaps because of 
the complexity of the task the number of studies evidencing and quantifying indirect 
economy wide rebound effects are far fewer in number than those studying direct 
effects with the result that we can have less certainty in estimating total rebound effects 
(Sorrell, 2007).  
Explanations of rebound have traditionally stemmed from Neo-Classical economic 
theories regarding resource management (Berkhout et al., 2000).  One of these 
principles is that of rationality. The idea is that individuals always prefer to maximise 
utility and will act to maximise gains and minimise losses. This principle of rationality 
with regard to resource management is in fact central to the concept of rebound. The 
rebound theory, for example, assumes that the purchaser of the more efficient car will 
drive further. However, not all Neo-Classical principles of resource management are so 
easy to apply.  For example, in order to always efficiently maximise profit and minimise 
loss it is assumed that individuals can consistently act to optimise utility based on a 
complete knowledge of the facts. In everyday life, however, this is not so easy. For 
example, energy bills tend not provide a comprehensive breakdown of the consumption 
of each household device meaning that the consumer is unlikely to be fully informed of 
the costs of running their household appliances without going to considerable effort 
(e.g., obtaining an energy monitor) (Berkhout et al., 2000).  
Secondly, Neo-Classical principles assume that the cost of making the transition from 
one optimum to another is negligible.  As psychological studies have shown, however, 
this is not always the case because individuals are not only loss adverse but may make 
emotional as well as financial investments in their purchasing decisions (Gifford, 2011). 
For example, once someone has invested in a car and felt the benefits of car ownership 
such as the greater convenience or status they may be very reluctant to give up the car 
even though they know that using public transport or cycling would have greater 
financial benefits (Gifford, 2011).  In short, people may simply be willing to pay more 
for luxury or convenience and value these more highly than financial rewards.  
Therefore, while neo-classical economic models of rebound might be useful for 
24 
 
understanding economic trends and financially motivated behaviours they are likely to 
find it more difficult to account for decisions based on other values.  
1.3.2. Potential psychological mechanisms underlying negative spillover  
Psychology provides another account of decision-making – considering how people 
may make seemingly irrational or sub-optimal decisions (e.g., opting for short term 
gains with negative long term consequences). This section will provide a brief 
explanation of self-regulation dilemmas and how these may lead people to justify acting 
counter to their long term goals. Self-regulation is defined here as the effort a person 
invests in directing their thoughts, feelings, desires and actions towards obtaining a 
personally important goal. Conversely, a failure to exert control over these is described 
as a self-regulatory failure and may result in unsuccessful goal pursuit.  
Self-regulation dilemmas are typically seen to involve a conflict between the desire for 
immediate gratification (e.g., eating a delicious steak) and the necessity of resisting in 
order to achieve long term goals (e.g., reducing personal carbon emissions) (Rabiau, 
Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006). A fundamental principle of effective self-regulation is the 
ability of the individual to rise above immediate temptations in order to focus on their 
long term goals (De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2014a). That people often fail in 
this is illustrated by a range of societal problems such as obesity, credit card debt and 
environmental issues.   
Traditionally, self-regulation has been seen to be governed by two conflicting systems 
which compete for control. The cool, rational or reflexive self that works towards long 
term goals is seen to compete with the hot, irrational and impulsive self that craves 
immediate gratification (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
When people are in a depleted state (e.g., fatigued) they are seen as being vulnerable to 
being governed by the impulsive self. In contrast when the cognitive resources are 
available people are seen as more likely to act rationally and in line with their intentions 
and long term goals (see Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). This account of inconsistent 
behaviour suggests that seeking balance (e.g., between effort and relaxation) is a natural 
and perhaps mainly subconscious process underlying self-regulation. 
While self-regulation failures can occur as a result of non-conscious processes there is 
also evidence that people knowingly and willingly succumb to temptation by 
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rationalising their indulgences (see, De Witt Huberts et al., 2014a). For example, it has 
been found that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions which they find desirable 
providing that they are able to produce some sort of justification for their choice 
(Kunda, 1990). Furthermore, it has been found that simply having a justification seems 
more important than the quality of the reason itself (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014a; 
Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). The implication of this is that our reflective 
faculties are being used to facilitate seemingly “irrational choices” which may be 
counter to our best interests (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014a). These types of justification 
are most likely to occur when a dilemma is encountered and, acting in accordance with 
one’s earlier intentions is consequently more challenging. The actual form of 
justification used is likely to be determined both by the idiosyncrasies of the individual 
and also by the exact nature of dilemma being encountered (De Witt Huberts et al., 
2014a). Nonetheless, a number of broad categories of justification have been identified 
some of which have aspects in common (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014a; De Witt 
Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2014b). These justifications are presented below. 
1.3.2.1. Licensing effects: balancing moral accounts   
Broadly speaking, self-licensing can be seen as a form of justification. Put very simply 
the basic idea is that having undertaken one moral behaviour people are subsequently 
less likely to undertake another moral behaviour and vice versa (see meta-analysis by 
Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015).  Insofar as pro-environmental behaviours 
can also be viewed as moral or altruistic – because they tend to have societal benefits 
such as reduced pollution (Bamberg & Möser, 2007) – licensing may also be expected 
to occur within an environmental domain. For example, a person who has invested in 
more efficient appliances might feel that they have built up sufficient “credits” to 
license the undertaking of behaviours which are less pro-environmental but nonetheless 
enjoyable (e.g., using the appliances for longer). This moral credits model sees pro-
environmental behaviours as being comparable to a bank account or a carbon off-setting 
scheme (Miller & Effron, 2010) where pro-environmental behaviours earn moral 
“credits” which can be “spent” on off-setting enjoyable but less pro-environmental 
behaviours. To use the same analogy – in cases where the pro-environmental behaviour 
did not fully off-set the less pro-environmental behaviour the accounts would not 
balance and negative spillover effects could occur. 
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Evidence of moral-licensing effects has been found with respect to environmentally 
significant behaviours – with studies finding that participants were willing to make 
trade-offs between very different kinds of behaviours.  For example, Sachdeva, Iliev, & 
Medin (2009) conducted a study where participants were asked to imagine managing a 
manufacturing a plant that was releasing pollutants. Participants who had just reflected 
on their positive traits stated that they would only co-operate by running costly pollution 
filters 56% of the time. In contrast participants who had previously reflected on their 
negative traits volunteered to run the filters 73% of the time. Similarly, Mazar and 
Zhong (2010) found that following engagement in a pro-environmental behaviour 
participants were less cooperative and more likely to cheat, while Klöckner, Nayum, 
and Mehmetoglu (2013) found that drivers of electric cars felt less obligated to act pro-
environmentally. It seems that acting morally or pro-socially was used by participants to 
license morally dubious or environmentally detrimental behaviours. 
Miller and Effron (2010) also propose that licensing may be mediated by the way in 
which people construe their behaviour – calling this the moral credentials model. This 
account differs in that rather than simply “purchasing” a license to harm the 
environment in some way – the previous moral decision allows the current transgression 
to actually be construed differently.  For example, it was found that having endorsed 
Obama as a black president, participants who scored highly on a measure of racial 
prejudice were more likely to subsequently allocate more money to an organisation 
favouring white people at the expense of black people (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 
2009). In short it seems that having demonstrated their non-racist credentials, these 
participants felt able to act in a more discriminatory fashion without the fear of being 
judged to be racist. It might similarly be expected that people may use tokenistic efforts 
in being pro-environmental in order to defend acting in environmentally detrimental 
ways in other areas of their lives. 
1.3.2.2. “Work hard, play hard”: Entitlement to a reward  
Notably, some justifications relate to ideas about entitlement or earned rewards (e.g., 
Taylor, Webb, & Sheeran, 2014). For instance, having first imagined undertaking an 
altruistic or laudable act such as donating to charity, caring for the homeless or working 
to benefit the environment, people have been found to subsequently show a strong 
preference for luxury goods (e.g., designer wear) over and above utility products (e.g., 
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vacuum cleaner) (Khan & Dhar, 2006).  Khan and Dhar (2006) propose that even 
imagining acting morally (as opposed to actually acting) can enhance people’s positive 
self-concept, thus, licensing them to indulge. In short, it seems that having focused on 
being virtuous, people subsequently felt they deserved a treat.  
 Similarly, prior effort and achievement have been identified as justifications to indulge 
in “forbidden treats” (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014a; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002). Having 
worked hard or received recognition for their efforts people tend to feel that they have 
earned a reward. Xu and Schwarz (2009), for example, showed that people expected 
that they would feel less negative about indulging if they could justify the treat based on 
good performance or high effort. This particular rationale can be traced back to 
puritanical ideas about the necessity of earning rewards (see, Weber, 2002). 
Furthermore, in the case of both these types of justification the licensing is not domain 
specific; rather participants felt able to treat themselves to something unrelated to their 
performance (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014a). In a study by De Witt Huberts, Evers, and 
De Ridder (2012), for example, a group of participants who were under the erroneous 
impression that they had worked twice as hard as another group on a computer based 
task appeared to feel licensed to eat significantly more sweet snacks.  
1.3.2.3. Prior restraint: “I was good then so I don’t need to be good now”  
Another justification is that of prior restraint. Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009), for 
example, found across a series of studies that the salience of previous restraint can, 
somewhat ironically, lead participants to not exercise restraint in a subsequent situation. 
In this case, after recalling successfully resisting purchasing a tempting product, 
participants were subsequently more likely to select an indulgent product. This effect 
has also been found in moral decision-making. A series of experimental studies by 
Effron, Miller, and Monin (2012), for instance, demonstrated that people strategically 
used forgone misdeeds to regulate their moral behaviour. For example, participants who 
were given the opportunity to demonstrate their non-racist attitudes subsequently felt 
licensed to express less racial sensitivity. Put simply, these participants felt able to show 
bias based on the fact that they had previously not exercised bias. In another study the 
same effect was found in relation to health. Dieters who reflected on the unhealthy 
alternatives to their previous behaviours demonstrated weaker intentions to pursue 
weight-loss goals and one week later reported that they undertook fewer weight 
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management activities and would continue to be less active in this respect (Effron, 
Monin, & Miller, 2013). In sum, these studies indicate that people who recall a time 
when they resisted a temptation may use their previous restraint as a justification to 
succumb to a current temptation. 
1.3.2.4. Prior success or failure: perceptions of goal progress  
A related justification is that of prior success or failure. People are driven by multiple 
and conflicting goals; they may want to save time by eating fast food and also desire to 
eat more healthily or they might want to save for retirement and also indulge in an 
expensive luxury holiday (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Four studies conducted by Fishbach 
and Dhar (2005) demonstrated that perceived progress on one goal enabled people to 
feel able to temporarily relax from pursuing that goal and instead pursue a different or 
even opposing goal. They found, for example, that eighty-five percent of dieters who 
assessed their progress towards achieving their desired weight using a wide scale (scale 
points were suggestive of faster progress) chose a chocolate bar rather than an apple in 
recompense for participation, while 58% of participants who assessed their progress 
using a narrow scale (scale points were suggestive of slower progress) chose an apple 
instead. In short, those dieters who felt that they had made good progress subsequently 
lapsed in their goal pursuit by selecting a less healthy high calorie snack over a low 
calorie healthy snack. Conversely, a previous failure can also result in the abandonment 
of goal pursuit. For example, it has been found that some people who break their diet go 
on to subsequently eat with less restraint (see, De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 
2013). This is known as the “what the hell” effect (Cochran & Tesser, 1996). In such 
cases someone might reason that having already broken their diet they may as well 
indulge in the foods they had previously worked to resist. 
1.3.2.5. Negative emotional events: seeking comfort  
It can be seen from the overview of models of pro-environmental behaviour provided in 
Section 1.2, that relatively little attention has been given to discussing the relationship 
between affect and pro-environmental behaviour. This is because relatively few studies 
have, in fact, attempted to specifically model affect as a predictor of pro-environmental 
action (see, De Young, 2000; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009). 
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Negative emotional events may, however, be relevant to environmental behaviours 
because they can be used as a justification to abandon goals. For example, De Witt 
Huberts, Evers, and De Ridder (2012) conducted a study where participants were either 
highly aware or minimally aware of being exposed to aversive images. Both groups 
reported similar levels of negative affect. However, only the group that was highly 
aware of seeing the images consumed significantly more snacks. It seems that only 
those participants who were highly aware of being exposed to aversive images were 
equipped with a reason to justify the indulgence (for an overview, see De Witt Huberts 
et al., 2014a). Similarly, effects have been found in the context of moral decision 
making. Experiments conducted by Zitek, Jordan, Monin, and Leach (2010), for 
example, found that recalling unfair treatment resulted in participants being less willing 
to help the experimenter on another task and that participants who lost on a computer 
game for an unfair reason (e.g., technical fault) were more likely to act selfishly with 
respect to money allocation for participation in a future task. In short, it appears that 
participants who felt that they had been wronged in some way could justify acting more 
selfishly. 
1.3.2.6. Compensatory beliefs: minimising harm and maximising pleasure  
Compensatory beliefs, namely the belief that the negative effects of one behaviour can 
be compensated for or off-set by engaging in another behaviour (Rabiau et al., 2006) 
can be seen to constitute another form of justification for deviating from goals. 
Compensatory beliefs have risen to prominence within the health psychology where 
they have been associated with poor diabetes and weight loss management, failure to 
quit smoking and other issues in adopting healthier lifestyles (Kronick, Auerbach, Stich, 
& Knäuper, 2011; Miquelon, Knäuper, & Vallerand, 2012; Monson, Knäuper, & 
Kronick, 2008; Radtke, Scholz, Keller, & Hornung, 2012; Radtke, Scholz, Keller, & 
Knäuper, 2011). Compensatory beliefs are seen as maladaptive. This is because 
compensatory beliefs allow people to justify deviations from pursuit of long term goals 
(Miquelon et al., 2012). Furthermore, compensatory beliefs may be inaccurate. A 
compensatory behaviour (e.g., exercise) does not necessarily fully address the damage 
caused by the unhealthy behaviour (e.g., smoking). Another related concern with 
compensatory beliefs is that individuals do not actually undertake the planned 
compensatory behaviour. People may not, for example, act immediately and over time 
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their feelings of guilt may subside, thereby reducing their motivation to actually act in a 
compensatory manner (Kronick et al., 2011; Rabiau et al., 2006). While compensatory 
beliefs may seem like an appealing way to resolve a dilemma (i.e., indulge now and pay 
later), they can pose challenges to the long term achievement of goals.   
Research from health psychology suggests that whether an individual forms or endorses 
a compensatory belief as opposed to adjusting outcome expectancies or finding another 
solution to their dilemma (e.g., resisting the desire to travel by car) is likely to depend 
upon: (a) the person’s self-efficacy; (b) the strength of their motivation to pursue the 
goal; and (c) how desirable the alternative behaviour is believed to be (Rabiau et al., 
2006). Individuals with high levels of self-efficacy and strong motivation to pursue their 
goal are better placed to resist the temptation and are, therefore, less likely to employ 
compensatory beliefs than individuals with lower levels of self-efficacy and motivation. 
Individuals are also unlikely to feel the need to use compensatory beliefs when a 
behaviour is very desirable because the desirability of the behaviour can in itself 
provide sufficient reason to indulge (Taylor et al., 2014). Compensatory beliefs are, 
therefore, associated with behaviours that are only moderately desirable (i.e., as 
opposed to irresistible or less desirable behaviours) (Miquelon et al., 2012; Rabiau et 
al., 2006). 
1.3.3. Compensation within an environmental domain  
Recent research has looked for evidence of compensatory beliefs in relation to 
behaviours that impact on the environment (e.g., that the positive consequences of 
recycling can somehow compensate for energy in-efficient behaviours) (Bratt, 1999; 
Kaklamanou et al., 2015). Specifically, there are concerns that, just as people with the 
goal of achieving healthier lifestyles employ compensatory beliefs to justify acting in 
unhealthy ways, people may also justify desirable but environmentally detrimental 
behaviours on the basis of compensatory beliefs (Bratt, 1999; Kaklamanou et al., 2015).  
Compensatory beliefs could hinder the adoption of lower carbon lifestyles in the sense 
that they allow individuals to justify environmentally detrimental actions on the basis 
that they can compensate for any negative consequences at another time. To date, 
however, despite the significant applied and theoretical implications of compensatory 
beliefs in relation to environmental behaviours, relatively little is known about the 
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nature and extent of compensatory beliefs in this domain (Bratt, 1999; Kaklamanou, 
Jones, Webb, & Walker, 2013; Kaklamanou et al., 2015).  
There are a number of reasons to suspect that compensatory beliefs may occur within an 
environmental domain (see Kaklamanou et al., 2015). In the same way that people 
working towards long-term health goals may be tempted to indulge in pleasurable but 
unhealthy activities, people striving to live more pro-environmental lifestyles but who 
live in societies where many activities with high environmental impacts are considered 
desirable (e.g., air travel) are likely to experience conflict between their short- and long-
term goals (e.g., between convenience and the desire to avoid undue harm to the 
environment). It could be hypothesised that this will be especially likely in societies 
where economic growth (e.g., through increased spending on consumer goods) and 
lower carbon lifestyles (e.g., through consuming fewer products and services) are 
simultaneously promoted. It is probable, therefore, that there will be people within these 
societies who have internalised pro-environmental goals and values – and so feel guilty 
when acting in a manner that perceptively damages the environment (see, Bamberg & 
Möser, 2007) – but who nevertheless partake in socially-desirable but environmentally 
detrimental activities (e.g., driving sports cars, air travel, eating imported foods etc.). In 
these contexts, it could be reasonably predicted that such individuals might seek to 
employ compensatory beliefs in order to permit such activities (e.g., someone justifies 
their inefficient sports car on the basis that they have solar panels on their home). 
However, while such ideas seem feasible, there has been little research to date into the 
extent or nature of environmental compensation. The present research will therefore aim 
to address this gap.  
Furthermore, while we may expect to find compensatory beliefs in relation to 
environmental behaviours just as previous research has found them with respect to 
health behaviours, important differences might also be expected. For example, unlike 
pro-environmental behaviours, health behaviours tend to have direct personal costs and 
benefits (Nisbet & Gick, 2008). The dieter, for instance, who abstains from delicious 
but unhealthy foods does so at some cost to their enjoyment of food, but receives the 
health benefits. In contrast, pro-environmental behaviours are often associated with 
personal costs (e.g., in time, money, or effort) but the personal benefits are spatially and 
temporally removed (Nisbet & Gick, 2008; Pahl, Sheppard, Boomsma, & Groves, 
2014). For example, recycling can be effortful and the benefits (e.g., reduced waste in 
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landfill, carbon emissions) may not be immediately apparent or directly beneficial to the 
individual doing the recycling. For this reason, pro-environmental behaviours can be 
viewed as having an altruistic or moral component (see Heberlein, 1972; Stern, 2000). 
These social and moral aspects to pro-environmental behaviours may mean that 
compensation in an environmental domain is related to moral licensing mechanisms – 
which could result in important differences in the way in which compensatory beliefs 
are used in environmental and health domains. To date, however, little research has 
been undertaken in this area. 
1.4. Summary and future directions 
This chapter began by outlining the need for behavioural change in order to address 
growing environmental concerns including serious climate change. Following this a 
number of the main models developed within psychology and applied to understanding 
(dis)engagement in pro-environmental behaviours were provided.  It was argued that 
moral, affective and normative factors were valuable additions to rationalistic models in 
accounting for behaviours which often come with no direct personal benefit but which 
bring benefits to wider society. The models also served to illustrate the complexity of 
environmental behaviours and to highlight the challenges faced by those designing 
behavioural interventions. The issue of negative spillover was then presented – with 
evidence suggesting that having engaged in one pro-environmental behaviour people 
may subsequently be less likely act less-pro-environmentally. A variety of possible 
mechanisms underlying negative spillover were explored including both rationalistic 
economical models and also psychological mechanisms. 
In this chapter, it was argued that people may act in seemingly irrational ways while 
pursuing goals (e.g., “being pro-environmental”) by employing justifications which 
permit them to licence succumbing to temptations on the basis that they may be able to 
balance out the negative consequences resulting from their behaviour at another time.  A 
number of the justifications presented in fact involved the idea of “balancing” short 
term desires with longer term goals. Taken together, these strategies can be seen as 
ways of: 1) justifying deviations from what is socially acceptable (e.g., being racist) and 
2) maintaining a sense of consistency even while acting in a way which appears to run 
counter to goal pursuit. Ironically, however, it seems that in attempting to maintain 
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some form of consistency people end up behaving in seemingly irrational, 
counterproductive or inconsistent ways that could also be environmentally detrimental.  
One such form of justification, namely the evocation of compensatory beliefs, was 
explored in some detail as a potentially important underlying psychological mechanism 
behind negative spillover effects (Bratt, 1999; Kaklamanou et al., 2015). From the 
review of literature presented in this chapter it can be seen that compensatory beliefs 
ostensibly relate to many other forms of justification. Compensatory beliefs could, for 
instance, be seen to partly underpin justifications based on prior restraint (e.g., I resisted 
driving yesterday which compensates for my driving today). Compensatory beliefs can 
also be seen to relate to moral licensing, insofar, as the belief that one behaviour can 
off-set the negative consequences of another may permit someone to act counter to their 
goals. Research into compensatory beliefs could, therefore, provide valuable insights 
into a variety of mechanisms potentially underlying negative spillover effects. 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
The chapter raised a number of important questions including the following: 
 Do people use compensatory beliefs to licence engaging in environmentally 
detrimental behaviours? 
 What is the nature of the compensatory beliefs that people hold with respect to 
environmental behaviour? 
 Do compensatory beliefs provide a useful framework for understanding why 
people face difficulties in achieving their pro-environmental goals?  
The remainder of this thesis will aim to address these questions and will be structured as 
outlined below.  
Chapter 2 presents the results of Study 1 and investigates whether and to what extent 
compensatory beliefs may be used within an environmental domain using exploratory 
qualitative methods. A total of 40 people participated in a think aloud exercise and 
semi-structured interview. The chapter presents evidence showing that participants did 
employ compensatory beliefs to license engaging in environmentally detrimental 
behaviours. However, it will be also be shown that these beliefs differed in some 
important respects from the kinds of statements used to assess compensatory belief 
endorsement in a previous questionnaire study (Kaklamanou et al., 2015).  Study 1 also 
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presents evidence indicating that compensatory beliefs within an environmental domain 
are not only employed to resolve feelings of dissonance but also play a role in 
reputation management (i.e., maintaining green credentials).   
Insofar as the findings of qualitative research are best described as ‘transferable’ (in that 
they may be applied where similar situations of people exist) caution should be used in 
making any generalisations from the data. For this reason, the findings of Study 1 are 
followed by a series of experimental studies.  
Chapter 3 presents the findings of Study 2 which was designed to further assess the 
relationship between environmental guilt and compensation. In line with the literature 
on compensation within a health domain, it was anticipated that participants who 
reflected on how their lifestyles had caused harm to the environment (guilt condition) 
would have stronger (compensatory) intentions to be pro-environmental in future and 
would volunteer more hours to an environmental charity than participants asked to 
reflect on how their lifestyles benefited the environment or the control condition. The 
results show that guilt predicted (compensatory) intentions to be pro-environmental in 
future but not willingness to volunteer.  
Chapter 4 presents Studies 3 to 5 which further explore the nature of compensatory 
beliefs within an environmental domain. Research from health psychology suggests that 
people use compensatory beliefs in order to strike a balance between maximising 
pleasure and minimising harm (Rabiau et al., 2006). Studies 3 to 5, therefore, look for 
evidence of compensation across a series of environmentally related scenarios using 
vignettes. It was hypothesised that a “flip-flopping” pattern would be seen in the data if 
participants were alternating between more personally beneficial but environmentally 
detrimental behaviours and vice versa. After controlling for the extent of participants’ 
green identity this pattern can be seen in Study 3. However, the data presented in 
Studies 4 and 5 suggest that participants are acting consistently rather than “flip-
flopping”.  Possible explanations for these mixed findings are explored both within 
Chapter 4 and also within the main discussion in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 5 presents the findings of Study 6 and explores the mechanisms underlying goal 
pursuit by looking at the influence of affect and goal construal on compensation 
(Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Fishbach, Eyal, & Finkelstein, 2010). The results of 
Study 5 suggest that participants who are lead to perceive that they are advancing 
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towards pro-environmental goals are more highly motivated to continue pursuing pro-
environmental goals. 
Finally, Chapter 6 aims to draw together and contextualise the findings from the 6 
studies. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the limitations of the studies which 
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2. Chapter 2 – A qualitative exploration of 
endorsement of compensatory green beliefs  
2.1. Introduction         
The preceding chapter discussed how compensatory beliefs within an environmental 
domain could be problematic – potentially leading to negative spillover effects, 
whereby, engaging in one pro-environmental behaviour subsequently decreases the 
likelihood of undertaking a subsequent pro-environmental behaviour) (Truelove, 
Carrico, Weber, & Raimi, 2014).  The reason for such concerns is that studies within 
health psychology have shown that compensatory beliefs are associated with 
maladaptive behaviours. Compensatory beliefs, for example, allow people to permit 
deviations from long term goals, while in cases where beliefs are inaccurate or where 
people do not follow through with the planned compensatory action, risks to long-term 
goal achievement (and health) are increased. 
Compensatory beliefs pertaining to environmental behaviours have been termed as 
“Compensatory Green Beliefs” (or CGBs). Kaklamanou, Jones, Webb, and Walker 
(2015, p. 3) define CGBs as:  
the idea that the positive consequences of proenvironmental behaviors (e.g., 
switching to a “green” energy tariff) can somehow compensate for the negative 
consequences of energy-inefficient or unsustainable behaviors (e.g., leaving the 
heating on while not at home) and/or the reverse idea that engaging in energy-
inefficient behaviors can be compensated for by engaging in energy-efficient 
behaviors (e.g., using public transport).  
The concept of compensation can be seen as analogous to carbon off-setting whereby 
someone can permit themself to act in a way that they know is detrimental to the 
environment on the basis that their previous or future pro-environmental actions will in 
some way neutralise the negative consequences of their behaviour. A study conducted 
by Miller, Rathouse, Scarles, Holmes, and Tribe (2010), for example, found that people 
had a widely held belief that their everyday pro-environmental behaviours (e.g., reusing 
carrier bags and using low energy bulbs) had greater environmental benefits than 
changes to their tourism behaviour (e.g., air travel) could achieve (also see McDonald, 
Oates, Thyne, Timmis, & Carlile, 2015). Research has also suggested that recycling 
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may enable individuals to feel absolved from undertaking other pro-environmental 
actions (e.g., Barr, 2007; Thøgersen, 1999). These examples suggest that people may 
feel that their pro-environmental behaviours can somehow compensate for their 
omissions to act pro-environmentally in other ways. Where such beliefs are inaccurate 
(e.g., believing that carrier bag re-use can compensate for air travel) or where people 
fail to follow through with the planned compensatory behaviour increased 
environmental damage may be expected. 
While there are reasons to believe that compensatory beliefs are occurring in relation to 
environmental behaviours, attempts to assess the extent to which such beliefs are 
endorsed have encountered difficulties. Bratt (1999), for example, conducted a postal 
survey of 1,500 randomly selected Norwegian consumers from four cities in order to 
investigate whether interventions to promote recycling had unintended negative 
consequences on other pro-environmental behaviours (e.g., driving habits). Participants 
were asked to what extent they agreed with three compensatory statements (e.g. “If I 
deliver paper and glass to recycling bins instead of throwing them out along with other 
garbage, I’m already doing something for the environment. Then it doesn’t matter that 
much if I use my car to some extent”). It can be seen from this example that a possible 
criticism of Bratt (1999) is that the scenarios had many components and, thus, people 
could disagree at a number of different junctures. Agreement levels with the three 
statements was relatively low being 13.2%, 3.5% and 17.1% respectively. The study led 
Bratt (1999) to conclude that there was no evidence that the introduction of measures to 
promote recycling had resulted in compensatory behaviour or attitudes. Kaklamanou et 
al. (2015) recruited 770 participants through university mailing lists and leaflets to the 
wider local community and found similar results. Average agreement with a series of  
statements describing compensation in relation to a range of everyday activities such as 
shopping, driving, water and electricity consumption and travel (e.g., walking to the 
supermarket can compensate for buying highly packaged food) was just 8.13% 
(Kaklamanou et al., 2015).   
It is not known, however, whether the findings of Bratt (1999) or Kaklamanou et al. 
(2015) suggest that low levels of compensation are likely with respect to environmental 
actions or whether they reflect something about the sensitivity of the measures used to 
identify the extent of people’s compensatory beliefs in this domain. There are reasons to 
suspect the latter. For example, Kaklamanou et al. (2015) found a negative correlation 
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between a measure of socially desirable responding and the endorsement of CGBs, 
which could suggest that CGBs were underreported (for a review of self-report validity 
see, Kormos & Gifford, 2014). Participants, for instance, may have been reluctant to 
admit to making trade-offs concerning environmentally significant behaviours because 
of concerns about being seen as inconsistent or hypocritical (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 
2010). Furthermore, as pro-environmental behaviours may be associated with moral and 
social norms, participants may have been reluctant to admit to endorsing some CGBs or 
may have disagreed with compensations in principle on moral grounds (Kaklamanou et 
al., 2015). In addition, Kaklamanou et al. (2015) suggest that their study may have 
provided a conservative estimate of the endorsement of CGBs because: (a) The study 
was advertised as relating to energy and environmental issues meaning that a 
disproportionate number of people with an interest in being pro-environmental may 
have chosen to respond; (b) the statements were framed in a definitive way that did not 
permit participants to indicate an “it depends” response (e.g., action A will compensate 
for action B); and, finally (c) participants may have disagreed with the specific 
combination of compensatory elements within an item (i.e., they may think 
compensation is possible, but not in that specific instance). For example, participants 
may have agreed that it is possible to compensate for driving a car but not that recycling 
presents a suitable opportunity for such compensation.  
Similar issues may have arisen in the study by Bratt (1999). For example, participants 
may have disagreed with the specific combinations of compensatory actions as outlined 
by Bratt. Notably, one item: (“If one doesn’t drive a car to work, one is already doing 
something for the environment. Then it doesn’t matter that much if one travels by 
airplane on holiday, even though the airplane uses a lot of fuel and possibly harms the 
environment”) – where both behaviours were travel related received relatively high 
endorsement (17.1%) compared to the other two items where the behaviours were less 
related (recycling and driving). This could suggest that response rates were affected by 
the composition of the items (i.e., relatedness of the behaviours) and may not accurately 
reflect actual levels of endorsement.   
2.2. Study 1 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, there are likely to be situations in which people 
feel the need to justify engaging in behaviours that ostensibly damage the environment. 
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For example, many behaviours which are known to be carbon intensive may also be 
deemed otherwise desirable (e.g., air travel, eating meat, running a car) causing 
individuals who aim to be more pro-environmental to experience goal conflict. Parallel 
research in health contexts suggests that one way in which people are likely to justify 
desirable behaviours that conflict with longer-term goals is through the activation and 
use of compensatory beliefs. However, despite the theoretical and applied importance of 
this idea, research on how similar notions of compensation might be used in relation to 
environmentally significant behaviours is in its infancy and extant empirical work only 
provides a partial account of whether, when, why and how compensatory green beliefs 
(CGBs) are held or acted upon. Study 1, presented in this chapter, aimed to address this 
gap in two ways. Participants first took part in a ‘think-aloud’ exercise (see Anders & 
Herbert, 1980) where they were required to articulate their thoughts while completing a 
self-report measure of CGBs developed by Kaklamanou et al., 2015. Second, the topics 
and issues raised during this ‘think-aloud’ exercise were explored in greater depth via 
semi-structured interviews.  
Based upon the extant literature, it was predicted that participants should recognise and 
identify with the concept of CGBs as a means of justifying or self-licencing less 
environmentally friendly behaviours. Furthermore, it was expected that the research 
would help to: (a) elucidate under what circumstances CGBs might be activated and 
used; and (b) identify some of the idiosyncrasies around their use, which might make 
their measurement difficult and go some way toward explaining the low levels of 
endorsement seen in studies to date.  
2.3. Method 
2.3.1. Participants 
 Participants were contacted during spring 2013 via university mailing lists and 
community groups (e.g., a church, school, and environmental charity). A total of 41 
participants took part, which is a comparable number to other think-aloud studies, (e.g., 
Darker & French, 2009; Kaklamanou, Armitage, & Jones, 2013) and also research using 
interviews to explore peoples’ beliefs about issues pertaining to the environment, (e.g., 
Caperello & Kurani, 2012; Kaplan, Kaplan, & Austin, 2008). One participant was 
excluded because they did not talk out loud while completing the think-aloud exercise. 
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Participants ranged in age from 17 – 65 years with 52.5% indicating that they were aged 
between 22 – 44 years. Nineteen participants were male and 31 were educated to degree 
level or above. Thirty two participants were White British with the remaining 
participants classifying themselves as: White other (n = 4); Asian (n = 2); White Irish (n 
= 1); or Other (n = 1).   
2.3.2. Procedure 
Within each session participants took part in a ‘think aloud’ exercise, a semi-structured 
interview and then completed a short questionnaire. Sessions lasted between 45 and 60 
minutes and participants were given £15 for their time.  
Think-aloud exercise. All participants agreed to be audio-recorded and completed a 
think-aloud exercise with respect to the 20-item measure of CGBs developed by 
Kaklamanou et al. (2015). This scale can be seen in Appendix 1 on page 159. 
Participants familiarised themselves with the think aloud procedure by articulating their 
thoughts while responding to four items designed to measure compensatory health 
beliefs (e.g., “Smoking can be compensated for by physical activity”). The researcher 
provided instructions adapted from French, Cook, McLean, Williams, and Sutton 
(2007); namely that participants should vocalise their thoughts from the moment of 
reading the question to the time of giving their response and to act as if they were alone. 
Participants were then provided with a copy of the scale and invited to complete it in 
their own time while thinking aloud. While the participants were completing the scale 
the researcher sat out of view, only speaking to prompt the participant to keep talking if 
they were silent for 10 or more seconds (French et al., 2007). 
Semi-structured interview. Each participant took part in a semi-structured interview 
immediately after they had completed the think-aloud exercise. Questions were 
designed to explore whether, when, why and how CGBs are held or acted upon and to 
clarify responses to the think-aloud exercise. Table 2-1 below provides a summary of 
the interview questions. 
Questionnaire. Participants were given a short questionnaire designed to capture basic 
demographic information, environmental values and beliefs. The questionnaire used the 




 A modified version of the General Ecological Behaviour scale (Kaiser, 
Wölfing, & Fuhrer, 1999). The original scale consists of 65 items each 
relating to an environmental behaviour (e.g., “I use a compost bin”).  
However, some items were removed (Kaklamanou et al., 2015) because they 
were considered inappropriate for a UK audience (e.g., “after meals, I dispose 
of leftovers in the toilet”) while others were edited (e.g., kilometres were 
converted to miles). Participants responded using a yes/no/unsure response 
options. Responses were summed with higher scores indicating engagement in 
a greater number of pro-environmental behaviours. 
 The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale (see, Dunlap, Kent, Mertig, & 
Jones, 2000) was included to assess the extent to which participants endorsed 
an ecological worldview (i.e., the belief that humans are part of, rather than, 
distinct from nature). This scale consists of 15 items (e.g., Humans are 
seriously abusing the environment) and participants are asked to indicate the 
extent of their agreement with each item using a 5-point scale anchored by 
strongly agree and strongly disagree.  Responses were summed with higher 
scores being indicative of a stronger ecological worldview. 
 A modified measure of green identity (see Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010) was 
included to assess the extent to which participants identified with being pro-
environmental. Four items were included: 1) “I think of myself as someone 
who is very concerned with environmental issues”; 2) “I think of myself as an 
environmentally friendly consumer”; 3) “I would not want my family and 
friends to think of me as someone who is concerned about environmental 
issues” (Reverse coded) and; 4) “I would be embarrassed to be seen as having 
an environmentally friendly lifestyle” (Reverse coded). Agreement was 
measured on a 5-point scale anchored by “strongly agree” and “strongly 
disagree”. Results were summed with higher scores indicating stronger green 
identities.  
 A modified measure of beliefs about climate change (see, Spence, Venables, 
Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Denski, 2010). First, participants were asked: “Do you 
think that the world’s climate is changing” and participants responded using 
yes/no/don’t know response options. Participants were then asked to rate their 
level of concern about climate change using a 5-point scale for which the 
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options were: not at all concerned, not very concerned, fairly concerned, very 
concerned and don’t know.  






 How did you find that (i.e., the think aloud exercise)? What did 
you think of the list of statements? 
 What do you think about the idea of “compensating”? In other 
words, the belief that performing a positive behaviour (e.g., 
switching to a ‘green’ energy tariff) can somehow compensate 
for performing a negative behaviour (e.g., leaving the heating on 
while not at home). 
 How effective do you think these compensatory actions might 
be? Can you think of an example? 
 Can you think of a time when you have done something which 
you thought was bad for the environment and tried to make up 
for it in some way? 
 Have you heard people say things similar to the statements on 






 You didn’t say very much about why you agreed/disagreed with 
statement X what were you thinking? Why did you say that? 
 You seemed unsure about how to respond to statement X. Can 
you tell me more about why you were unsure? 
2.3.3. Thematic analysis procedure 
The data from the think-aloud protocol and semi-structured interviews were transcribed 
verbatim. The primary coder conducted an initial reading and proceeded to free code the 
transcripts by assigning conceptual labels to topics and refining these through a process 
of repeated examination (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Hannes, Janssens, & Wets, 2009). 
These codes were compiled into a coding manual that captured re-occurring themes in 
participants’ beliefs and behaviours. Secondary coding was undertaken by another 
researcher leading to the continued refinement of the coding manual (see Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). This was an iterative process whereby the coding of randomly selected 
transcripts from each data set (think-aloud and interview) were discussed with the codes 
being revised as necessary (e.g., to provide clearer definitions) (Darker & French, 2009; 
Trickett, 2009).  This process was repeated three times (i.e., for a total of 15 transcripts 
from each data set). Any remaining disagreements were resolved jointly through 
discussion. The final coding manual was then applied to the remaining transcripts by the 
primary coder.  
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2.4. Results and discussion 
Participants’ responses to the questionnaire measures assessing their environmental 
beliefs and behaviours can be summarised as follows: green identity (M = 13.48, SD = 
2.33, maximum score of 16); New Ecological Paradigm (M = 46.61, SD = 8.96, 
maximum score of 64); and General Environmental Behaviour (M = 33.7, SD = 6.82, 
maximum score of 58). A total of 92.5% (N = 37) of participants thought that the 
climate was changing; 62.5% (N = 25) attributed climate change partly to human 
activity; 90% (N = 36) were fairly to very concerned and; 82.5% (N = 33) thought 
something could be done to tackle climate change. 
The qualitative results are presented below. The results have been placed under broad 
headings which reflect the main research questions. The quotations provided are 
illustrative rather than exhaustive and provide an overview of the broader themes or 
“patterns” which emerged from the data. 
2.4.1. Do people recognise and endorse compensatory green beliefs?  
Participants seemed to recognise and endorse the concept of CGBs. For example, 
participants said: 
I suppose in a sense I am trading one off against the other and saying “well I'm 
allowed a bath once every couple of months if I have a shower all the rest of the 
time. (P09, female, 65 years or above) 
I’ll often catch the school bus or I’ll walk in the morning to school and then I 
often think well I’ve cut down on that so if I'm going out in the evening I ask my 
dad to give me a lift. (P19, male, 17-18 years)   
Rather than forming a specific, prospective intention to compensate for an 
environmentally detrimental actions, the CGBs discussed by participants tended to be 
retrospective, involving past or ongoing behaviours that seemed relatively habitual (i.e., 
participants described behaviours that were performed repeatedly in similar situations) 
(Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006). Participants talked about striking an overall balance 
between their more and less pro-environmental behaviours – seeing compensation on a 
general cumulative or holistic level (i.e., these behaviours compensate for these other 
45 
 
behaviours) rather than on a one-one basis (i.e., this behaviour compensates for this 
behaviour): 
I think I shouldn’t be buying it [out of season produce]. That’s all. So the 
compensation is just from my regular habits that are positive in terms of the 
environment. (P04, female, 65 years or above) 
 
I do own a car and I don’t have a dishwasher and there are things that are 
unavoidable in my day to day life that aren’t good for the environment. By 
trying to keep everything else, like buying food and keeping electrical things 
turned off […] by trying to keep that as a whole, sort of more green, then I’m 
hoping to have a more positive effect on the environment or less of a negative 
effect, if you like […] I try to look at it like a sum of all parts rather than each 
individual activity. (P36, female, 22-34 years) 
The cumulative and holistic nature of the compensatory beliefs expressed by 
participants in Study 1 makes them somewhat different from the statements that, for 
instance, feature in the measure of CGBs developed by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) (i.e. 
where single, pre-defined compensatory actions were pitted against one another). The 
fact that participants referred to habitual behaviours could also account for why the 
compensatory beliefs expressed by participants in Study 1 tended to be primarily 
retrospective (i.e., I did X, so it is okay to do Y) rather than prospective (i.e., I have 
done Y, so I need to do X). Participants seemed to use compensatory beliefs to resolve 
conflict within their current/past routines rather than to justify and plan future action. 
2.4.1.1. “Little Green Lies”: Endorsing CGBs despite doubting their efficacy 
While participants in Study 1 did recognise – and in some cases endorse – CGBs, they 
also had doubts regarding the overall efficacy of compensatory actions. This concern 
arose principally from the complexity of calculating whether or to what extent one 
action would actually compensate for the negative effects of another action: 
I mean, it depends really […] if you don’t drive a car can you go abroad on 
holiday? You know, does it compensate? It depends where you’re going, how 
many times you’re flying per year and how many times you’re using the car. 
It’s, kind of, a grey area question. (P40, male, 22-34 years) 
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This finding was also supported by evidence from the think-aloud exercise, which 
suggested that participants found it difficult to assess the comparative impact of 
different activities, particularly when these were in different domains (e.g., saving water 
to permit energy use). Indeed, in some cases, participants found the compensations 
outlined within the CGB-scale items to be obscure and/or illogical:  
I would never have put those two together [Flying abroad can be made up for by 
being a vegetarian]. (P08, female, 65 years or above).  
Participants were also found to exploit their uncertainty surrounding the environmental 
impact of different behaviours in order to justify engaging in the most personally 
beneficial one (see also: Johnson & Levin, 2009; Pieters, Bijmolt, Van Raaij, & de 
Kruijk, 1998; Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009). For example, one participant 
acknowledged that she found it convenient to think that using a dishwasher was more 
energy and water efficient than washing by hand, although at the same time she 
questioned whether or not this was true:  
We have got quite a small dishwasher it’s a really slim one and I’ve read things 
that say “dishwashers use less water than washing up by hand” and so I kind of 
justify it in my head by saying “oh well, I'm at least using maybe the same 
amount of water”. But in the back of my head I think it’s this big piece of 
equipment that’s doing my dishes for me so I think I'm just trying to convince 
myself as it’s easier. (P10, female, 22-34 years) 
2.4.1.2. Moral Objections 
Some participants disagreed with the notion of behavioural compensation outright, 
feeling that any attempt to balance environmental impacts would limit their progress 
towards living more sustainably. These participants argued that, wherever possible, 
people should act pro-environmentally and not make compromises: 
I don’t think we can afford to be doing all this compensation […] I think we are 
just going to have to accept that we are going to have to live different kinds of 
lifestyles and that we may just not be able to do things that we now do. (P06, 
female, 65 years or above) 
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at the end of the day the point is to save the environment and […] not to 
compensate. (P19, male, 17-18 years) 
2.4.2. Why and how do people use compensatory green beliefs?  
There was evidence that holding and endorsing compensatory beliefs had psychological 
benefits for participants. By being able to license their negative environmental impacts 
by, for example, drawing attention to their general green credentials, participants felt 
able to reduce feelings of negative affect (e.g., guilt) and feel more positive about their 
overall impact on the environment: 
I suppose that my biggest sin is car driving […] I do endeavour to recycle.  I do 
endeavour to switch off appliances as much as I can, not use appliances when I 
don’t need to, those kinds of things.  I’m pretty sure that it doesn’t compensate 
for the more extreme damage that, potentially, a car does to the environment by 
doing what I do. I sort of think: ‘at least I am doing this.’  (P25, male, 45-54 
years) 
I found that one of the supermarkets was doing carrier bag recycling and I took 
them down to recycle and I thought ‘well that’s kind of made up for it a little 
bit’. I just think I feel better myself for doing it. (P10, female, 22-34 years) 
Both these examples show that participants are aware of their negative impact on the 
environment, with one participant even using moral language to demonstrate his 
understanding (i.e., ‘my biggest sin’).  However, phrases such as ‘at least I am doing 
this’ indicate a tokenistic or perfunctory gesture towards acting pro-environmentally 
perhaps indicating that participants are unwilling to invest much effort in compensating 
but rather use CGBs as a momentary and immediate means of resolving the dilemma.  
Being able to justify undertaking actions that have a negative impact on the 
environment was also deemed to be socially useful, enabling participants to emphasise 
their green credentials even where evidence for their pro-environmental behaviours was 
ambiguous:  
If I’m put on the spot and if I was being interrogated about: ‘how much are you 
contributing?’ I’d inevitably drift into self-justification-style language. (P13, 
male, 45-54 years) 
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Participants recognised that pro-environmental behaviours were morally and socially 
normative:  
If you deliberately said “oh I'm allowed to behave in an un-environmentally 
friendly way” – there’s probably a lot of stigma around that. (P01, male, 22-34 
years) 
I think today most people would want to be seen as being concerned […] I think 
we would all try to make ourselves sound better in one respect by [citing] some 
of the things that we do that we believe to be, you know, beneficial to the 
environment. (P24, female, 35-44 years) 
This may go some way toward explaining why people use or endorse compensatory 
beliefs; potentially they serve a communicative function explaining or justifying to 
others the performance of potentially stigmatizing behaviour. 
2.4.3. When are people likely to use compensatory green beliefs?  
There was evidence in both the think-aloud exercise and the interviews that participants 
viewed compensation between certain behaviours as socially and morally permissible 
(e.g., eating in season produce compensating for the impacts of eating out of season 
produce) but also that they rejected the idea of compensation between other behaviours 
(e.g., driving less to compensate for drinking bottled water). Whether compensation was 
deemed to be allowable seemed to relate to the perceived morality and ease of 
performing certain pro-environmental actions. In short, some environmental behaviours 
(e.g., recycling or preventing waste) appear to be viewed as moral behaviours with the 
result that people’s attitudes tend to relate to their moral beliefs about the behaviour 
(i.e., what is ‘right’), as opposed to a personal calculation of the relative costs and 
benefits of engaging in the behaviour (Thøgersen, 1996):   
I see no reason why people wouldn’t recycle because all the facilities are 
available. I think if there’s nothing blocking you doing it, then you do have that 
moral obligation to do it. (P36, female, 22-34 years)  
Some participants were also unwilling (at least publicly) to entertain the idea that any 
trade-off or compensation could be justified for relatively simple pro-environmental 
actions such as sorting waste for recycling (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Frank, 1988; 
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Thøgersen, 1996).  In essence, where undertaking a pro-environmental activity was seen 
to be easy, participants felt that justifying inaction or compensation was difficult to 
excuse. Endorsing notions of compensation seemed easier when (i) acting more pro-
environmentally was deemed to be either difficult or personally costly or (ii) where 
acting in an environmentally detrimental way was seen as unavoidable: 
I do think there are occasions when you need to get to a place and it’s out of the 
way and you can only really drive a car to that place […] then you would maybe 
think of trying to lower it down [car use] and balance it out by using less on 
other occasions. (P03, female, age 22-34) 
If it’s unavoidable, at least you can help [by compensating]. (P25, male, 45-54 
years) 
2.4.4. Other varieties of justification 
In addition to compensatory beliefs, participants also expressed a number of other (non-
compensatory) justifications for engaging in less pro-environmental actions many of 
which will be familiar to the reader of Chapter 1. These included: (i) the difficulty or 
impracticality of the pro-environmental option (e.g., as found by Gifford, 2011); (ii) a 
lack of perceived and actual behavioural control (e.g., as emphasised by the theories of 
Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour) (iii) that personal actions are relatively 
insignificant and, therefore, will not have much impact on the environment (see Gifford, 
2011); and (iv) that indulgent behaviour is deserved (see Taylor, Webb, & Sheeran, 
2014). For example, in circumstances where acting morally or pro-environmentally was 
deemed to be difficult or impractical, participants drew attention to circumstances that 
prevented their pro-environmental action or to other more important goals – such as the 
needs of family members – which necessitated and hence justified acting in less 
environmentally desirable ways:  
I need to have a car, my very elderly mother is now on her own and I need to be 
a phone call away from her which means I need to be literally five minutes away 
from her.  I haven't got time to be waiting for a bus. (P37, female, 35-44 years) 
Sometimes, participants appeared to take a fatalistic view arguing that nothing could 
really be done to remediate certain environmental impacts. This type of response has 
been identified in a number of studies (e.g., Gifford, 2011; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, 
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& Whitmarsh, 2007) and seems to stem from a lack of self-efficacy which in turn 
demotivates pro-environmental action. For example, one participant argued that 
attempting to compensate for a return flight to Australia would be a pointless gesture 
because even off-setting a short flight was relatively unfeasible: 
I do know from my carbon output charts […] that just one short European flight 
─ the amount of carbon that it bangs on that month is huge, so no you can’t 
really compensate. (P05, male, 65 years or above)  
Some participants felt helpless due to the global scale of environmental problems and 
saw their own actions as a “drop in the ocean” (see Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  Focusing 
on the scale of issues and the negative environmental impacts caused by others seemed 
to help participants to maintain their own sense of personal moral value and minimise 
feelings of guilt and personal responsibility (see also discussions by Gifford, 2011; 
Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012):  
[With] countries like China doing whatever they want - whether you’ve got an 
efficient appliance in your house isn’t really going to make such a difference. 
(P27, female, 34-44 years). 
Finally, some behaviours were seen as highly desirable and participants felt deserving 
or even entitled to participate in them.  In such cases no justifications for indulging were 
deemed necessary, for example:  
Flying on holiday is something that if you want to go far enough and that’s 
something that you have to do you shouldn’t have to balance stuff out in order to 
do that. (P10, female, 22-34 years) 
In short, while participants commented that it was unacceptable to not undertake low 
cost behaviours (e.g., recycling), they expected – or even felt entitled – to be able to 
undertake behaviours such as foreign travel that potentially have a larger negative 
environmental impact. This finding was further supported by evidence from the think-
aloud exercise where justifications based on feelings of entitlement or on the perceived 
‘need for a treat’ emerged: 
 Sometimes I think it’s unavoidable (no of course it would be avoidable) but I 
want to treat myself to certain things that are not locally produced, for example, 
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having Navel oranges in January and February when they’re at their best but are 
obviously not grown in the UK at that time of year. (P24, female, 35-44 years) 
2.5. General Discussion 
Study 1 used a qualitative exploratory and open-ended approach to explore how people 
think and feel when they act, or anticipate acting, in a way that is detrimental to the 
environment. In particular, the research aimed to translate notions of compensation that 
have been extensively researched with respect to health behaviours in order to 
investigate whether, when, why and how such beliefs are held or acted upon in relation 
to environmentally-significant behaviours. The ‘Compensatory Green Beliefs’ (CGB) 
scale (see Kaklamanou et al., 2015) was used as a stimulus for discussion, and 
participants were asked to respond to the scale while simultaneously articulating their 
thoughts. This was followed by a semi-structured interview that served to further 
explore themes of compensation in relation to environmental action. This final section 
of the chapter explores overarching themes that emerged from the research and provides 
recommendations for future work in this area.  
2.5.1.  Evidence of compensatory green beliefs 
Study 1 found evidence that people did entertain the prospect of environmental 
compensation and, specifically, the belief that an environmentally preferable action 
might (to some extent) compensate for a less environmentally preferable one. However, 
the nature and expression of these beliefs differed slightly from the statements included 
in the scale designed to measure CGBs developed by Kaklamanou et al. (2015). 
Notwithstanding some confusion about, and disagreement with, some of the 
compensatory couplings in the scale (e.g., whether gas use could be off-set by 
conserving water), the compensatory beliefs described by participants in Study 1 tended 
to be more holistic and cumulative in nature, with people seemingly drawing on a 
generic bank of relatively habitual and ongoing environmental behaviours in order to 
justify their less pro-environmental actions. This contrasts with the specific, rigid 
combinations of actions pitted against one another in the Kaklamanou et al.’s scale (e.g., 
that recycling compensates for driving a car). In sum, it is possible that the relatively 
low level of endorsement of CGBs in Kaklamanou et al.’s study (and possibly also 
Bratt’s 1999, work) was not due to the absence of notions of environmental 
52 
 
compensation, but rather due to the rigidity and simplicity of the behavioural couplings 
used within the scale. 
2.5.2. Occurrence of, and reasons for, compensatory green beliefs 
Study 1 found that use of CGBs was associated with: (a) the desirability of the 
behaviour in question, (b) the relative ease or difficulty of acting pro-environmentally, 
(c) moral and social norms associated with the behaviour, and (d) the relative 
availability and/or suitability of other types of justification. There were a number of 
instances, for example, where compensation was not required because the behaviour 
could be more easily justified in other ways. This seemed to be the case with air travel 
where the behaviour was either seen as so desirable or deserved that compensation was 
deemed to be redundant or as having such a large impact on the environment that 
attempts to compensate would be futile (i.e., that inaction could be justified) (Gifford, 
2011).  In these cases, the desirability of the action or a lack of self-efficacy meant that 
compensatory beliefs were not generated (as predicted in the compensatory health belief 
model by Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006).  
While participants found it difficult to justify not engaging in relatively low cost pro-
environmental behaviours (e.g., recycling), they found it easier to justify not acting pro-
environmentally when so doing would incur a high cost (e.g., in terms of the time or 
effort involved in taking public transport as opposed to the car) (Thøgersen & 
Crompton, 2009). This finding is in line with previous research into environmental 
behaviour which has found that moral and normative frameworks appear successful in 
explaining low-cost pro-environmental actions but are far less effective in explaining 
high-cost environmental actions (see discussion by Steg & Vlek, 2009). In short 
participants did not feel that compensation was socially or morally acceptable in the 
case of behaviours which were easy to undertake but did employ compensation and 
other justifications in the case of higher cost but also more environmentally important 
behaviours.  
Study 1 suggests that CGBs are related to the phenomenon of moral licensing (for an 
overview of moral licensing see, Miller & Effron, 2010). In short, by thinking that one 
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action can compensate (at least to some extent)9 for another, participants were able to 
license actions which they knew were environmentally detrimental. This connection 
between compensation and licensing is to be expected insofar as many pro-
environmental actions are also viewed as moral or altruistic actions (e.g., Lindenberg & 
Steg, 2013; Thøgersen, 1996).  
 
Figure 3: A summary of participants’ views on when compensation is acceptable 
Research on psychological licensing describes two construals of actions which may 
facilitate licensing. First, actions may be construed as providing “moral credits”, 
whereby an individual who has just acted morally (e.g., donated to charity) will 
subsequently feel licensed to act less morally and vice versa. In support of this idea, 
Study 1 found that participants argued that their habitual pro-environmental behaviours 
balanced out or off-set their habitual less pro-environmental behaviours. In other words, 
participants felt that their “good behaviours” accrued some form of moral currency 
which could be spent on environmentally detrimental but otherwise enjoyable or 
convenient behaviours (e.g., driving) (see, Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Relatedly, 
the tokenistic responses described by some participants (i.e., that full compensation was 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that while some employed compensatory beliefs they also expressed significant 
doubts about their efficacy (see section: 2.4.1.1, p. 43). This indicates a tokenistic approach towards 
acting pro-environmentally rather than a real willingness to invest effort in environmental behaviour.  
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not possible but was better than not compensating at all) could be seen as a “credit card” 
strategy whereby participants felt that they could act in an environmentally detrimental 
manner despite not being able to afford to pay off the debt at present.  
The second construal of actions that may facilitate licensing focuses on the idea of 
credentials. For example, donating to charity may enable someone to construe their 
subsequent refusal to donate to another charity as not ungenerous. In other words, 
previous actions may provide a lens by which people interpret their subsequent actions. 
Similarly, being able to draw attention to their pro-environmental behaviours seemed to 
enable participants to feel that they would be more favourably judged by others. Miller 
and Effron (2010) argue that the two accounts are not mutually exclusive but may be 
viewed as independent routes to moral licensing. Insofar as holding the belief that some 
actions can compensate for other actions, compensatory beliefs may facilitate licensing. 
Participants in Study 1 expressed concern that CGBs may be exploited by individuals 
who want to look or feel green but who are not yet ready to pay the price of actually 
acting pro-environmentally (also see, Beattie, 2010 on "green fakers"). In light of the 
general and cumulative nature of the CGBs expressed by our participants this would 
seem to be a valid concern. Such general beliefs could constitute a form of ‘lazy 
accounting’, which allows individuals to appear (to themselves and to others) to be in 
possession of significant green credentials but without having to make significant 
changes to their lifestyles. However, while CGBs may be used by individuals to defend 
their moral character (i.e., as a green and altruistic person) their use may also carry the 
risk of appearing duplicitous or hypocritical. For example, Kaklamanou et al. (2015, p. 
10) found a small but statistically significant negative correlation between the 
endorsement of CGBs and scores on a social desirability scale. This suggests that 
participants may have been reluctant to admit to endorsing CGBs because doing so may 
make them appear less pro-environmental to others (i.e., potentially lowering their 
social desirability).  
2.5.3. Recommendations for improving the measurement of the compensatory 
green belief scale   
The think aloud protocol employed in Study 1 provided a number of insights into how 
participants responded to the CGB scale developed by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) that 
might be used to improve questionnaire measures of CGBs in future research. 
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Responding to statements describing CGBs where the compensation is in a different 
domain to the environmentally damaging action appeared to require a degree of 
environmental literacy10 and participants without the required knowledge found it 
difficult to see the connection between the different domains. Such statements could be 
re-worded in order to provide the requisite information (e.g., “Not eating meat reduces 
carbon emissions and can thus make up for those generated by flying abroad”).  
Alternatively, compensatory beliefs may be better measured using statements that are 
domain specific (e.g. comparing different forms of transport). Data from the studies by 
Bratt (1999) and Kaklamanou (2015), for example, suggest that the compensatory items 
which trade off two behaviours within the same domain generally appear to receive 
stronger endorsement than trade-offs that are in different domains (e.g., driving and 
recycling).  Furthermore, an unpublished study by Kaminska, Byrka, and Jeziorowska 
(2013)11 also showed the strongest endorsement of compensation when both behaviours 
belonged to the same cognitive category.  
To summarise, promising strategies to improve future questionnaire measures of CGBs 
include: a) making the connections between item components explicit and b) ensuring 
that the compensatory behaviour is within the same behavioural domain as the 
environmentally detrimental behaviour.  
The definitive way in which some of the compensations were described in Kaklamanou 
et al.’s scale also seemed to caused participants difficulties. There seemed to be two 
main reasons for this. First, certain behaviours appeared to be viewed as moral norms 
(e.g., recycling) and for this reason some participants seemed unwilling to consider (at 
least publically) the possibility of making a trade-off. Second, participants often wanted 
to qualify their responses – outlining, for example, in what circumstances and how 
frequently the described compensation would be acceptable. Taking into account the 
finding that mixed domain and definitive compensations were more challenging for 
                                                 
10 Environmental literacy can be broadly defined as “the capacity to perceive and interpret the relative 
health of environmental systems and to take appropriate action to maintain, restore, or improve the health 
of those systems” (Roth, 1992, p. 17).  
11 Since the completion of the present doctoral research into CGBs, the work by Kaminska et al. (2013) 
has been further developed and published (see, Byrka & Kaminska, 2015).  Their findings confirm that 
participants are more willing to endorse compensatory statements in which the compensatory behaviour 
belongs to the same domain as the environmentally detrimental behaviour and where the compensatory 
behaviour is the easier option. Conversely, the lowest level of endorsement was found when the 
behaviours were in different domains. 
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participants there is a case for:  a) changing response options from the extent of 
agreement to a more frequency based scale (i.e., “How often is it okay to compensate?”) 
and/or b) changing the nature of the measure to allow for an open response (e.g., 
“Driving could be compensated for by X”). This latter method has been tested in a 
series of studies in Poland with some success (Byrka & Kaminska, 2015; Kaminska, 
Byrka, & Jeziorowska, 2013).  
2.6. Limitations 
It is worth noting a number of limitations with Study 1. First, the sample size is a 
potential issue. To the author’s knowledge there is no recommended sample size for 
studies employing a think-aloud methodology and because a new measure (i.e., the 
CGB scale) was being tested it was not possible to anticipate the exact point of 
theoretical saturation (Gardner & Tang, 2014). Nonetheless, a sample size of 40 is 
relatively common for think-aloud exercises and in combination with the data from the 
semi-structured interviews the resulting data was very rich, allowing for an in-depth 
exploration of participants’ perceptions of and reactions to CGBs. Therefore, while the 
sample size is relatively small compared to quantitative studies (e.g., studies that use a 
questionnaire to measure CGBs, such as Kaklamanou et al., 2015) and caution is 
required when making generalizations from the data, the findings may be described as 
‘transferable,’ – that is they may be applied where similar people or situations exist 
(Maxwell, 2009; Yardley, 2000). Furthermore, the qualitative paradigm drew attention 
to the limitations of questionnaire-based measures of CGBs, and suggested that they 
may not be the best way to study notions of compensation in relation to 
environmentally-significant behaviours. 
A second and related issue is that a convenience sample was used. Staff and students at 
the University of Sheffield in addition to local community groups and schools were 
invited to participate in the study. It can be observed that some participants have a 
relatively high level of education and/or level of environmental awareness (e.g., having 
calculated their personal carbon emissions). While this is a clear limitation, the sample 
nonetheless captures a range of different perspectives and beliefs about pro-




Third, the study relied on self-report. Concurrent think-aloud protocols are seen as 
preferable to retrospective think-aloud protocols because any difficulties participants’ 
experience in completing the task are recorded simultaneously with questionnaire 
completion (rather than relying on participants being able to recall and explain any 
difficulties after completing the task) (Trickett, 2009). However, concurrent think aloud 
protocols do not allow the researcher to ask the participant any questions (Trickett, 
2009). The present research overcame this limitation via the use of semi-structured 
interviews after the think-aloud task. Nonetheless, to the extent that both methods 
require self-report rather than objective measures of behaviour it is possible that the 
ability of participants to recall particular occurrences may have been limited by, for 
example, their distance in time (Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson, 1977). 
2.7. Conclusion 
Study 1 makes a number of contributions to the understanding of compensatory beliefs 
concerning environmentally significant behaviours. First, evidence was found regarding 
whether, when, why and how CGBs occur. Specifically, the findings suggest that CGBs 
are triggered when people feel the need to justify their pro-environmental credentials to 
themselves (e.g., to reduce guilt) or to others and when justifications involving 
compensation will not incur social sanctions (e.g., because they conflict with norms). 
Second, the findings point to the similarities and differences between compensatory 
beliefs in health and environmental domains. Specifically, the findings suggest that 
CGBs, like compensatory health beliefs, appear to be associated with dissonance and 
situations involving goal conflict. However, while CGBs are in some respects 
reminiscent of the personal licensing that occurs within health behaviours, they also 
appear to have an additional moral dimension – bearing a close resemblance to moral 
licencing where individuals work to demonstrate their moral character to themselves or 
to others. Finally, the present findings suggest that current measures of CGBs may not 
adequately capture the extent to which people endorse CGBs and provide a number of 
specific suggestions by which subsequent measures might be improved. The next 









3. Chapter 3 – Exploring the relationship between guilt 
and compensation  
3.1. Study 2 context  
The present research (Study 2) into the role of guilt in compensation follows on from 
Study 1 which used qualitative methods to investigate whether and in what 
circumstances compensatory green beliefs (CGBs) may be used. Study 1 found that 
participants did hold and endorse compensatory beliefs about some environmentally 
significant behaviours. Furthermore, the research suggested that just as with 
compensatory health beliefs (CHBs), CGBs have an apparent function in dissonance 
resolution.  In short, CGBs seemed to be important in resolving guilt by providing a 
justification for environmentally detrimental but otherwise desirable actions (e.g., car 
use).  
In Study 1 participants argued that previous or on-going pro-environmental behaviours 
(as opposed to future behaviours that they intended to undertake) compensated for the 
ways in which they harmed the environment. In other words, participants principally 
endorsed retrospective compensatory beliefs. For example, participants argued that their 
habitual more pro-environmental behaviours such as recycling or walking to work could 
compensate for the environmental damage caused by their less pro-environmental 
behaviours (e.g., eating imported foods). While it is possible that this finding results 
from the nature of the exercise (i.e., self-reflection), it could also suggest a potential 
difference in emphasis between compensatory health beliefs and compensatory green 
beliefs in terms of intention formation. Such a difference could result, for example, from 
the fact that health behaviours tend to have direct personal consequences (Nisbet & 
Gick, 2008).  Take the case of the dieter who repeatedly eats cake. This person is 
unlikely to lose weight unless he/she does actually plan and follow through with a 
compensatory behaviour (e.g., more exercise).  In contrast, the person who succumbs to 
a delicious beef steak, despite being aware that eating it runs counter to their carbon 
reduction goal, is unlikely to suffer any personal or immediate repercussions resulting 
from this behaviour. Arguably, as a result such a person may be less motivated to plan 
and undertake a compensatory action. In short, a lack of personal consequences coupled 
with the fact that the outcomes of pro-environmental behaviours may be somewhat 
uncertain, may mean that people may have a tendency to resolve feelings of 
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environmental guilt by employing retrospective compensations (i.e., reflecting on past 
pro-environmental behaviours). Additionally, Study 1 highlighted that CGBs had a 
social function in terms of reputation management.  Participants may have focused on 
past pro-environmental behaviours because providing concrete evidence of one’s green 
credentials may be more effective in social situations than simply expressing an 
intention to “do better” in future.  
Study 1 provided evidence that participants did use CGBs and that CGBs had a role in 
dissonance resolution. However, it was uncertain whether dissonance resolution was 
achieved cognitively or whether participants would in fact be motivated to undertake a 
compensatory action. Study 2, therefore, further investigated the relationship between 
compensation, guilt, intention and behaviour using experimental methods. 
3.2. Study 2 
Compensatory beliefs are generated when people want to pursue desires (e.g., for air 
travel) that compete with other goals (e.g., reducing personal carbon emissions) and, 
therefore, feel a need to resolve uncomfortable feelings of dissonance such as guilt, 
(Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006). In order to create feelings of guilt participants in 
Study 2 were randomly assigned to a guilt condition where they were asked to reflect on 
how their own lifestyles had caused environmental harm. As guilt is a “pro-social” 
emotion that tends to result in feelings of obligation to undertake a reparative (i.e., 
compensatory) act, it was expected that these participants would form stronger 
intentions to be more pro-environmental in future relative to the other conditions 
(Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Baumeister, 1998). Following on from Study 1, Study 2 also 
investigated how reflecting on past pro-environmental behaviours might influence 
compensatory intentions. A number of participants were, therefore, randomly assigned 
to a pride condition where they were asked to reflect on how their lifestyles had helped 
or benefitted the environment in some way.  It was anticipated that participants in the 
pride condition would feel that that their past pro-environmental behaviours licensed 
them to relax in pursuit of environmental goals (i.e., because their previous pro-
environmental behaviours would compensate for their current lapse) (Miller & Effron, 
2010).   
The study focused on pride and guilt because these are emotions which are seen to 
result from an evaluation of a person’s own behaviour – something which people are 
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likely to take into account when deciding whether a goal incongruent (or indulgent) 
behaviour can be licensed (Vining & Ebreo, 2002). It should be noted that the study 
specifically aimed to manipulate feelings of guilt rather than shame. Whereas guilt has 
been found to prompt reparative or compensatory action, shame tends to lead to 
withdrawal and unresolved negative affect (Giner-Sorolla, Kamau, & Castano, 2010). 
To summarise, it was predicted that participants who felt environmental guilt would be 
motivated to compensate as measured by: a) forming an intention to do more to help the 
environment and b) by pledging more hours to helping conserve the environment 
(volunteering) than participants who had reflected on how their lifestyles had helped the 
environment. The effects of these manipulations were compared to a control condition, 
in which participants were not asked to reflect on their environmental behaviour.  
Finally, the study investigated to what extent feelings of pride and guilt would predict: 
a) intention and b) pledged behaviour (volunteering).   
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants 
The initial sample included 350 participants who were University of Sheffield staff 
members who had subscribed to a volunteer mailing list. From the original sample, data 
were excluded from 27 participants because they did not actually answer any questions. 
Data from a further 78 participants were removed because these participants did not 
follow the experimental protocol (e.g., did not reflect on their environmental 
behaviour). The final sample included 245 participants. Of those participants who 
provided demographic data, 75 (30.06%) were male and 162 (66.01%) were female. 
The majority of participants were aged between 18 - 34 years (n = 101, 41.02%) (Range 
18 - 65 plus). 
3.3.2. Procedure and materials 
The current research was conducted online using Qualtrics survey software.12 A link to 
the survey experiment was contained in the email distributed to participants. In order to 
avoid recruiting participants with a particular interest in the environment who may have 
                                                 
12 For more information about Qualtrics please see: http://www.qualtrics.com/  
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relatively strong green identities, the study was advertised as relating to “lifestyle and 
wellbeing”. Furthermore, by concealing the true purpose of the study it was hoped that 
the study would avoid receiving socially desirable responses. Participants were offered 
the opportunity to enter a prize draw for a £20 Amazon voucher. 
Green Identity: The first question seen by participants was the 4-item measure of green 
identity (Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010) used in Study 1 (e.g., I think of myself as an 
environmentally friendly consumer). However, in order to disguise the environmental 
focus of the study, the green identity scale was embedded among distractor items on 
health (e.g., I think of myself as someone who eats healthily). Responses were recorded 
using a 5-point Likert scale with neither agree nor disagree as the midpoint. Scores on 
the green identity scale were internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .77). The full scale 
including distractor items, can be seen in Appendix Two: Materials for Study 2. 
Reflective Exercise: After responding to the green identity scale, participants were 
randomly allocated to one of three conditions. In the two experimental conditions, 
participants were either asked how their lifestyle had: 1) helped (pride condition) or 2) 
harmed (guilt condition) the environment and how this made them feel. Insofar as 
individuals are likely to differ with respect to which environmentally significant 
behaviours they undertake and which evoke feelings of pride of guilt, this manipulation 
took the form of a reflective exercise where participants were free to choose which 
behaviours they focused upon. The control condition were not invited to participate in a 
reflective exercise. The instructions for the reflective exercise are presented below: 
We would like to ask you about how you think and behave in relation to the 
environment. Almost everything we do impacts the environment in some way. 
For example, the products we buy and the way we travel. In the present research, 
we are interested in finding out more about the behaviours that people engage in 
that have a [negative impact / positive impact] on the environment.  Please 
think about how [your lifestyle has harmed / helped] the environment in some 
way. Please write a description of what you are thinking about in the box below. 
You may want to think about the following: What did you do? Where and when 
did this happen? How did you feel?  Please spend some time on this, as we are 




Measuring Affect: To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used (Watson, Clark, & Telleger, 1988).  The 
PANAS is formed from two scales, one that measures positive affect and the other 
which measures negative affect. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which 
they feel a range of emotions at the present moment using a 5-point scale. The response 
options are: 1) very slightly or not at all, 2) a little, 3) moderately, 4) quite a bit and 5) 
extremely. Twenty emotions are listed (e.g., Guilty, Proud, Interested and Excited). The 
focal emotions for this study were pride and guilt. 
Measuring Intention: Following the PANAS, all participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which the following statement was true for them: “I intend to do more to help 
the environment” (7-point Likert scale anchored by “very untrue of me” and “very true 
of me”). The scale midpoint was labelled as “neutral”.  Again the question was 
presented with distractor items on health (e.g., I intend to take more exercise). The 
purpose of the distractor items was to make the environmental focus of the study less 
obvious to participants. The full scale including distractor items can be seen in 
Appendix Two: Materials for Study 2.  
Social Desirability: Participants were also presented with the short form of the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social desirability scale (Cronbach’s α = .70) (Ray, 1984). Items 
included: “Do you sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget?” 
Participants responded using “true”, “false” and “don’t know” response options. 
Responses were summed with higher values indicating a need for greater social 
approval. 
Demographics:  Participants were asked to provide basic demographic information 
(e.g., sex and age).   
Volunteering: Next, participants were told that the questionnaire was complete and 
thanked for taking part. The remaining dependent variables were presented as a separate 
questionnaire, purportedly from the University of Sheffield, regarding volunteering 
opportunities.  As participants were reached via the staff volunteer mailing list it was 
felt that the main purpose of the study would, therefore, be concealed preventing bias in 
responses. The information and questions as presented to participants are shown in 








Participants were given information about volunteering opportunities with a local 
wildlife trust and asked to indicate their interest in taking part (“yes”/”no” measure). 
Interested participants were invited to state how many hours they would be able to 
volunteer (0-25 hours) and to provide their name and email if they wished to receive 
further information about volunteering opportunities with that particular wildlife 
organisation. Finally, participants were asked if they were already a member of the 
wildlife or other environmentally focused organisation. The debrief which explains the 
deception used in this study can be found in Appendix Two: Materials for Study 2. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Randomisation check 
There were 106 participants in the control condition, 67 in the pride condition and 72 in 
the guilt condition. A one way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to check that 
levels of green identity did not differ between conditions. No difference in the green 
identity scores for each condition was found, F(2, 242) = 1.43, p =.242, ηp
2 = 0.12, 
indicating that participants were evenly distributed. Randomisation on the basis of green 
identity was deemed to be effective. The three conditions did not differ significantly in 
terms of social desirability (p = .127) or sex (p = .234). Age was measured in categories 
as follows: 18 - 34 years, 35 - 54 years and 55 - 65 and above years. A Chi-square test 
for independence indicated that participants in each condition did not differ significantly 
in terms of age, χ2 (4, N = 231) = 5.57, p = .234. Within the control condition 40 
(38.5%) were aged 18-34 years, 47 (45.02%) were aged 35-54 years and 17 (16.03%) 
were aged 55-65+ years. Within the pride condition 26 (40.6%) were aged 18-34 years, 
30 (46.09%) 35-54 years and 8 (12.05%) 55-65+ years. Finally, within the guilt 
condition 35 (55.6%) were aged 18-34 years, 20 (31.07%) 35-54 years and 8 (12.07) 
55-65+ years. Table 3-1 provides the means and standard deviations. 
Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics by condition 
 Control Pride Guilt 





















































3.4.2. Manipulation check: reflective exercise  
In Study 1, it was found that people provided a range of justifications for their less pro-
environmental behaviours. For this reason, the decision was made to check the extent to 
which participants had followed the experimental protocol. Responses were coded as 
follows: 1 = followed protocol and 2 = protocol not strictly adhered to. Participants in 
the guilt condition were counted as not strictly following the protocol if they justified 
their behaviour (e.g., difficulty of acting pro-environmentally) or went beyond the 
protocol by listing pro-environmental behaviours that they were undertaking or planned 
to undertake. A number of instances were found where participants in the guilt 
condition offered justifications or went beyond the protocol and then explicitly wrote 
that they did not feel guilty for harming the environment, suggesting the manipulation 
had been weakened. Similarly, some participants in the pride condition went beyond the 
brief by providing reflections on how they felt they could be doing far more to help the 
environment. In both conditions it was deemed that the manipulation was not having the 
desired effect for such participants and these participants were, therefore, coded as not 
conforming to the protocol. Over both conditions 47.1% were found to not conform to 
the protocol.  It was found that 47 (65.3%) participants in the guilt condition did not 
strictly follow the protocol while 25 (34.7%) did as instructed. In the pride condition, 16 
participants (23.9%) did not follow the protocol while 51 (76.1%) did as instructed.  
3.4.3. Guilt and pride manipulation check 
The results presented in this chapter include all participants, including those who did 
not strictly adhere to the experimental protocol. However, a number of statistical tests 
were repeated using only participants who had strictly adhered to the experimental 
protocol. There was no qualitative difference in results. Please refer to Appendix Two – 
Study 2 to see these additional analyses. It had been predicted that participants in the 
guilt condition who had reflected on how their lifestyles had harmed the environment 
would report higher levels of guilt. A one-way between groups ANOVA was, therefore, 
conducted to investigate whether guilt scores as measured by the PANAS scale would 
differ significantly between the pride, guilt and control conditions. There was, however, 
no significant difference in guilt scores between the three conditions, F(2, 237) = 2.46, 
p = .088. It had also been predicted that participants in the pride condition would report 
the highest level of pride. However, a one way between subjects ANOVA showed the 
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relationship between condition and reported level of pride to not be statistically 
significant, F(2, 237) = 1.56, p =.212. The manipulation check (presented above) found 
that a large proportion of participants had not adhered to the experimental protocol. 
These findings further suggest that the effectiveness of the manipulation was 
compromised.  Finally, general differences in positive and negative affect as assessed by 
the PANAS scale were also checked. No significant differences were found with respect 
to general negative (p = .141) or positive affect (p = .368). 
3.4.4. Intentions to do more to help the environment  
It had been predicted that participants who reflected on their negative environmental 
impacts would report higher intentions to “do more to help the environment” in order to 
compensate. In contrast, participants who had reflected on their pro-environmental 
behaviours were expected to feel licensed to relax in pursuit of this goal as shown by 
lower intentions to help the environment.  To investigate this hypothesis, a one-way 
between-groups ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of experimental 
condition (pride, guilt, control) on levels of environmental intention. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated. For this reason the Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is 
reported.  There was a statistically significant difference at the < .05 level in intention 
scores for the three conditions, F(2, 183.81) = 5.78, p = .004, ηp
2 = .05. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the guilt 
condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.01) was significantly different to the pride condition (M = 
4.23, SD = 1.44). The control condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.19) did not differ 
significantly from either the pride or guilt conditions. As predicted participants who 
reflected on their negative environmental impacts had stronger intentions to be pro-
environmental in future than participants who had reflected on their positive impacts.  
3.4.5. Volunteering 
Only 31 participants (16.15%) stated interested in volunteering for the Sheffield 
Wildlife Trust while 192 stated they were uninterested in this opportunity. Of those 
participants who expressed an interest in volunteering 13 were from the guilt condition 
and 5 were from the pride condition. The remaining 13 were from the control condition. 
A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no 
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significant association between the two experimental conditions (pride vs. guilt) and 
willingness to volunteer (yes vs. no), χ2 (1, N = 125) = 3.05, p =.081, phi =.18. 
A total of 40 participants specified exactly many hours, if any, they would be willing to 
pledge to volunteering (0 - 24 hours).13 Of these 15 were from the control condition (M 
= 9.53, SD = 6.21), 19 were from the guilt condition (M = 7.53, SD = 7.39) and 6 were 
from the pride condition (M = 8.17, SD = 7.39). A one way between participants 
ANOVA showed that there was no significant effect of condition (pride, guilt and 
control) on hours pledged, F(2, 37) = .38, p = .684.   
3.4.6. Exploring the relationship between guilt and intention  
Previous studies on compensatory beliefs have suggested that there is a risk that 
forming an intention to compensate will resolve dissonance meaning that people will 
not actually undertake a compensatory action. Further analyses were, therefore, 
conducted to: a) assess the extent to which guilt predicts intention to do more to help the 
environment and b) to assess the extent to which guilt predicts the number of hours 
volunteered (pledged behaviour).  
A multiple regression was performed to predict “intention to do more to help the 
environment”. Green identity, pride and guilt were entered into the model as predictors.  
The model was found to be statistically significant, F(3, 233) = 30.67, p < .001, and 
accounted for 27.4% of the variance, as indexed by the adjusted R2 statistic.  After 
controlling for other variables, guilt and green identity were significant predictors of 
pro-environmental intention but pride and condition were not. Higher green identity 
scores and reported feelings of guilt are positively related to pro-environmental 
intention.  
It was predicted that participants who experienced higher guilt levels would be more 
likely to donate a greater number of hours to environmental conservation work. A linear 
regression using the enter method was undertaken to predict intention. The model was 
not statistically significant, F(3, 36) = .368, p = .777. Furthermore, all predictors entered 
into the model were not statistically significant. The results of the two regression 
                                                 
13 The reader will notice that 31 participants stated interest in volunteering but 40 participants specified 
how many hours they would volunteer. This 40 includes participants who said “no” to volunteering and 




analyses suggest that green identity and guilt predict the strength of participants’ 
intentions to be pro-environmental but do not predict the amount of time participants 
were willing to donate to environmental conservation. 
Table 3-2: Unstandardized descriptive statistics (across all conditions) 
Unstandardized descriptive statistics  N M SD 
Intention 237 4.62 1.24 










Table 3-3: Regression Table: Predicting intention to do more to help the environment 
 B SE B β t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
      Lower Upper 
Constant 4.62 .07  67.23 <.001 4.49 4.76 
Z Green ID .60 .07 .48 8.58 <.001** .46 .73 
Z Pride .12 .07 .09 1.66 .099 -.02 .25 
Z Guilt .22 .07 .18 3.23 .001** .09 .36 
3.5. Discussion  
Study 2 aimed to manipulate feelings of guilt with the aim of investigating whether 
participants who felt guiltier would form stronger (i.e., compensatory) intentions to do 
more to help the environment. Furthermore, the study investigated whether participants 
who felt guilt would actually undertake a compensatory behaviour (volunteering). The 
findings from Study 1, for example, had suggested that there was a risk that participants 
would cognitively resolve their dissonance by reflecting on their past pro-environmental 
actions, which might, in turn disincentivise compensatory action. Interestingly, Study 2 
found that participants did try and resolve their guilt by reflecting on their past pro-
environmental behaviours during the reflective exercise. It was also found that 
participants in the guilt condition expressed significantly stronger compensatory 
intentions than other participants. However, these intentions did not translate into a 
greater willingness to volunteer. In fact, no significant differences were found between 
conditions with respect to volunteering. These results suggest, therefore, that guilt 
triggers compensation (both retrospective and prospective) but that compensatory 





Two hypotheses that were not supported by the data were that: 1) participants in the 
guilt condition would report significantly more guilt and, 2) participants in the pride 
condition would report significantly more pride relative to the other conditions. As 
reported earlier in this chapter, however, a high number of participants in the 
experimental conditions were found to have not strictly adhered to the experimental 
protocol.  It appears, in fact, that an unintentional result of the reflective exercise was 
that it not only provided participants with the opportunity to reflect on their negative 
behaviours but also gave them time to cognitively resolve their guilt.  Participants in the 
guilt condition, for example, did not merely describe how their lifestyles had harmed the 
environment but also reflected on the more positive actions they had undertaken which 
might help to off-set or even license the damage (e.g., “The car I use is an eco-friendly 
car so this makes me feel better about driving rather than using public transport”, 
Participant 145). Participants in the pride condition also went beyond the experimental 
remit. For example, some participants expressed dissatisfaction with their 
environmental performance (e.g., “I also try to reuse carrier bags but don’t always – we 
reuse plastic carrier bags as rubbish containers which I know is bad”, p.70). To the 
extent that participants in the pride condition felt they could do more to benefit the 
environment and to which participants in the guilt condition felt that they were 
compensating for their impacts in some way – the influence of the manipulation may 
have been somewhat limited.  
The literature on compensatory beliefs within a health domain lead to the prediction that 
participants were likely to form compensatory intentions in order to resolve feelings of 
dissonance (e.g., environmental guilt). However, there was a concern that intention 
formation may not be translated into compensatory action. The data appear to support 
these predictions. For example, regression analyses found guilt to be a significant 
predictor of intention but not of pledged behaviour (volunteering), and significant 
differences were found between pride and guilt conditions with respect to intention but 
not pledged behaviour. These findings suggest, therefore, that forming a compensatory 
intention can cognitively resolve guilt. Nonetheless, these results should also be treated 
with some caution as there are alternative explanations for the findings. For example, 
pledging to volunteer may have been an issue for many participants. Undertaking 
conservation work for Sheffield Wildlife Trust would have required physical labour and 
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travel to site locations as well as a time commitment. Participants may not have been 
able to volunteer for a wide number of reasons including their state of health and overall 
fitness, mobility reasons or because of family or other time commitments. In short, 
volunteering could be seen as a difficult or costly behaviour.  
Furthermore, a limitation of this study was that general intentions are poor predictors of 
specific behaviours (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, 1980). In this study participants 
simply expressed a very general commitment to “do more to help the environment”. 
The study could have been improved by making the intention and behaviour measures 
more closely related. For example, the measure of intention could have been to “do 
more to off-set personal carbon emissions” while the measure of compensatory 
behaviour could have been a financial donation to a carbon offsetting scheme.  
3.6. Summary 
The present study built on Study 1 helping to better understand the relationship between 
guilt and compensation within an environmental domain. Participants who reflected on 
the negative impacts of their lifestyles expressed significantly greater intentions to do 
more to help the environment in future relative to participants who reflected on how 
their lifestyles had benefitted the environment. Furthermore, the data suggest that 
compensation may be a contributing factor to the intention-behaviour gap by allowing 
people to resolve guilt cognitively. The measure of (pledged) compensatory behaviour 
was, however, a limiting factor. Volunteering was too specific (as intentions were 
general) and also perhaps too demanding, with very few participants volunteering time 
to the conservation charity. In short, a better measure of compensatory behaviour is 
required. Studies 3-5 which are presented in the next chapter aim to address this 








4. Chapter 4: Looking for evidence of compensation in 
sequential environmentally-related decision-making 
The current chapter explores the idea of compensation as a way of achieving balance 
between maximising pleasure and minimising harm (Rabiau et al., 2006) across a series 
of different scenarios. This builds on the previous chapter in the following way. The 
previous chapter (Chapter 3, Study 2) considered compensating and licensing effects, 
looking at whether participants who reflected on how they had harmed the environment 
would feel greater environmental guilt and, therefore, be more motivated to express 
(compensatory) intentions to be more pro-environmental in future and to undertake a 
compensatory behaviour (as measured by time pledged to volunteering). Study 2 also 
considered whether participants who were asked to reflect on how their lifestyles had 
benefitted the environment would feel licensed to relax in their pursuit of this goal as 
measured by their relatively lower intentions and willingness to volunteer. However, 
while study 2 found evidence of (compensatory) intentions, it failed to find evidence of 
compensatory behaviour (volunteering). There are a number of possible reasons for this, 
including that volunteering was considered too difficult or costly (e.g., in terms of time 
and effort). Consequently, whereas in Study 2 participants were offered only one 
opportunity to compensate, Studies 3-5 (presented in this chapter) examine how 
participants would behave across a series of scenarios in which they face a dilemma 
between doing what is pro-environmental versus doing what is easy or pleasurable.14  
Study 3 is a quasi-experimental study that looks at whether participants display 
balancing behaviours across a series of 10 vignettes. After reading each vignette 
participants were forced to choose between a personally beneficial but environmentally 
costly behaviour (e.g., air travel) and an environmentally beneficial but personally 
costly behaviour (e.g., abstaining from air travel) – thus creating a dilemma between 
self-interest and pro-environmental behaviour. Because Study 3 was limited insofar as 
participants were not randomly allocated to conditions, Study 4, assigned participants to 
conditions by manipulating their first choice. In short, participants were either told to 
imagine that they had gone to some effort to behave pro-environmentally or that they 
had failed to do so. The aim was to manipulate whether participants felt themselves to 
                                                 
14 This task could also be described in terms of investigating how participants managed multiple and 
competing goals (e.g., hedonic vs. normative goals) (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007).  
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be in possession of or in deficit of environmental credits at the start of the exercise. 
Within the literature there has been some debate regarding whether positive spillover 
(Thøgersen, 1999; Tucker & Douglas, 2007) or licensing and compensating (i.e., “flip-
flopping”) (Blanken et al., 2015) are more likely to occur when behaviours are 
conceptually similar. This was explored in Study 5 where participants were either 
presented with conceptually similar of dissimilar vignettes.  
The design of all three studies follows those of Zhong, Lount, and Murnigham (2010) 
who employed vignettes to explore the ethicality of decision-making in business 
contexts. One important difference, however, is that while Studies 3 – 5 in this thesis 
used binary response options (i.e., act to benefit self vs. benefit the environment), each 
of Zhong et al.’s vignettes included four behavioural choices. These choices were 
ranked by the authors according to how much they benefitted the individual at the 
expense of others. The rankings were validated in a pre-test where students 
independently evaluated the behavioural choices, providing average (normative) 
ethicality ratings for each response option. In contrast, a binary response option was 
used in studies 3 – 5 in this thesis because behaviours on a spectrum between benefiting 
the individual and benefiting the environment could potentially be seen as to some 
extent compensatory. The implications of these differences are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6: Main discussion.  
While the study by Zhong et al. (2010) initially set out to see whether giving 
participants longer to deliberate about their decisions would result in less ethical 
choices, the authors actually found that decision makers appeared to be acting as if their 
previous choices had created or lost moral credits. In short, it appeared that participants 
who made a first more ethical choice went on to make a subsequent choice that was less 
ethical and vice versa – with the pattern repeating across the scenarios. Quite simply, 
the idea was that by providing participants with a series of decision-making 
opportunities they would be offered the opportunity not only to act in self-interest but 
also to work to promote a positive self-image (reputation maintenance), thus, striking a 
balance between pleasure and environmental harm  (Rabiau et al., 2006; Zhong et al., 
2010).   
While the research by Rabiau et al. (2006) and Zhong et al. (2010) look at balancing in 
non-environmental domains there is now a growing body of evidence to suggest similar 
effects in relation to environmentally significant behaviours (Austin, Cox, Barnett, & 
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Thomas, 2011; Meijers, Noordewier, & Avramova, 2014). A study by Mazar and Zhong 
(2010) for example, found that participants were more likely to behave selfishly, cheat 
and even steal after purchasing eco-friendly products. Another example is provided by a 
study conducted by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) where participants were asked to 
write a short story about themselves using either nine positive, negative or neutral 
words. Participants were then presented with a vignette where they imagined managing 
a manufacturing plant that was releasing harmful pollutants into the atmosphere. The 
emissions could be reduced but at a cost to the profitability of the plant. Participants 
who had been assigned the task of writing about their positive traits were significantly 
more likely to prioritise the profitability of the plant at a cost to the environment – 
opting to run the filters only 56% of the time which was in breach of an agreement with 
lobbyists and other managers.  In contrast, participants who focused on their negative 
attributes opted to run the filters 73% of the time demonstrating a “moral cleansing” 
effect. In other words these participants worked to reduce the threat to their moral self-
image by undertaking a virtuous or cleansing action (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). 
Studies have found that even imagining virtuous acts (as opposed to recalling past moral 
acts) can be sufficient for people to license morally dubious behaviours (e.g., Khan & 
Dhar, 2006). The current research, therefore, builds on this body of research using 
imagined scenarios to explore balancing effects in environmental decision-making.  
These studies also speak to the moral credits hypothesis, whereby, participants who feel 
that they have harmed the environment should feel motivated to regain moral credits, 
while those who feel that they had already benefitted the environment should feel that 
they had credits to spend (i.e., they can afford to be less pro-environmental) (Miller & 
Effron, 2010; Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006).  
The remainder of this chapter presents the results of Studies 3-5 in turn and concludes 
with a general discussion of the three studies. 
4.1. Study 3: Exploring sequential pro-environmental decision-making   
4.1.1. Study 3 aims 
This study investigated whether participants would display flip-flopping (i.e., 
alternating between more and less pro-environmental choices) across a series of 
environmentally related vignettes. A total of 10 vignettes were developed (see Appendix 
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Three) which related to a range of different environmentally significant behaviours 
(e.g., water and energy use). Participants were first asked to imagine the dilemma 
described by the vignette and then to decide how they would respond. In each case, 
participants had to choose between making a decision which would be personally 
beneficial but environmentally costly (e.g., indulging in a long hot shower) or 
environmentally beneficial but personally costly (e.g., forgoing a long hot shower). 
The study was quasi-experimental and participants were divided into two groups 
depending on whether or not their decision to the first vignette seen was pro-
environmental or not. It was predicted that participants’ decisions would be influenced 
by their previous decisions. It was also predicted that if participants balanced personal 
benefits with environmental benefits, then the data would reveal a “flip-flopping” 
pattern with responses alternating between more and less pro-environmental choices.  
4.1.1. Pilot Study: vignette development 
A series of vignettes were developed and refined by the author and the authors’ 
supervisors.  A total of 10 vignettes were selected for piloting with first year psychology 
students. The full text for all vignettes is available in Appendix Three. The vignettes 
consisted of a series of commonplace situations which involved environmentally 
relevant decisions such as shopping for clothes (e.g., buying new versus second hand), 
personal hygiene (e.g., length of shower: short vs. long), home energy use (e.g., turning 
out lights versus leaving them turned on) and food (e.g., preventing potential food waste 
vs. throwing food away). The vignettes were piloted to ensure that the scenarios were 
plausible and that participants agreed with the researcher as to which responses were 
more pro-environmental and also personally costly. A total of 13 students participated 
in the pilot study. Due to time limitations, participants did not manage to respond to 
questions about all the vignettes. The minimum number of participants who answered 
questions about any single vignette was 5.  Order was counterbalanced to ensure even 
coverage. 
The questions asked and the mean responses for the vignette pilot study are reported in 
Table 4-1.  Questions were scored on a 1-4 scale with higher scores indicting stronger 
agreement. The vignette evaluation form can be seen in Appendix Three.  
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In this pilot, participants were asked to read each of the 10 vignettes in turn and to rate 
how easy the vignette was to understand and to what extent the vignettes and response 
options were believable. Participants also rated how pro-environmental and personally 
costly they deemed each of the response options to be. Finally participants were asked 
to discuss whether they felt that their fellow undergraduate students would be likely to 
feel proud of undertaking the more difficult but pro-environmental choices or 
conversely whether they would be likely to feel guilty for failing to make pro-
environmental decisions. This final discussion was not recorded or coded, but was 
borne in mind when developing the scenarios. The vignettes and response options were 
revised in line with the feedback from participants.  
























































































































































1 (dispose of vs. recycle leftover 
paint) 
3.90 3.80 3.50 3.56 2.11 3.78 1.33 2.44 
2 (new clothes vs. second-hand) 3.90 3.80 3.70 3.78 1.78 2.89 2.11 1.89 
3 (dispose of vs. store surplus 
recycling) 
3.70 4.00 3.80 3.89 1.11 3.56 1.22 1.89 
4 (disposable vs. reusable nappies) 3.75 3.88 3.50 3.86 1.57 3.29 2.86 2.29 
5 (plane vs. train) 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.00 1.43 3.00 2.00 2.86 
6 (don’t adjust vs. adjust boiler) 3.67 3.67 3.89 3.67 1.33 3.67 2.78  2.22 
7 (lights on vs. off) 3.88 3.75 3.67 4.25 1.75  3.00  2.25 2.50 
8 (dispose of vs. use damaged 
fruit) 
3.57 3.57 3.43 3.43 1.43 3.43 2.29 2.14 
9 (plastic vs. eco bag) 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.60 1.60  4.00  1.80  2.20  
10 (long vs. short shower) 3.60 3.80 3.60 3.60 1.60 3.60 2.20 1.80 
 
                                                 
15 In the actual exercise counterbalancing was used meaning that the pro-environmental response was not 




In the main study, a total of 55 first year psychology undergraduates at the University of 
Sheffield were recruited through an online participant pool and volunteered in exchange 
for course credits. Of these, 48 were female and 7 were male.16 Participants undertook a 
computer-based lab study. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions based 
upon their first response.  An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the 
age of participants in both conditions. There was no significant difference in age 
between conditions; t(46) = 1.08, p = .286 (two-tailed). Similarly, no significant 
differences were found with respect to self-reported altruism; t(53) = 1.38, p = .173 
(two-tailed) or self-interest scores; t(53) = .34, p = .666 (two-tailed) or in social 
desirability scores; t(53) = .56, p = .581 (two-tailed). However, an independent-samples 
t-test comparing green identity scores found a significant difference for pro-
environmental first choosers and less pro-environmental first choosers; t(53) = 2.96, p = 
.005 (two-tailed). The mean scores are presented in Table 4-2 below. 
Table 4-2: Descriptive Statistics by experimental condition  
 Pro-environmental first 
choice 
Less pro-environmental first 
choice 
M SD N M SD N 
Age  19.47 1.38 17 19.03 1.33 31 
Green ID17  15.23 1.93 22 13.24 2.72 33 
Altruism18 12.00 2.49 22 13.18 3.46 33 
Self interest19 9.86 2.38 22 10.12 2.00 33 
Social desirability20 17.14 3.66 22 16.55 3.99 33 
 
The decision was taken to advertise the study as more generally relating to everyday 
decision-making rather than to the environment. This was done in order to avoid 
recruiting a sample of participants with strong green identities who might be less likely 
to exhibit compensating (Rabiau et al., 2006). Following the computer-based task there 
was a funnelled debrief to check whether participants had guessed the exact purpose of 
the study. A funnelled debrief involves asking participants for their thoughts regarding 
                                                 
16 There was a roughly equal number of male participants in each condition (less pro-environmental first 
choosers = 3 males and pro-environmental first choosers = 4 males).  
17 Scale coded 1 to 5, with higher scores being indicative of stronger environmental identities.  
18 Scale coded 1 to 4 with higher scores being indicative of stronger endorsement of the concept.  
19 Scale coded as above. 
20 Response options were “yes”, “no” and don’t know”. Honest responses score 1 for ‘yes’ and 3 for ‘no’, 
while dishonest answers score 3 and 1 respectively. ‘Don’t know’ is coded as 2.  
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the purpose of the study. Questions are very open at the start but become progressively 
more specific. This procedure was used because there was some concern that 
participants might guess at the purpose of study, thus, raising the possibility of biased 
responses.  No participant guessed the exact purpose of the study. 
4.1.3. Methods and materials  
A total of 55 first year psychology students undertook the main experiment. Participants 
completed the study individually on a computer in lab conditions. The study was run 
using the online survey platform Qualtrics. Participants were given the following 
instructions before responding to the 10 vignettes which were presented in a random 
order:  
As you read each of the stories, please take a little time to imagine yourself in 
the situation described. Even if you have never experienced the situation before, 
try to imagine yourself in it. After reading each story you will need to make a 
decision. Remember, that you have the opportunity to do EITHER of the options 
which are presented.  Please answer as honestly as possible. There are no right 
or wrong answers. 
Each of the vignettes constituted a scenario which required participants to make a 
choice between acting in their own interest or that of the environment. It was not 
possible to do both. An example is provided below:  
You are studying Environmental Conservation at a university in the UK. You 
have been given the opportunity to attend a training course assessing the 
environmental impact of different activities. The course is in France and you 
know that it’s a great opportunity to develop your professional skills. You have 
a limited budget and after some research you find that it is more expensive to 
travel by train than by plane. However, flying will result in significantly more 
carbon emissions than rail travel. You are aware that flying will cause greater 
damage to the environment; but flying will save on travel costs and enable you 
to afford nicer food and accommodation while you are away. Which of the 
following would you do? 
o Travel by plane. 
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o Travel by train.  
The decision was made to ask participants what they would do rather than what they 
should do. “Should” questions are likely to focus participants on the moral dimensions 
of the scenario and how they should ideally act. As this research was interested in the 
intention-behaviour gap participants were instead asked what they would realistically do 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013). 
After responding to the 10 vignettes participants were then asked to provide basic 
demographic information (age and sex).  Participants then completed four items adapted 
from the Whitmarsh and O'Neill (2010) green identity scale (Cronbach’s α = .70) and a 
short version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Ray, 1984) 
(Cronbach’s α = .65). Both these scales are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Finally 
participants completed a 7-item altruism subscale (Cronbach’s α = .82) and a 4-item 
self-interest value subscale (Cronbach’s α = .67). These were sourced from Schwartz’ 
Moral Norm Activation Model and were presented as used by Stern, Dietz, Guagnano, 
and Kalof (1999).  These were included in order to ensure that participants did not differ 
in their levels of self-interest across conditions. Participants were instructed to indicate 
the extent to which the values were a guiding principle in their life using a 4-point 
Likert scale anchored by strongly agree and strongly disagree. Items from the altruism 
subscale included “Social justice, correcting injustice, care for the weak” while items on 
the self-interest subscale included “wealth, material possessions, money”. The scale was 
coded so that higher scores indicated stronger agreement with the values. 
4.1.4. Results 
Figure 5 shows the behaviour of participants across the ten randomly displayed 
vignettes. The responses are presented in the order in which participants saw and 
responded to the vignettes (i.e., first vignette seen, second vignette seen, third vignette 
seen, etc.). It can be seen that participants who made a first pro-environmental choice 
tended to make an un-environmental second choice. Participants who made an un-
environmental first choice tended to make a pro-environmental second choice.  
Participants showed some evidence of “flip-flopping” between pro-and un-
environmental behaviours in subsequent choices. The results, therefore, appear to 




Figure 5: Impact of vignette order on pro-environmental decisions 
To investigate whether this “flip-flopping” effect was significant an average score was 
calculated for each participant for vignettes 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 (odd vignettes) and for 
vignette 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 (even vignettes).21 The rationale for this was that if flip-
flopping were to occur then responses to odd numbered vignettes should differ 
significantly from responses to even numbered vignettes. To investigate whether this 
hypothesis was correct participants were divided into two groups depending on whether 
they made an initial ‘pro’ (pro-environmental) or less pro (less pro-environmental) first 
choice. Following this, two paired-samples t-tests were conducted. The first compared 
scores for odd and even numbered vignettes for less pro-environmental first choosers (n 
= 33). A significant difference between the scores for odd numbered vignettes (M = .36, 
SD = .20) and even numbered vignettes (M = .52, SD = .25); t(32) = 2.73, p = .010 (2-
tailed) was found. The second paired samples t-test compared scores for odd and even 
numbered vignettes for pro-environmental first choosers (n = 22). Again, a significant 
difference between the scores for odd positions (M = .66, SD = .18) and even positions 
(M = .51, SD = .17); t(21) = 2.85, p = .009 (2-tailed) was found. From these results it 
appears that there is some evidence to suggest that participants were alternating between 
more and less pro-environmental responses.  
                                                 
21 The vignettes were presented in a randomised order. The vignette first seen by one participant is likely, 
therefore, to differ from the vignette first seen by another participant. The numbering relates solely to the 
timing and order of participants responses (i.e., the vignette first seen and responded to).  
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4.1.4.1. Exploring the non-independence of observations hypothesis  
While there was some initial evidence to suggest that participants were flip-flopping 
between more and less pro-environmental choices further analyses were conducted both 
as an alternative way of testing the “flip-flopping” hypothesis  and also to explore the 
effects of other factors on participants’ choices such as green identity, social desirability 
and dispositional altruism. First, to further test whether it was the case that one decision 
to a vignette would influence another (rather than each decision being independent), the 
data was re-formatted with each participant’s responses to vignettes being presented in 
pairs. Each pair was then placed on a separate line. For example, in Table 4-3 below the 
participant’s responses are set out as follows: response to the vignette first and second 
seen, second and third seen, third and fourth seen and etcetera. There were, therefore, a 
total of nine lines per participant. Responses are coded so that 0 indicates a less pro-
environmental choice and 1 indicates a more pro-environmental choice.  







Response to subsequent 
(target) vignette 
1 2 0 1 
1 3 1 0 
1 4 0 1 
1 5 1 0 
1 6 0 1 
1 7 1 0 
1 8 0 1 
1 9 1 1 
1 10 1 0 
 
Direct logistic regression was performed in STATA to investigate: a) whether responses 
to a preceding vignette would influence responses to a subsequent vignette and b) to 
explore how green identity might influence pro-environmental decision-making. The 
analyses were conducted in two steps. First, a basic regression model was conducted 
which simply predicted responses to vignette using responses from the preceding 
vignette (Wald χ2(1) = 2.35, p = .125, Pseudo R2 = .01, Log pseudolikelihood = -
341.32). Second, green identity was added to the model (Wald χ2(2) = 21.00, p <.0005, 
Pseudo R2 = .03, Log pseudolikelihood = -331.55) . Both regression analyses used 
clustering to take into account that there were multiple data points from each participant 
(because they responded to a series of vignettes). It can be seen that a negative 
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relationship was found between preceding vignette responses and subsequent responses 
indicating that participants who were initially pro-environmental were subsequently less 
likely to be pro-environmental and vice versa, after controlling for Green ID (step 2).  
Table 4-4 Regression exploring the influence of previous choice on current choice 
Step Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE z P>[z] 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
1 Constant 1.23 .17 1.43 0.152 .93 1.62 
T1 .72 .16 -1.53 .125 .47 1.10 
2 Constant  .06 .04 -4.43 <.0005 .02 .21 
T1 .60 .14 -2.17 .030 .38 .95 
Green ID 1.28 .07 4.58 <.0005 .02 .21 
(Number of observations = 495. Std. Err adjusted for 55 clusters in Participant ID.) 
4.1.5. Study 3: Summary 
Study 3 investigated participants’ responses to a series of ten vignettes which presented 
a conflict between acting pro-environmentally and acting in accordance with self-
interest. Evidence was found which suggested that participants did “flip-flop” between 
more and less pro-environmental decisions – balancing self-interest with environmental 
concern (when controlling for green identity). The results suggest that previous 
decisions can influence current and future decisions lending support for a compensatory 
ethics model  (Zhong et al., 2010) where participants attempt to establish moral 
equilibrium between maximising pleasure and minimising harm (Miller & Effron, 2010; 
Rabiau et al., 2006). The results also indicate the importance of green identity in 
environmental decision-making. A significant limitation of Study 3, however, was that 
it was quasi-experimental. This is a limitation as, since participants were not allocated 
to conditions, as one might expect, participants who selected a pro-environmental 
choice for the first vignette tended to have a stronger green identity.  This weakness is 
addressed in Study 4 which is described in the next section.  
4.2. Study 4: imagining environmental actions 
4.2.1. Study 4 aims 
Study 3 found evidence supportive of compensating and licensing effects as measured 
by participants “flip-flopping” between acting in self-interest and acting to benefit the 
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environment. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Study 3 had the limitation of being 
quasi-experimental.  Study 4 aimed to address this limitation. Study 4 randomly 
allocated participants into one of two experimental conditions. The aim was to 
experimentally manipulate whether participants felt themselves to be in possession or in 
deficit of pro-environmental credits. For this purpose, a vignette was designed which 
presented a scenario in which someone either went to considerable effort to recycle or 
simply disposed of recycling with general waste. Recycling was chosen as the subject of 
the vignette: a) because participants in Study 1 argued that recycling was a moral 
obligation and b) because recycling is associated with moral and social norms within the 
wider literature (Thøgersen, 1996). It was anticipated that imagining a failure to recycle 
would make participants feel in deficit of moral credits and, therefore, make them more 
likely to make a first free choice that was pro-environmental to compensate. 
Conversely, participants asked to imagine acting pro-environmentally (i.e., recycling) 
were expected to exhibit licensing effects (i.e., being more likely to make a less pro-
environmental first choice).  
Items were included to measure feelings of guilt and pride in order to check the extent 
of participants’ engagement with the imagined scenarios. It was anticipated that 
participants would feel guilt after imagining transgressing moral norms (Bamberg & 
Möser, 2007), while those participants who imagined going to considerable effort to 
recycle were expected to feel proud.  
Study 4 also differed from Study 3 in that fewer vignettes were included (4 rather than 
10).  There were two reasons for this change. First the study design was based on that of 
Zhong et al. (2010) who used the four most effective vignettes from their earlier 12 
vignette study. As in the 4 vignette study by Zhong et al. (2010) the first vignette was 
the imagined scenario where participants were told which decision they had made (in 
this case whether they recycled or not). This imagined decision was followed by three 
vignettes to which participants could respond freely. The three “free choice” vignettes 
were taken from Study 3. Second, fewer vignettes were required because the main focus 
of the study was to see whether participants would provide a first free choice that 
contrasted with their imagined choice.  Another important change between Studies 3 
and 4 was that Study 4 was conducted as an online survey rather than as a lab study. 
The reason for this was that a power analysis indicated that around 220 participants 
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were required to detect a medium sized effect and running the study online enabled the 
researcher to gain access to a larger participant pool.  
Some additional measures were included. A measure of commitment and progress 
towards being more pro-environmental was added to Study 4. This is because the 
literature suggests that seemingly inconsistent or contrasting pro-environmental 
behaviours may also occur as a result of the way in which individuals monitor and 
pursue their goals (Meijers et al., 2014). For example, when a goal is as yet unfulfilled, 
goal related constructs are salient and individuals may feel a resulting strong motivation 
to pursue the goal (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). However, once someone has acted in 
accordance with that goal, motivation may decrease (Meijers et al., 2014).  For instance, 
someone with the general aim of being more pro-environmental and who undertakes a 
pro-environmental action (e.g., recycling) may feel that they have to some extent 
achieved their goal for the day and, therefore, feel licensed to relax in the pursuit of this 
goal. In contrast another person might interpret their decision to recycle as further 
evidence of their commitment to being pro-environmental, thus, motivating them to 
undertake further pro-environmental decisions (Fishbach, Eyal, & Finkelstein, 2010).22  
The study explored whether feelings of progress would be positively associated with 
higher levels of flip-flopping. It also investigated whether higher levels of commitment 
would result in more consistent decision-making (lower levels of flip-flopping). 
Additionally, as in Study 2, a measure of intention was included. Just as in Study 2 it 
was expected that participants who reflected on environmental harm would express 
stronger (compensatory) intentions to be more pro-environmental.  
Finally, a measure of normative beliefs about environmental obligations (those of 
individuals, businesses and governments) as used by Stern et al. (1999) was also 
included to investigate how this may relate to the level of flip-flopping seen. It was 
expected that participants with strong normative beliefs may be less willing to make 
trade-offs in their pro-environmental decision-making. 
                                                 




 A total of 413 people from the University of Sheffield student volunteers list responded 
to the online survey. The study was advertised as generally relating to decision-making 
rather than being specifically about the environment. As before, the aim of this was to 
reduce the risk of recruiting a sample of participants with a particular interest in or 
commitment to the environment. A total of 56 people were excluded from analysis 
because they did not provide any data. Another individual was excluded because of a 
technical problem with the online survey. A further 69 participants were excluded from 
the analysis because they provided an incorrect response to a comprehension question 
which was designed to check whether participants had read and understood the 
imagined recycling scenarios. This left a total of 286 respondents. The sample contained 
102 males, 168 females and 2 who identified as other. Other descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5: Descriptive statistics by experimental condition  
 Imagined recycling Imagined failure to recycle 
M SD N M SD N 
Age  23.94 6.63 134 23.95 6.65 138 
Green Identity 15.13 2.71 135 14.11 2.74 140 
Normative Belief 30.96 3.88 135 30.61 4.55 138 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (imagine recycling or 
failure to recycle).  An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the age of 
participants in both experimental conditions. There was no significant difference in age 
between conditions; t(270) = .01, p = .991 or sex χ2 (1, n = 270) = .22, p = .637.  An 
independent-samples t-test comparing green identity scores found a significant 
difference between conditions; t(273) =  3.10, p = .002.23 No significant difference was 
found, however, for normative belief scores between conditions; t(271) =  .71, p = .481.  
4.2.3. Materials and procedure 
The vignette which set out the recycling scenario is presented below along with the 
comprehension question:  
                                                 
23 The minimum score for the Green Identity Scale was 4 and the maximum was 20 (sum of 4 items 
coded 1 to 5). 
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You have had friends come to visit. As a result you have far more waste to 
dispose of than usual. You have been storing the materials that can be recycled 
(e.g., cardboard, tins, plastic bottles, and glass) but these are taking up valuable 
space in your small kitchen. Your recycling bin is full and you cannot fit in the 
remaining bags of plastic, glass, tins and paper. There is, however, some space 
in the general disposal bin but this will mean that the recyclable materials will 
be sent to landfill. There is a recycling centre at the supermarket which is a short 
walk from your house. You pack all the recycling into bags and take it to the 
recycling centre [recycle condition]/“You opt to put the recycling in the general 
disposal bin” [non-recycle condition]. 
What happened to the recyclable materials? 
 Recycled 
 Disposed of with the general waste 
The same instructions as before (Study 3) were used in conjunction with the vignette. 
Below is an example of a vignette used in this study:  
You find your job stressful and enjoy shopping for leisure at the weekends with 
your friends.  You are all interested in fashion. You particularly enjoy treating 
yourself to new clothes.  However, you have recently been made aware that 
cotton is one of the most pesticide intensive crops in the world. The clothing 
industry is therefore causing environmental damage and by shopping for leisure 
you are contributing to this problem. You find that it is possible to buy organic 
cotton which is grown in a more environmentally friendly way but that this is far 
more expensive and the range of designs is more limited. Which of the 
following would you do?    
 Buy non-organic cotton 
 Buy organic cotton 
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to report how they felt about the 
decision which had been taken (namely to recycle or not) using a 5-point Likert scale 
anchored by “Very slightly or not at all” and “Extremely”. The response options were: 
happy, sad, proud and guilty – with happy and sad being distractor items. The aim was 
88 
 
to investigate whether imagining success or failure to recycle would trigger feelings of 
guilt and pride in the participants. Participants were then instructed to read and respond 
to a series of vignettes. A total of three vignettes were presented (see Appendix Three) 
in a counterbalanced order.24 Following the vignettes participants were asked to rate 
their intention to “do more to help the environment” using a 7-point Likert scale 
anchored by “very untrue of me” to “very true of me”. The midpoint was labelled 
“neutral”. Four filler items were included (e.g., “I intend to take more exercise”). 
Participants were then presented with the PANAS scale (positive subscale Cronbach’s α 
= .91; negative subscale Cronbach’s α = .89) and a short measure of green identity 
(Cronbach’s α = .63) developed by Whitmarsh and O'Neill (2010). Also included were a 
two-item scale assessing progress and commitment toward the goal of being pro-
environmental and a measure of Personal Normative Beliefs (Cronbach’s α = .88) about 
environmental obligations  (those of individuals, businesses and governments) as used 
by Stern et al. (1999). The Personal Normative Belief scale consisted of 9 items of 
which 3 related to beliefs about personal moral obligations (e.g., I feel a personal 
obligation to do whatever I can to prevent climate change), 3 related to obligations of 
government (e.g., The government should take strong action to reduce emissions and 
prevent global climate change) and 3 related to obligations of business (Business and 
industry should reduce their emissions to help prevent climate change). Responses were 
recorded on a 5-point scale anchored by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”. 
Finally, there were two demographic questions on sex (Which one of these most 
accurately describes you? Male/Female/Other) and age (How old are you?) which was 
an open response question.  
4.2.4. Results 
4.2.4.1. Comprehension and manipulation checks 
A question asking participants whether the materials were recycled or not was included 
in order to assess whether participants had read and understood the vignettes. In total 69 
participants were excluded from the analysis because they provided an incorrect 
response to the question. A manipulation check was also undertaken to assess whether 
                                                 
24 Counterbalancing controlled for order effects while also making the data output from Qualtrics easier to 
process than when randomisation was used. 
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participants had emotionally engaged with the imaginative exercise. Two independent 
samples t-tests confirmed that participants who imagined failure to recycle reported 
significantly higher guilt (M = 3.11, SD = 1.13) than participants who imagined 
recycling (M = 1.12, SD = .45); t(187.06) = 19.61, p = <.001 (equal variance not 
assumed), while participants who imagined failure to recycle reported significantly 
lower pride (M = 1.14, SD = .63) than participants who imagined recycling (M = 3.17, 
SD = 1.20); t(214.36) = 17.92, p = <.001 (equal variances not assumed).  This suggests 
that the manipulation was effective. 
4.2.4.2. Environmental decision-making  
Based upon Study 3 and the concept of moral licensing it was predicted that participants 
would make a free choice that contrasted with their imagined (i.e., forced) response. 
Participants who had imagined causing harm to the environment by not making the 
effort to recycle were expected to compensate by making a pro-environmental choice. 
In contrast, participants who had imagined recycling were expected to feel licensed to 
act less pro-environmentally on their first free choice.  However, a chi-square test for 
independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no significant association 
between imagined choice and first free choice, χ2 (1, N = 286) = .14, p = .713, phi = .03.  
Table 4-6: Participants’ first free choice after imagining recycling scenarios 
  Less pro-environmental 
first free choice made 
More pro-environmental 
first free choice made 
Imagined failure to 
recycle condition 
Count 92 51 
Exp. Count 90 53 
Imagined recycling 
condition 
Count 88 55 
Exp. Count 90 53 
 
If participants in the failure to recycle condition flip-flopped (i.e., alternated between 
doing what was personally beneficial and what was pro-environmental) then they 
should have made a maximum of 2 pro-environmental free choices. In contrast, if 
participants in the imagined recycling condition flip-flopped they should have made 
only 1 pro-environmental free choice. The hypothesis that the imagined failure to 
recycle condition would select a greater number of pro-environmental responses to the 
vignettes was also unsupported by the data; t(281.48) = 1.55, p =.123 (two tailed) (equal 
variances not assumed). Taken together these analyses found: a) no evidence that 
participants made a first free choice that contrasted with their imagined choice (which 
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would have been indicative of compensating and licensing effects) and, b) that 
participants in the imagined failure to recycle condition did not make efforts to 
compensate.  
4.2.4.3. Exploring sequential decision-making 
Following on from Study 3, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to look for 
evidence of flip-flopping in sequential decision-making. Again, the analyses were 
conducted in two steps. First, a basic regression model was conducted which simply 
predicted responses to vignette using responses from the preceding vignette (Wald χ2(1) 
= 5.72, p = .017, Pseudo R2 = .01, Log pseudolikelihood = -369.80). Second, green 
identity was added to the model (Wald χ2(2) = 39.83, p <.0005, Pseudo R2 = .07, Log 
pseudolikelihood = -346.28) . Both regression analyses used clustering to take into 
account that there were multiple data points from each participant (because they 
responded to a series of vignettes). As shown in Table 4-7 response to “preceding 
vignette” (T1) was a significant predictor of “response to vignette” (T2) but that this 
effect was no longer significant when green identity was added as a predictor. From this 
data it can be seen that: a) strength of green identity is more important in predicting 
choice than was “preceding vignette” and b) the direction of the relationship for T1 is 
positive meaning that participants showed highlighting rather than balancing in their 
choices. Study 4, therefore, did not replicate the findings of study 1.  
Table 4-7 Regression exploring the influence of previous choice on current choice 
Step Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE z P>[z] 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
1 Constant .59 .07 -4.57 <.0005 .47 .74 
T1 1.54 .28 2.39 .017 1.08 2.20 
2 Constant  .02 .01 -6.30 <.0005 .00 .06 
T1 1.03 .20 .13 .895 .70 1.51 
Green ID 1.28 .06 5.75 <.0005 .18 1.40 
(Number of observations = 550. Std. Err adjusted for 275 clusters in Participant ID.) 
4.2.4.4. Intention 
It was expected that participants who had imagined failing to recycle would express 
stronger intentions to help the environment. This, however, was not the case. 
91 
 
Participants who imagined recycling reported significantly stronger pro-environmental 
intentions (M = 5.24, SD = 1.09) than participants who imagined failing to recycle (M = 
4.88, SD = 1.35); t(281) = 2.47, p = .014 (2 tailed) suggesting a positive spillover 
(consistency) effect rather than evidence of compensation.  
4.2.4.5. PANAS 
This second measurement of affect took place after participants had completed the 
vignette exercise. As before, participants in the imagined failure to recycle condition (M 
= 2.09, SD = 1.10) reported significantly stronger feelings of guilt than participants who 
imagined recycling (M = 1.65, SD = .964); t(273) = 3.48, p = .001 (two tailed). 
However, participants who imagined recycling no longer reported significantly stronger 
feelings of pride (M = 2.13, SD = 1.21) than those who imagined failing to recycle (M = 
1.15, SD = 1.14), t(273) = 1.90, p = .059 (two tailed).  
The focal emotions in the study were guilt and pride. However, overall positive and 
negative affect scores were also checked. The results are as follows: participants in the 
imagined failure to recycle condition (M = 17.56, SD = 6.94) reported significantly 
stronger negative affect on the PANAS measure than participants who imagined 
recycling (M = 15.61, SD = 6.91); t(273) = 2.34, p = .020 (two tailed). Similarly, 
participants who imagined recycling had significantly stronger positive affect (M = 
25.13, SD = 8.77) than those who imagined failure to recycle (M = 22.78, SD = 8.61); 
t(273) = 2.24, p = .026 (two tailed). 
4.2.4.6. Perceptions of commitment and progress  
It was anticipated that feelings of progress in being environmental (e.g., among 
participants who were more focused on environmental sub goals such as doing the 
recycling, than on the superordinate goal of “being pro-environmental”) would 
positively correlate with higher levels of flip-flopping in responses. In contrast, a 
negative relationship between feelings of commitment and the number of times 
participants’ flip-flopped was expected. However, there is no significant relationship in 
terms of either commitment or progress (between Progress and Sum of Flip-Flops, r = 
.08, n = 275, p = .173, between Commitment and Sum of Flip-Flops, r = .03, n = 275, p 
= .577).  
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4.2.4.7. Normative Belief 
A scale was included to explore the relationship between normative beliefs and how 
(in)consistent participants were their environmental decision-making. It had been 
expected that normative beliefs would be negatively correlated with more inconsistent 
decision-making. However, there was no significant correlation between Normative 
Beliefs and Sum of Flip-Flops, r = .10, n = 273, p = .109. 
4.2.5. Study 4: Summary and discussion 
In Study 3, evidence suggesting the presence of compensating and licensing effects was 
found. It appeared that participants flip-flopped between more and less pro-
environmental decisions in an attempt to balance self-interest with environmental 
interests. Study 4 built on this previous quasi-experimental study by randomly 
allocating participants to one of two experimental conditions (imagined recycling and 
imagined failure to recycle). The main hypothesis was that if participants were 
compensating and licensing they would make a first free choice which contrasted with 
their imagined decision (to recycle or not). The study also looked at sequential decision-
making to investigate whether participants would continue to alternate between more 
and less pro-environmental decisions in their remaining free responses. Study 4 also 
follows on from Study 2 by looking at whether participants who imagined harming the 
environment would report higher levels of guilt and whether those imagining benefitting 
the environment would report higher levels of pride.  
While participants who imagined a failure to recycle did report higher levels of guilt 
they did not make a pro-environmental (i.e., compensatory) first free decision. 
Similarly, while participants who imagined recycling reported feeling pride they did not 
show evidence of self-licensing by making a less pro-environmental first choice. Rather, 
taken together the results of Study 4 suggest consistent rather than contrasting decision-
making. Participants who imagined acting pro-environmentally went on to express 
greater intentions to be pro-environmental in future than participants who had imagined 
acting less pro-environmentally. Furthermore, the relationship between previous 
response to a vignette and current response to a vignette was positive which might be 
taken to suggest consistency in responses. Notably, this relationship between past and 
current response disappeared after controlling for Green Identity, suggesting that Green 
93 
 
Identity was a primary driver of responding within the task.  These results differ, 
therefore, from both those of Study 3 and the predictions of Zhong (2010).  
One potential explanation for this difference might be found in the participant samples 
which differed in age, with participants in Study 4 being older. The literature suggests 
that consistency in moral decision-making increases with age (see Sidani, Zbib, 
Rawwas, & Moussawer, 2009).  Furthermore, participants in Study 4 completed the 
study online rather than in lab conditions where an experimenter was present. These 
issues are taken up in Chapter 6: Main discussion. 
Another reason why the results of Studies 3 and 4 differ may be because the imagined 
recycling vignette informed participants whether they had recycled or not rather than 
giving them a free choice.  According to the Norm Activation Model (see Chapter 1) in 
order to act pro-environmentally participants would need to feel a sense of personal 
responsibility for the state of the environment (i.e., whether recycling had taken place or 
not). Participants who were informed that they had failed to recycle may have felt 
negative without feeling personally responsible. Similarly, participants who were 
instructed to imagine recycling rather than actually selecting this option may have felt 
pride and yet not have felt that they had obtained a moral license to relax in pursuit of 
this goal (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015; Bradley-Geist, King, Skorinko, 
Hebl, & McKenna, 2010).  
A third reason for the difference in results between Studies 3 and 4 could relate to the 
nature of the vignettes. For example, the first vignette seen by participants in Study 4 
was a scenario about waste and pollution (by recycling materials could be re-used rather 
than contributing to landfill). Two of the free choice vignettes have a very similar 
theme. One related to whether to make the effort to throw paint away or give it away so 
that it could be used again while the other looked at whether to invest in re-usable 
nappies or use disposable ones that will add to landfill.  The third vignette related to 
shopping for leisure (i.e., unnecessary consumption) highlighting the pollution caused 
by clothes manufacture. Because more vignettes were used in Study 3 there was a 
greater variety of scenarios making the situations less related. It is possible, for 
example, that participants may have been more sensitive to making contrasting or 
hypocritical decisions on vignettes that were perceptively similar leading them to act 
more consistently (Blanken et al., 2015). This question is explored by Study 5.  
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Before moving on, it is interesting to note that, in Study 4, while participants were 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions, participants in the imagined recycling 
condition had significantly higher reported green identity scores than participants who 
had imagined a failure to recycle. It is possible that this difference results from a failure 
in randomisation, whereby, more participants with stronger green identities were 
allocated to the imagined recycling condition. However, as participants responded to the 
green identity measure after the vignettes it is perhaps more probable that the study 
inadvertently manipulated participants’ sense of green identity.  For example, it may 
have been the case that imagining recycling not only made participants feel pride but 
also re-enforced their sense of green identity. In contrast, it may have been the case that 
participants who imagined acting less pro-environmentally and who experienced 
feelings of guilt may have felt discouraged from undertaking further pro-environmental 
decisions.  In short, the exercise may have undermined their green identities. That 
participants in the imagined failure to recycle condition continued to feel negative is 
confirmed by the PANAS scale that was completed at the end of the vignette exercise.  
4.3. Study 5: Exploring consistency and contrast in sequential 
environmental decision making across similar and dissimilar 
vignettes 
4.3.1. Study 5 aims 
So far this chapter has presented two studies. The first set out to assess whether there 
was evidence of participants seeking to establish a balance between personally 
beneficial and environmentally beneficial decisions over a series of 10 different 
scenarios. The finding was that participants did ‘flip-flop’ between more and less pro-
environmental decisions once the extent of their green identity was controlled for. Study 
4 aimed to build on the findings of Study 3 and better understand the licensing and 
compensating mechanisms by manipulating participants’ first choice and, thereby, 
whether they started the exercise in moral credit or deficit. The results of Study 4 
differed from those of Study 3 in that rather than finding contrasting decisions 
participants were found to act more consistently. A number of reasons were proposed as 
to why the results differed. One potential explanation was that the difference related to 
the nature of the vignettes.  For example, participants may have been more sensitive to 
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inconsistencies in their decision-making because the vignettes in Study 4 were more 
conceptually similar (e.g., in the type of issue raised) than those in Study 3.     
Within the literature there has been some debate regarding whether positive spillover 
(Thøgersen, 1999; Tucker & Douglas, 2007) or licensing and compensating (i.e., “flip-
flopping”) (Blanken et al., 2015) are more likely to occur when behaviours are 
conceptually similar. On the one hand where behaviours are conceptually similar it 
might be expected that people might see the connection between behaviours and, 
therefore, act more consistently. On the other hand it has been proposed that where 
behaviours are conceptually similar it would be easier for someone to assess whether 
they are in a state of moral credit or deficit (see Study 1). It would arguably be easier, 
for example, to make an assessment of whether one form of travel could off-set or 
compensate for another (e.g., cycling to compensate for car use) than trying to assess 
whether car travel could be off-set by waste prevention (e.g., recycling to compensate 
for car use).  
The main aim of Study 5, therefore, was to investigate whether the extent to which 
vignettes were conceptually similar would influence the amount of compensating and 
licensing (‘flip-flopping’) seen. The results of Study 4 suggest that compensation will 
be less likely to occur within related vignettes. The present study (Study 5) had two 
experimental conditions: conceptually related vignettes (e.g., all relating to domestic 
energy use or to travel) and conceptually dissimilar vignettes (e.g., a combination of 
travel and domestic vignettes presented alternately to maximise variation). Participants 
were randomly allocated to one of these conditions. In Study 5, participants were able to 
make their own choice in response to the vignette first seen, rather than being asked to 
imagine having made a particular choice. It was hoped, therefore, that participants 
would feel personally responsible for the decisions made.  
Furthermore, like Studies 3 and 4, the present study (study 5) also aimed to further 
explore sequential decision making by looking at the extent to which previous decisions 
(i.e., whether one is in moral credit or deficit) and green identity would influence the 
amount of flip-flopping seen.  
As previously outlined, after controlling for green identity, Study 3 found a negative 
relationship between previous and current decisions suggesting compensating and 
licensing effects (as measured by flip-flopping). In contrast, the relationship identified 
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by Study 4 was positive suggesting more consistent responses (or a lack of flip-
flopping). Study 5, once again, set out to look for evidence of compensation and 
licensing by taking into account behavioural history and green identity. Finally, the 
extent to which strength of green identity influences the amount of compensating seen 
(as measured by flip-flopping) was assessed. This was to investigate whether 
participants who somewhat but not fully identified with the goal of being pro-
environmental would be more likely to compensate relative to the other participants as 
suggested by Rabiau et al. (2006) in the literature on health compensation.  
4.3.2. Pilot study  
A set of 8 vignettes were developed by the author. The vignettes underwent an iterative 
process of revisions which involved being piloted by undergraduates and discussed by 
the author and the author’s supervisory team. Following this the vignettes were 
amended and then re-piloted. The results of the final pilot study are presented in this 
section. Four vignettes related to travel including decisions about commuting to work 
(car versus bicycle), travelling to meet friends for lunch (car versus bus), going to the 
shops (car versus foot) and traveling to another city (car versus train). Four vignettes 
related to domestic decisions including whether to turn up the thermostat or wear a 
jumper, whether or not to turn off a laptop left on at night and whether to go back home 
to turn off lights.  As before, each vignette had a response option that forced participants 
to choose between doing something personally beneficial (e.g., more convenient) but 
which had a greater negative environmental impact (e.g., increased CO2) or acting pro-
environmentally but at greater cost to self.  
Participants: Ten Level 1 Psychology students rated the 8 vignettes in an online study 
in exchange for 1 course credit. Participants had a mean age of 18.90 (range 18 – 20 
years). A total of 9 participants were female and 1 was male.  
Procedure: The procedure was as follows. First the participants were asked how easy it 
was to imagine themselves in the situation described. Responses were recorded on a 4-
point scale with response options being “very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult 
and very difficult (coded as 1 = very easy and 4 = very difficult). Participants who felt 
that a vignettes was not very easy to imagine were invited to explain why this was the 
case (open response question) in order that the vignette could be improved.  Next 
participants were asked how much of a negative impact (e.g., in terms of water, energy, 
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carbon etc.,) each of the vignette response options would have (e.g., travel by car vs. 
bicycle). Responses were recorded on a 4-point scale (1 = no impact, some impact, 
moderate impact and 4 = big impact). Participants then evaluated how personally costly 
each response option was (e.g., in terms of inconvenience caused, take taken, personal 
comfort). This was done using a 4-point scale (1 = not costly, somewhat costly, quite a 
bit, 4 = very costly). Participants were invited to provide suggestions on how the 
vignette and/or its response options could be improved.   
Results: The results of the pilot trial were as follows. Both the travel vignettes (M = 
1.10, SD = .21) and the domestic vignettes (M = 1.23, SD = .34) were deemed easy to 
imagine and did not differ significantly in this respect; t(9) = 1.25, p = .244 (two tailed). 
Paired sample t-tests revealed that participants rated the less pro-environmental 
behaviours as having significantly higher negative impact (e.g., greater CO2 emissions) 
(M = 2.75, SD = .40) than the more pro-environmental behaviours (M = 1.50, SD = .33), 
t(9) = 6.87, p < .001  (two tailed), and the more pro-environmental behaviours as being 
significantly more personally costly  (e.g., in terms of inconvenience caused) (M = 2.25, 
SD = .53) than the less pro-environmental behaviours (M = 1.69, SD = .53), t(9) = 2.30, 
p = .047 (two tailed). It was important that acting environmentally was seen as more 
personally costly in order to establish scenarios where environmental and personal goals 
conflicted. A series of paired samples t-tests were conducted to check whether personal 
costliness and negative impact ratings were comparable between the two sets of 
vignettes. No significant differences were found (all p ≥ .158).   
4.3.3. Participants (main study) 
For the main study, and in contrast to Studies 3-4, participants were staff members at 
The University of Sheffield, UK who were contacted via a university mailing list during 
March 2015. Staff members were chosen because they were deemed to be more likely 
to make decisions about commuting and home energy use. A total of 360 participants 
entered the online study, of which 18 were excluded because they did not actually 
engage with the task or gave incomplete responses to the vignettes. Participants were 
offered the opportunity to enter into a prize draw to win £30.  Participants had a mean 
age of 38.38 years (range 18–72), 132 (38.5%) were male and 208 female (60.6%). A 
total of 328 (95.6%) participants reported contributing to household utility bills, 261 
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(76.1%) stated that they had access to a car and 253 (73.8%) reported traveling some 
distance between their home and work place on a regular basis.   
4.3.4. Materials  
There was some concern that participants’ decision-making might be influenced by 
financial considerations and that this might lead participants to make more pro-
environmental decisions (e.g., saving energy) than would be the case if money was no 
issue. For this reason the vignette instructions used in Studies 3 and 4 were amended to 
read as follows:   
Instructions. Please read carefully. As you read each of the stories, please take a 
little time to imagine yourself in the situation described. Even if you have never 
experienced the situation before, try to imagine yourself in it. After reading each 
story you will need to make a decision. You have the opportunity to do either of 
the options which are presented. Please respond to the information given in each 
story and note that in these scenarios, you have no restrictions on your budget, 
so there are no negative consequences of spending money. Please answer as 
honestly as possible. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Vignettes either presented domestic energy use or travel related vignettes. Below are 
two examples of vignettes used in this study. The first vignette relates to domestic 
energy use while the second relates to travel.   
Imagine that you are at home relaxing after an exhausting day at work. You are 
starting to feel rather cold. The heating is on but the house takes some time to 
warm up. You could go all the way up to your room in the attic to find a jumper 
to wear to try and keep warm. Alternatively you could turn the electric heater on 
for half an hour which will make the room warm. Getting a jumper would be 
better for the environment but considering how tired and cold you feel, turning 
on the electric heater would be easier, especially as it is next to you in the 
lounge. Which of the following would you do? 
- Turn on the electric heater instead of getting your jumper 
- Don’t turn on the electric heater and get your jumper 
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Imagine that you are planning a journey to your work place. You own a bicycle 
and a car and live 11km (7 miles) from your work place. There is a good cycle 
route between your home and work. Today the weather is bad so your cycle ride 
will be very cold and wet. However, you can get showered at work once you 
arrive. Otherwise you could drive to work, and there is no indication that there 
will be any traffic jams. Cycling would be better for the environment but 
considering the bad weather driving would be more pleasant. Which of the 
following would you do? 
- Travel by car 
- Travel by bicycle  
After participants had responded to the vignettes they were asked to provide basic 
demographic data. The demographic questions were as follows: How old are you? This 
was an open response question. Which of the following best describes you (Male, 
Female, Other, Prefer not to say)? Do you contribute to your household utility bills 
(e.g., electricity or water)? Response options were: Yes, No, and Prefer not to say. Do 
you have access to a car (as either a driver or a passenger)? Response options were: 
Yes, No and Unsure. Do you have to travel some distance between your home and place 
of work on a regular basis. Response options were: Yes, No and Unsure/Prefer not to 
say). Finally participants were asked to complete a short measure of green identity 
designed by Whitmarsh and O'Neill (2010) (Cronbach’s α = .74) which was described 
in Section 2.3.2 (beginning on page 41).  
4.3.5. Procedure 
The study was advertised as relating to decision making. After reading the instructions, 
participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions. Participants either saw 
four conceptually similar vignettes (i.e., either relating to travel or to domestic tasks) or 
four dissimilar vignettes (i.e., a combination of domestic and travel vignettes). The 
order of the vignettes was counterbalanced using a balanced Roman Square design. 
Each vignette required participants to make a choice between a more personally 
beneficial but environmentally detrimental option and a personally detrimental but 
environmentally beneficial option. As in Study 3 participants were free to make their 
own first choice.  It was possible for participants to alternate between more and less pro-
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environmental behaviours a maximum of three times (i.e., between vignette 1 and 2, 
between vignette 2 and 3 and between vignette 3 and 4).  For the purposes of analysis 
the two sets of conceptually similar vignettes were combined into one experimental 
condition (i.e., similar vignettes). The sets of combined travel and domestic vignettes 
were also combined into one experimental condition (i.e., dissimilar vignettes). After 
participants responded to the vignettes they were asked to provide basic demographic 
data and to complete a short measure of green identity designed by Whitmarsh and 
O'Neill (2010).  
4.3.6. Results 
4.3.6.1. Randomisation check  
An independent samples t-test found no significant difference with respect to the age of 
participants (years) within the similar vignettes condition (M = 38.29, SD = 11.48) and 
the dissimilar vignettes condition (M = 38.47, SD = 1237); t(337) = .14, p  = .888. No 
significant difference was found between conditions on the basis of sex χ2 (1, N = 340) 
= .52, p = .473 (two-sided). Furthermore, no significant differences were found with 
respect to reported levels of green identity between similar (M = 14.98, SD = 2.91) and 
dissimilar (M = 15.26, SD = 2.61) conditions; p = .546 (two tailed).  
4.3.6.2. Conceptual similarity of vignettes 
Next the question was addressed as to whether participants would compensate and 
licence less (as assessed by the number of flip-flops between more and less pro-
environmental decisions) in scenarios that were conceptually similar (i.e., where 
hypocrisy/inconsistency should be more apparent) than in scenarios that were 
conceptually dissimilar. To test this an independent samples t-test was conducted. 
Contrary to expectations there was no significant difference in flip-flopping between the 
similar (M = 1.30, SD = .94) and the dissimilar conditions (M = 1.43, SD = .93); t(341) 
= 1.22, p = .224.  
4.3.6.3. Exploring Sequential Decision-Making  
In Study 3, evidence of a negative relationship between preceding and current decisions 
was found suggesting that participants did “flip-flop” between more and less pro-
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environmental decisions – thus, striking a balance between self-concern and 
environmental concern (once the extent of their green identity was controlled for).  
Study 4 further explored the relationship between participants’ previous decisions and 
their present decisions. The evidence suggested that previous decisions were predictors 
of present decisions. However, once green identity was included in the regression model 
previous decision was no longer a significant predictor. Furthermore, unlike Study 3 the 
relationship between previous and current decision was positive suggesting that 
participants were acting consistently rather than flip-flopping. The present study (Study 
5) ran the analyses again to see whether the findings of Study 3 could be replicated.   
First, a basic regression model was conducted which simply predicted responses to 
vignette using responses from the preceding vignette (Wald χ2(1) = 5.79, p = .016, 
Pseudo R2 = .00, Log pseudolikelihood = -697.34). Second, green identity was added to 
the model (Wald χ2(2) = 31.51, p <.0005, Pseudo R2 = .03, Log pseudolikelihood = -
680.82) . Both regression analyses used clustering to take into account that there were 
multiple data points from each participant (because they responded to a series of 
vignettes). As shown Table 4-8 in response to “preceding vignette” (T1) was a 
significant predictor of “response to vignette” (T2) but that this effect was no longer 
significant when green identity was added as a predictor. From this data it can be seen 
that: a) strength of green identity is more important in predicting choice than was 
“preceding vignette” and b) the direction of the relationship for T1 is positive meaning 
that participants showed highlighting rather than balancing in their choices. Study 5, 
therefore, did not replicate the findings of study 3.  
Table 4-8 Regression exploring the influence of previous choice on current choice 
Step Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE z P>[z] 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
1 Constant .86 .08 -1.57 .116 .71 1.04 
T1 1.39 .19 2.41 .016 1.06 1.81 
2 Constant  .12 .05 -5.06 <.0005 .05 .27 
T1 1.20 .17 1.28 .200 .91 1.59 
Green ID 1.15 .03 4.85 <.0005 1.09 1.21 
(Number of observations = 1011. Std. Err adjusted for 337 clusters in Participant ID.) 
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4.3.6.4. Exploring the relationship between green identity and compensation  
The above analysis (4.3.6.3) raises an important question regarding the relationship 
between green identity and compensation, namely, the extent to which strength of green 
identity influences the level of compensating seen (as measured by flip-flopping). In 
Chapters 1 and 2 the review of research on compensation suggested that compensation 
would most likely be seen in people who were somewhat but not fully committed to a 
goal (e.g., Beattie, 2010; Rabiau et al., 2006). By this reasoning we should expect 
participants who have either relatively strong or relatively weak green identities to act 
more consistently (i.e., flip-flop less) than those in the uncomfortable middle position 
who can be expected to experience greater goal conflict.  
A total of 337 participants completed the 4 item measure of green identity. Responses 
were coded so that participants could score a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 20 – 
with higher scores being indicative of stronger green identities. The mean score for 
green identity was 15.12 (Range 7 – 13). To explore the hypothesis that people in the 
middle position (the middling or “light greens”) would exhibit more flip-flopping than 
other participants the sample was divided into 2 parts. Participants scoring 7 – 13 (weak 
green identity) and 17 – 20 (strong green identity) were coded as 1 while participants 
scoring 14 – 16 were coded as 2 (middling greens). An independent samples t-test was 
then conducted to compare the extent of flip-flopping among the middling greens in 
comparison with all the other participants (i.e., strong and weak greens). There was a 
significant difference in scores for the middling greens (M = 1.51, SD = .92) and the 
other participants (M = 1.29, SD = .94); t(335) = 2.09, p = .037, d = .24.  In line with the 
literature (e.g., Rabiau et al., 2006), therefore, it was found that participants with 
middling green identities did flip-flop (i.e., license and compensate) more than other 
participants.  
The above finding further raised the question as to whether any differences would be 
found in the extent of flip-flopping among participants with middling green identities 
between similar and dissimilar conditions. An independent samples t-test was 
conducted. There was no significant difference in levels of flip-flopping between similar 
(M = 1.48, SD = .91) and dissimilar (M = 1.54, SD = .94) conditions; t(127) = .422, p = 
.623. Taken together these analyses suggest that: 1) participants with middling green 
identities flip-flop more than participants with strong and weak green identities and 2) 
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that participants with middling green identities flip-flop more often regardless of the 
conceptual similarity of scenarios.  
4.3.7. Summary 
Study 5 investigated whether the extent to which vignettes are conceptually similar 
would influence the amount of compensating (flip-flopping) seen. The results of Study 
4 suggested that compensation may be less likely to occur within related vignettes 
where hypocrisy/inconsistency would be more obvious. This prediction was not, 
however, supported by the data. There was no significant difference in flip-flopping 
between the similar and the dissimilar conditions. Study 5 also looked at sequential 
decision-making and specifically at the influence of previous choices (behavioural 
history) and green identity in current decision-making. The results were consistent with 
Study 4 – showing consistency between prior and present decisions. Also, as before 
prior decision was no longer a significant predictor of present decision once green 
identity was entered into the model. Finally, the findings of Study 5 appear to be 
consistent with the wider literature on compensatory beliefs in that participants with 
middling green identities (as opposed to strong or weak green identities) appeared to 
compensate (flip-flop) more than other participants. However, no significant differences 
were found in the extent of flip-flopping among middling greens based the conceptual 
similarity of the vignettes.  
4.4. General discussion 
Each day individuals are faced with multiple moral choices, such as, whether to donate 
to charity, buy fair trade, recycle or volunteer. The literature suggests that in navigating 
the moral maze that is everyday decision-making people try to strike a balance between 
managing their reputations (e.g., as good moral people) and their self-interest (Effron, 
2014; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Miller & Effron, 2010; Rabiau et al., 2006). 
Previous research has further suggested that behavioural history is an important factor 
in shaping present moral choices (e.g., Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Study 3 
aimed to build upon this literature and, in particular, the work by Zhong et al. (2010) 
who looked at sequential ethical decision-making. To date, much of the work 
undertaken in this field has used experimental paradigms based on a two stage scenario 
(namely a manipulation and a response). Zhong et al. (2010), however, wanted to look 
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at decision-making across a greater range of instances in order to provide participants 
with multiple opportunities to balance self-interest with a desire to appear moral. Using 
a series of 12 vignettes (scenarios) Zhong et al. (2010) found that participants 
demonstrated a dynamic equilibrium in their ethical decision making – alternating 
between more personally advantageous but morally dubious options and more moral but 
personally disadvantageous options.  
Study 3 used this novel approach which had previously been employed by Zhong et al. 
(2010) to investigate compensating and licensing effects in environmentally related 
sequential decision-making. Study 3 presented participants with ten vignettes and 
allowed them to choose freely between more and less pro-environmental responses. The 
findings complement those of Zhong et al. (2010) because participants who made an 
initial pro-environmental choice were subsequently more likely to make a less pro-
environmental decision and vice versa across the vignettes. This “flip-flopping” pattern 
appears consistent with theories of moral licensing and moral cleansing where 
individuals who have just demonstrated their moral credentials proceed to act in a more 
morally dubious way while those individuals who have violated their values 
subsequently undertake actions which affirm their core values (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that while there was evidence of “flip-flopping” this 
pattern was only significant within the regression model when green identity was 
controlled for. This suggests that a person will tend to act in accordance with their 
general green identity and that, if you control for the influence of this variable, prior 
decisions impact on later decisions in a licensing or compensatory way 
The design of Study 3 had limitations. On one hand, allowing participants to make a 
free first choice most likely engendered feelings of responsibility for the decision made 
and thus promoted compensating and licensing (Bradley-Geist, King, Skorinko, Hebl, & 
McKenna, 2010). However, on the other hand, the lack of randomisation meant that the 
study had the weakness already identified of being quasi-experimental.  
To address this weakness in design, participants in Study 4 were randomly allocated to 
one of two conditions – being asked to imagine making either a pro or less pro-
environmental decision before responding freely to the remaining vignettes. The 
purpose of this imaginative exercise was to manipulate whether or not participants felt 
themselves to be in possession of moral credits. This in turn was predicted to influence 
whether or not participants would made a subsequent pro-environmental choice.  Study 
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4 was based on Zhong and colleagues’ second study which found initial evidence for 
compensation. In the study by Zhong et al. (2010) the condition which was asked to 
imagine making a less ethical choice subsequently freely chose to make a more ethical 
choice, while the condition asked to imagine making a more ethical choice subsequently 
chose to make a less ethical choice. For Zhong et al. (2010) this flip-flopping pattern 
remained significant for the second and third vignettes seen.  
Contrary to expectations, however, the findings of Study 4 did not replicate those of 
Zhong et al. (2010). Study 4 did not find any significant association between imagined 
choice and free choice. The findings of Study 4 also differed from those of Study 3 
(presented earlier in this Chapter) in that a positive relationship was found between 
choice and preceding choice. Again, this indicates an absence of flip-flopping and 
suggests that participants were acting consistently with their imagined choice.  
There are a range of possible explanations for the differences between Studies 3 and 4. 
For example, because participants had not freely chosen their response they may not 
have felt responsible for the environmental harm or benefit described in the scenario. 
Secondly, participant’s emotional responses may have played a role. For example, 
participants in the imagined failure to recycle condition reported significantly higher 
negative affect scores (e.g., guilt). Such participants may have actually felt discouraged 
from taking pro-environmental action or else cognitively resolved their guilt in some 
way. In contrast, participants who imagined recycling felt significantly more positive 
which may have encouraged them to act more pro-environmentally. Furthermore, as 
Study 4 used fewer vignettes than Study 3 and the vignettes used were arguably 
conceptually similar the question was raised as to whether the level of flip-flopping seen 
had been influenced by the nature of the vignettes themselves.  
Study 5 aimed to address some of the limitations of Studies 3 and 4 by randomly 
allocating participants to experimental conditions while still allowing them make a free 
response (rather than an imagined choice). The study investigated whether the similarity 
of the pro-environmental behaviours being undertaken influenced the amount of flip-
flopping (or compensating/licensing) behaviours seen. While Blanken et al. (2015) had 
predicted that greater licensing effects would be seen within related situations, Study 3 
suggested that participants might be more sensitive to inconsistencies in their 
behaviours where vignettes were related. Contrary to either of these predictions, no 
significant difference was found based on the conceptual similarity of the vignettes. 
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Again, the study looked to evidence flip-flopping in sequential decision-making as 
found by Zhong et al. (2010). As in Study 4 preceding choice was a predictor of choice 
but was no longer significant when green identity was entered into the regression 
model. Again the relationship between preceding choice and choice was positive 
indicating consistency and, therefore, a lack of flip-flopping.   
Study 5 further investigated the relationship between the extent of an individual’s green 
identity and the level of compensation and licensing (as measured by flip-flopping) seen 
in their decision-making. Previous research would lead us to expect that people with 
low green identities (i.e., who do not really identify with being pro-environmental) 
should experience relatively low goal conflict when presented with the choice of acting 
to benefit self or the environment, and thus, act consistently (Rabiau et al., 2006). 
Similarly, people with stronger green identities should make more consistent pro-
environmental choices and be less likely to exhibit tendencies towards compensation or 
licensing (Rabiau et al., 2006). For example, Meijers et al. (2014) found that 
participants with strong green identities were unlikely to show licensing behaviours 
within an environmental domain (although they did within non-environmental 
domains). Furthermore, Kaklamanou, Jones, Webb, and Walker (2015) found that 
endorsement of compensatory green beliefs was negatively associated with green 
identity. In the compensatory health belief model Rabiau et al. (2006) predicted that 
compensation would be most likely to occur among individuals who were somewhat but 
not fully committed to their health goals. This led to the prediction in Study 5 that 
participants had either relatively strong or relatively weak green identities should act 
more consistently (i.e., flip-flop less) than those in the uncomfortable middle position. 
In line with these expectations and the literature participants in the middling green 
category did make significantly more compensatory decisions (as measured by flip-
flopping). Perhaps, surprisingly, there were no significant differences in flip-flopping 
among the middling greens based on the conceptual similarity of the vignettes. In short, 
these participants exhibited balancing behaviours regardless of how similar the 
scenarios were. 
The three experiments presented here provide a novel approach to exploring sequential 
environmentally pertinent decision-making. The studies provide insight into spillover 
effects. For example, all three studies lend support to the hypothesis that previous 
decisions do in fact influence current decisions to some extent. The studies also show 
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the importance of green identity in environmental decision-making – with the “light” or 
“middling” greens being significantly more likely to exhibit compensating and licensing 
effects (as measured by flip-flopping) than other participants. Study 4 suggests that 
simply taking a moment to imagine undertaking a simple and low-cost pro-
environmental behaviour could help to promote positive spillover effects, while Study 5 
also suggests that strengthening green identity could help to promote positive spillover.  
Questions still remain, however, as to why compensating and licensing were seen in 
Study 3 but not in Studies 4 and 5. Could it be the case, for example, that student 
participants who undertake the study in person (as opposed to online) are more likely to 
try and strike a balance between reputation management and pro-environmental 
decisions? Another possible explanation could relate to the way in which participants’ 
mindset might influence whether or not they showed compensating and licensing effects 
or more consistent responses. For example, participants who focus on environmental 
subgoals (e.g., doing the recycling) might be more likely to relax in goal pursuit than 
participants who focus on abstract goals (e.g., being environmental).  This question is 
explored in Study 6 in the next chapter.  
4.4.1. Concluding thoughts 
At the end of the previous chapter (Chapter 3, Study 2) evidence of compensatory 
intentions but not compensatory behaviours had been found. It has hypothesised that 
evidence of compensatory behaviours might be seen if participants were offered the 
opportunity to balance personal benefits with environmental benefits over a series of 
different scenarios. The 3 studies presented in this chapter (Chapter 4) provide some 
(albeit) equivocal evidence of compensatory behaviour. The analyses suggest that 
compensating and licensing effects are subtle and participants appear to be influenced 
more strongly by the extent of their green identities than by either previous behaviours 
or the conceptual similarity of scenarios. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that free 
choice, the age of participants and social pressure (e.g., presence of an experimenter in 









5. Chapter 5: Do perceptions of goal progress versus 
goal commitment influence the consistency of pro-
environmental action? 
5.1. Introduction  
The previous Chapter (Chapter 4, Studies 3-5) explored the idea of compensation as a 
way of achieving balance between maximising pleasure and minimising harm (Rabiau, 
Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006). Following on from the work of Zhong, Ku, Lount, and 
Murnigham (2010) the studies presented in Chapter 4 took a relatively novel approach 
by looking at sequential environmentally-related decision-making. Overall, Studies 3-5 
found some evidence suggestive of compensation and licensing in decision-making as 
measured by “flip-flopping” (i.e., alternating between more and less pro-environmental 
choices) and as indicated by the relationship between guilt and intention. Furthermore, 
the studies found that behavioural history and green identity influenced participants’ 
choices. While Chapter 4 focused on how people might balance conflicting goals, the 
current chapter focuses on the relationship between affect, goal construal, licensing 
effects and compensation. Specifically, this chapter considers how the way in which 
individuals interpret their advancement towards achieving a goal might influence 
licensing and compensating effects.   
5.2. Study context: goal monitoring  
In order to work towards any goal, it is crucial to monitor goal progress (Harkin et al., 
2015). This process of monitoring can be seen as a test of consistency between one’s 
desired state (e.g., being someone who is able to run a marathon) and one’s current state 
(e.g., being someone who can only run short distance) (Moskowitz, 2009). Where a 
discrepancy is found it is thought that a state of tension arises. This tension could be 
expressed as, for example, a feeling of longing or as a negative emotion (e.g., guilt or 
regret) in relation to one’s performance standard (Bandura, 1989; Moskowitz, 2009). 
The process of goal monitoring has been compared to a negative feedback loop (Carver 
& Scheier, 1981). For example, someone might test the degree of consistency between 
their desired and current state, initiate an action to reduce discrepancy, and either 
continue to take action until dissonance is reduced or once this is achieved terminate 
goal pursuit (Moskowitz, 2009).  For instance, someone who is hungry may have the 
110 
 
goal of finding something to eat and, having done so, they may feel that they have eaten 
enough and, therefore, discontinue attending to this goal.  
Arguably, it is easier to determine the extent of one’s goal advancement in the case of 
goals which are fairly concreate and it is more difficult in the case of more abstract or 
“higher” goals. For example, having the goal of “being” something is far vaguer and 
more difficult to attain than having the goal of “doing” something. For instance, the 
goal of “being pro-environmental” could involve any number and type of actions and 
has no deadline meaning that reducing a discrepancy between one’s current and desired 
state is likely to be difficult to achieve. Furthermore, advancement towards some goals 
may be slow and hard to perceive. For example, someone trying to lose weight cannot 
easily monitor their advancement on an hourly basis but may need to wait for larger 
periods of time such as weeks or months. In the case of “being pro-environmental”, this 
time period may be even more substantial. For example, a person may never see any 
tangible improvement in the environment within their lifetime. In short, it might be 
expected, therefore, that people may feel a greater need to employ compensatory beliefs 
for goals that are more distant or difficult to achieve in order to smooth over instances 
of patchy goal progress (e.g., those occasions where they pursued desires that conflicted 
with goal progress), as indicated by Study 1. 
While abstract or “superordinate” goals can be seen as far from reach it is possible to 
break these abstract goals down into more concrete and specific actions known as “sub-
goals” (Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Fishbach & Finkelstein, 2010). Take the case 
of “being pro-environmental”. This abstract goal can be broken down into a series of 
specific actions such as doing the recycling or doing laundry at 30 degrees. Research by 
Fishbach et al. (2006) has suggested that when people focus on the successful 
achievement of a single sub-goal (e.g., having done the recycling) they tend to view 
other pro-environmental actions as substitutes and are, therefore, less likely to undertake 
other pro-environmental actions (e.g., also doing laundry at 30 degrees). In contrast, 
when people consider their commitment to their superordinate goal on the basis of their 
successful attainment of a sub-goal they are more likely to undertake other actions 
towards achieving the superordinate goal. To use another environmental example – 
someone who has just successfully recycled may see this as a sign of their commitment 
to being pro-environmental, thus, being motivated to also wash their laundry at 30 
degrees. In short, Fishbach, Dhar, and Zhang (2006) propose that actions are thought to 
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signal commitment rather than progress when the goal is seen as distant. Furthermore, 
they propose that actions signal progress rather than commitment when the focus of the 
individual is directed at a specific action (Fishbach et al., 2006). The implication for this 
thesis is that viewing actions as signalling progress to becoming pro-environmental 
could facilitate licensing and compensating effects resulting in negative spillover 
effects.   
An important element in working towards goals is getting feedback on progress 
(Fishbach et al., 2010). Someone who was unsuccessful at an interview, for example, 
might ask for feedback in order that they can adjust their efforts to meet the challenge. 
While feedback might be given by a person it can also be obtained in other ways. With 
regard to the environment, for instance, someone might get feedback on their energy 
saving efforts via an energy monitor or a carbon calculator. Feedback elicits an affective 
(emotional) response. Positive feedback can make people feel good (e.g., happy or 
proud), while negative feedback might make someone feel bad (e.g., sad or guilty). 
Fishbach et al. (2010), therefore, further propose that these affective responses to 
feedback are actually an underlying mechanism by which feedback influences 
behavioural responses. In short, Fishbach et al. (2010) argue that feedback should 
encourage goal pursuit but only when a person feels good and then infers that they are 
committed to further pursuit of the goal. Similarly, they argue that negative feedback 
will only be effective in motivating goal pursuit in cases where the person feels bad and 
attributes the feeling to their lack of progress. This idea clearly relates to the theory 
tested in Chapters 4 and 5 that negative emotions may prompt reparative or 
compensatory actions while positive emotions may prompt licensing.  
Relatedly, as noted in Section 4.2.5, one potential reason why Study 4 may have failed 
to replicate the findings of Study 3 was that participants were forced to make a choice 
(i.e., to recycle or not) and may have not, therefore, felt responsible for the decision. A 
potential implication of this is that participants may not have questioned their 
environmental goal progress meaning that they did not feel either motivated to 
compensate or licensed to act less pro-environmentally. The current chapter will, 
therefore, extend this previous work by also looking at the effect of goal construal in 
terms of commitment versus progress.  
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5.3. Study 6 
The design of Study 6 is based on work by Fishbach et al. (2006). In their study, 
Fishbach et al. (2006) provided gym users with feedback on their workout before 
looking at whether these individuals would also choose a healthy meal. Participants 
either completed a survey while resting on a phone book (control condition) or on a 
‘health and fitness’ book which was intended to increase the saliency of these goals. 
Goal progress was manipulated by allowing participants to see a fictitious participant’s 
responses (exercise 1 hour vs. 10 hours). Where the health goal was superordinate (i.e., 
the fitness book) and participants construed positive feedback (i.e., that they were doing 
well because the fictitious participant only exercised for 1 hour) participants expressed a 
greater interest in eating healthily (positive spillover), whereas, in the absence of the 
superordinate goal participants expressed less interest in healthy eating (negative 
spillover).   
Study 6 investigates whether construing past pro-environmental actions in terms of goal 
commitment versus goal progress will have differential outcomes in terms of future 
interest in being pro-environmental (e.g., when making purchasing decisions).  This 
study used images of print advertisements to manipulate the accessibility of the 
superordinate goal of “environmental sustainability”, before providing participants with 
the opportunity to reflect on the number of pro-environmental actions they had 
undertaken in the past six months. Participants were either asked to list 3 or 12 pro-
environmental actions. It was anticipated that retrieving from memory 3 examples of 
pro-environmental actions (especially, being as 1 example was already provided) would 
be relatively easy, thus allowing participants to construe positive feedback on being pro-
environmental (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz et al., 1991). In 
contrast it was anticipated that retrieving from memory12 pro-environmental actions 
would be relatively difficult, leading participants to construe negative feedback on being 
pro-environmental. 
In addition to “environmental sustainability” (in terms of resource conservation values), 
“status” (in terms of conspicuous consumption and materialistic values) was also 
primed. Status (in this case as signified by the pursuit of material goods) was chosen as 
a means of providing contrast with environmental conservation goals. This is because 
the literature suggests that the two goals are diametrically opposed (Hurst, Dittmar, 
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Bond, & Kasser, 2013). Hurst et al. (2013, p. 258), for example, argue that materialistic 
goals such as financial success and fame are “grounded in conspicuous consumption 
and the accumulation of high status goods” which tend to have a high negative impact 
on the environment. Furthermore, when material values have been assessed alongside 
Schwartz’ values, they fall next to “Power and Achievement” and opposite to 
“Universalism” – a value which relates to social justice, equity and valuing the 
environment (Grouzet et al., 2005). The study hypotheses are summarised in Table 5-1. 
While the design of Study 6 closely follows that by Fishbach et al. (2006) the 
manipulation differs in an important respect. By showing participants a questionnaire 
partly completed by another (albeit fictional) individual, Fishbach et al. (2006) arguably 
combine anchoring effects (1 versus 12 hours at the gym) with a subtle manipulation of 
social comparison. For practical reasons Study 6 was run online and it was not deemed 
possible to convincingly provide information from a fictional individual. Study 6, 
therefore, only uses ease of retrieval (for a discussion of these different approaches see, 
Pahl & Eiser, 2006). 
Table 5-1: Experimental Hypotheses 
Advancement 
condition 
Advancement on affect Goals Salient 
Environmental Status 
Asked to list 3 Advanced (expected to 
succeed in task and 
report positive affect) 
Commitment inferred  
Positive spillover  
(+ → +) 
Progress inferred  
Negative spillover  
(+ → −) 
 
Asked to list 12 Not advanced 
(expected to fail in 
task and report 
negative affect) 
Low commitment inferred 
Negative spillover  
(− → −) 
Low progress inferred 
Compensation  
(− → +) 
5.4. Methods 
5.4.1. Participants 
Participants were University of Sheffield staff and students. The invitation to take part 
was distributed by email via University mailing lists and contained a link to the online 
study which was hosted by Qualtrics. Incentives were offered for participation. Students 
were offered a course credit while staff members were offered the opportunity to enter a 
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prize draw and to win a £30 Amazon voucher. The study was advertised as consumer 
research into how people respond to advertisements rather than as an environmental 
psychology study. The reason for this small deception was twofold. First, it was 
intended to limit demand characteristics because it was thought that participants’ would 
respond differently to the task (e.g., evaluating the advertisement) if they suspected that 
it was issued by the Department of Psychology. Second, it was thought that advertising 
the study as relating to the environment could influence the type of response given (e.g., 
socially desirable responses) and also the characteristics of the sample (e.g., attracting a 
disproportionate number of people with an interest in environmental issues).  
A total of 705 people responded to the online survey. However, of these, a total of 199 
were removed because they did not actually participate in the study while a further 27 
were excluded because they provided a largely incomplete data set. Following these 
exclusions 479 participants remained of whom 145 (30.3%) were male, 332 (69.3%) 
were female and two (0.4%) described themselves as other. The mean age was 27.59 
years (range 17–66 years, SD = 11.56). A 2-way ANOVA found no significant 
differences between conditions in terms of age. The interaction was non-significant, p = 
.545.  There were no significant main effects for goal saliency, p = .877, or 
advancement, p = .650. Similarly, there were no significant differences in gender 
between goal saliency conditions, χ2 (1, n = 477) = .25, p = .620 and advancement 
conditions, χ2 (1, n = 477) = .59, p = .441.25 Finally a two-way ANOVA was conducted 
to explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on reported levels of 
materialistic values. The interaction was non-significant, p = .939.  There were no 
significant main effects for goal saliency, p = 462, or advancement, p = .800. 
5.4.2. Study design 
An independent measures design was used. The study had a 2 (goal saliency: 
environment vs. status) x 3 (goal advancement: advanced vs. not advanced) between 
subject design. Goal saliency was manipulated by an exercise where participants 
reflected on the messages conveyed by print advertisements, while, goal advancement 
                                                 
25 Two participants described themselves as other. These participants were in the Status Salient Action 
Advanced Condition.  
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was manipulated by asking participants to list 3 (a relatively easy task) or 12 (a 
relatively difficult task) pro-environmental actions undertaken in the last 6 months. 
5.4.3. Piloting stimuli  
A total of 28 different print advertisements either relating to status or the environment 
were selected for piloting by 6 x Level 1 Psychology students. The pilot trial was 
conducted using Qualtrics. The 28 advertisements were presented in a randomised 
order. Each advertisement was presented at the top of the page of the online 
questionnaire. First, participants were asked to briefly describe what the advertisement 
showed (open response). Next participants were asked: “In your opinion what is the 
main message being communicated by this advert?” (An open response question). 
Participants were then asked to respond to a sliding scale where 1 = does not promote at 
all and 7 = very strongly promotes. The scale items were as follows: “something to 
aspire to/work towards”, “Status goods (e.g., designer brands), “A way of life / 
lifestyle” and “Environmental sustainability”. Participants then responded to another 
open response question: “Does this advertisement say anything else to you?” Finally 
participants were asked what words they associated with the brand being advertised. An 
image of the survey as seen by the participants is presented in Figure 6, p.117. The 
mean scores for environmental sustainability vs. status can be seen in Appendix Four – 
Study 6. 
Advertisements used: From the initial set of 28 advertisements, 4 were selected for the 
main study (see Figure 7 below). The set of environmental sustainability advertisements 
comprised: 1) an advertisement from the World Wildlife Fund showing a part-human 
part-fish creature alongside a message about climate change and 2) an advertisement 
from Greenpeace showing a woman with a sign containing a message about the 
woman’s actions to protect the rainforest. The status set comprised: 1) an advertisement 
from Dior showing a woman with a luxury designer watch and 2) an advertisement by 
Polo showing a sportsman with a luxury designer bottle of fragrance. The images were 
selected because they had either been rated as strongly promoting environmental 
sustainability or status and because they had a number of features in common. For 
example, both females are directly facing the camera, both wear dark coloured clothes, 
have blond hair and are presented with text. Both males are wearing blue shirts, are 
presented on a coloured background and with text on their chests.  
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The 6 participants rated the extent to which each advertisement promoted environmental 
sustainability versus status goods. A 2 (type of advertisement: environmental vs. status) 
x 2 (activated issue: environmental vs. status) within participants ANOVA was 
conducted. As expected, there was a significant interaction between the nature of the 
advertisement and the activated issue, F(1,5) = 228.10, p < .001. The advertisements 
that reflected pro-environmental issues were judged as more likely to reflect 
environmental concerns (M = 6.67, SD = 0.52), than the advertisements that reflected 
status (M = 1.00, SD = 0.00), F(1, 5) = 722.50, p < .001. Conversely, the two 
advertisements that the author believed to reflect status/conspicuous materialism were 
indeed judged by participants to be more likely to promote status goods (M = 6.00, SD = 
0.89) than the advertisements that the author believed to promote pro-environmental 
issues (M = 1.17, SD = 0.41), F(1, 5) = 89.47, p <.001 (ηp
2 = .99). 
5.4.4. Materials: main study  
Advertisements: Participants were presented with a series of open response questions 
in relation to either the status advertisements or the environmental sustainability 
advertisements (they did not see both sets of images). The questions included the name 
of the brand or organisation being shown to ensure that this was made obvious to 
participants. Participants, for example, were asked to “briefly describe what this Ralph 
Lauren advert shows”. Participants were then asked: “In your opinion what is being 
communicated by this Ralph Lauren advert?” and “What words do you associate with 
Ralph Lauren? Please list as many as you can”.   
Advancement measure: Participants were either asked to list either 3 or 12 pro-
environmental actions undertaken in the past 12 months. These questions were 
introduced with the following introduction: “The next few questions relate to your 
emotions and lifestyle choices. We would like to know about the activities you 
undertake which benefit the environment in some way”. The question was worded as 
follows: “Please list three/twelve ways in which you have acted to benefit the 
environment in the last 6 months (e.g., wash laundry at 30 degrees)”. A form with either 















Figure 7: Images used to make environmental sustainability and status salient 
 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS): Participants’ emotional 
responses were assessed using the PANAS scale (Watson, Clark, & Telleger, 1988). 
The scale was comprised of 10 positive emotions (Cronbach’s α = .91) and 10 negative 
emotions (Cronbach’s α = .89). Responses were given on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 
being “very slightly or not at all”, 3 being “moderately” and 5 being “extremely”. 
Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they were experiencing the emotions 
at the present moment. This measure was included to assess whether participants 
assigned the relatively easy task of listing 3 pro-environmental behaviours would report 
higher positive affect than participants given the more challenging task of listing 12 pro-
environmental behaviours. 
Measure of progress vs. commitment: Two items were included as a manipulation 
check for goal commitment vs. goal progress in relation to environmental impact 
reduction. One item was designed to assess goal progress and one item was designed to 
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assess goal commitment. The items were as follows:  “I am committed to reducing my 
environmental impacts” and “To date, I feel that I have made good progress toward 
reducing my environmental impacts”. Responses were anchored on a 7-point Likert 
Scale with strongly disagree to strongly agree options and a neither agree nor disagree 
midpoint.   
Measures of intention: Participants saw two items intended to assess the impact of 
goal priming and progress on levels of intention to consider and reduce environmental 
impacts. The items were as follows: “I intend to reduce my impact on the environment 
over the next 6 months” and “Over the next 6 months, I plan to think about how my 
actions affect the environment”. Responses were anchored on a 7-point Likert Scale 
with strongly disagree to strongly agree options and a neither agree nor disagree 
midpoint.  
Purchasing decision: The main dependent variable was an assessment of participants’ 
preferences for status versus sustainability features on a car.   
For this task participants were asked to think about making a significant purchasing 
decision – namely investing in a new car. Cars can be thought of as status symbols (e.g., 
sign of affluence/luxury) but they can also offer opportunities for people to demonstrate 
their commitment to reducing negative environmental impacts (e.g., by selecting a car 
with eco-features or choosing hybrid or electric vehicles).  In line with the literature on 
compensating and licensing, it was anticipated that participants who felt they had made 
sufficient progress in being pro-environmental would be more likely to license 
expressing a preference for luxury car features (e.g., speed), while participants who felt 
greater environmental commitment or the need to compensate for poor progress would 
express a stronger preference for eco-features. The following text introduced the task:  
The cost of buying a car has risen from £12,207 in 1988 to around £27,219 
today. Buying a new car, therefore, constitutes a significant investment for most 
people. We would like you to imagine that you are buying a new car. 
The task was to: “rate how important the following features would be in making your 
decision to invest in a new car” using a 7-point sliding scale. The items were anchored 
as follows: 1 = “Not at all important” and 7 = “Extremely important”. Features included 
four pro-environmental items (low CO2 emissions, brake energy regeneration, stop-start 
systems and fuel efficiency), four status related items (top speed, luxury upholstery, 
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colour and style and air conditioning) and four filler items (e.g., storage space). Items 
were allocated to these categories by the author and category choices were confirmed by 
the author’s supervisors. Eco preference scores were calculated by summing responses 
to these 4 items. Similarly, status preference was calculated by summing responses to 
the 4 status items. Higher scores were taken as an indication of stronger preferences for 
these concepts. Figure 8 provides an image showing the appearance of the scale. 
Basic demographics: Questions included “How old are you?” (Open response) and 
“Which one of the following most accurately describes you?” (Male/Female/Other). 
Material Values: The materialism scale developed by Richins and Dawson (1992) was 
included in the study. This scale aims to tap into three important sets of beliefs 
associated with materialism. These are that: 1) possessions constitute “success” in that 
they are indicators of one’s achievements (e.g., prosperity); 2) that material goods give 
meaning to life and; 3) that possessions are essential to life satisfaction (Beardon & 
Netemeyer, 1999). The scale consists of 18 items which are scored on a 5-point Likert 
scale anchored by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”. Scores are summed to make 
an overall materialism score. Items include statements such as “I usually buy only the 
things I need” (Reverse coded).  
5.4.5. A Summary of the Procedure 
The study was advertised as relating to consumer research being conducted by a 
member of academic staff at Sheffield University Management School. The cover letter 
(sent by email) introduced the purpose of the study as follows: “We would greatly 
appreciate your help in this study of peoples’ responses to advertisements”.  
Participants were randomly (using Qualtrics survey software) allocated to see two 
advertisements relating to environmental sustainability or to status goods. Participants 
were then asked to describe the advertisements, summarise what message the 
advertisements conveyed and list the words they associated with the organisations 
which had produced the advertisements. The aim of the exercise was to make either pro-





Figure 8: Screenshot of car evaluation task 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two feedback conditions the purpose of 
which was to manipulate perceptions of advancement towards pro-environmental goals. 
Participants were either asked to list 3 or 12 pro-environmental actions which they had 
undertaken in the last 6 months.  It was anticipated that listing 3 actions was would be 
easy (especially as the example of washing at 30 degrees has been provided), thus, 
giving participants positive information about their advancement towards the goal of 
environmental sustainability (action advanced manipulation). In contrast, it was 
anticipated that listing 12 actions would be more difficult, thus giving participants’ 
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negative information about their progress towards the goal of environmental 
sustainability (action not advanced manipulation).  
Three factors were measured following the listing exercise which were: affect (positive 
and negative), and self-report measures of commitment to being pro-environmental, and 
progress in being pro-environmental to date. The main dependent variables were 
intention to benefit the environment in future and preference for car eco features versus 
status features on a car evaluation task. Finally, participants were presented with a 
written debrief which explained the purpose of the study.  
5.5. Results 
An unforeseen challenge with the experimental design was discovered when looking at 
how many pro-environmental actions participants succeeded in listing. While it had 
been anticipated that listing 12 pro-environmental actions would be difficult and that 
most participants would fail to do so, this was not actually the case. Instead, it was 
found that 126 participants or 53.84% of the action not advanced condition succeeded in 
listing 12 pro-environmental behaviours (M = 9.23, SD = 3.57).  While it could be the 
case that these participants still found the exercise challenging, there is a clear risk that 
they also inferred positive advancement because of their success. Caution should, 
therefore, be employed when interpreting the results of this study.  
5.5.1. Checking Randomisation was effective 
A 2 (goal prime: environment vs status) x 2 (Advancement: list 3 vs list 12) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted to explore whether participants differed between 
conditions in terms of age. The interaction was non-significant, F(1, 474) = .366, p = 
.545 and there were no significant main effects for goal saliency, F(1, 474) = .02, p = 
.877, or advancement, F(1, 474) = .21, p = .650. Two Chi-square tests (with Yates 
Continuity Correction) were conducted to investigate whether there was an equal 
number of males and females in each condition. Participants did not differ significantly 
by sex in the goals salient condition, 𝜒2 (1, 477) = 16, p = .692, or the advancement 
condition, 𝜒2 (1, 477) = 45, p = .502.  A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted 
to explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on levels of materialistic values. 
The interaction was non-significant, F(1, 425) = .01, p = .939 and there were no 
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significant main effects for goal saliency, F(1, 425) = .542, p = .462, or advancement, 
F(1,425) = .06, p = .800.  To summarise, the randomisation function provided by 
Qualtrics appeared to have been effective.  
5.5.2. Manipulation Checks 
First, it had been predicted that if the manipulation was effective, participants asked to 
list 3 actions would report significantly higher levels of positive affect. A 2 (goal prime: 
environment vs status) x 2 (Advancement: list 3 vs list 12) between subjects ANOVA, 
was therefore, conducted to explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on 
levels of positive affect. The interaction was non-significant, F(1, 473) = .31,  p = .577, 
and there were no significant main effects for either goal saliency, F(1, 473) = .04, p = 
.844, or advancement, F(1, 473) = .11, p = .737.  
Second, it had been predicted that if the manipulation was effective participants asked to 
list 12 actions would report significantly higher levels of negative affect (because the 
task was expected to be difficult). A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to 
explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on levels of negative affect. The 
interaction was non-significant, F(1, 473) = .21, p = .651. Furthermore, there were no 
significant main effects for goal saliency, F(1, 473) = .015, p = .902, or advancement, 
F(1, 473) = .32, p = .572.  
Third, if the manipulations were effective, it was predicted that participants in the 
environmental goals salient conditions (both advanced and non-advanced) should report 
higher levels of commitment to the environment than other participants.  A 2x2 between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted, therefore, to explore the impact of goal saliency and 
advancement on levels of commitment. The interaction was significant, F(1, 475) = 
3.89, p = .049, with a small effect size (ηp
2 = .01). For people for whom the environment 
was made salient, feeling they had advanced (i.e., because listing 3 actions was 
relatively easy) resulted in higher levels of commitment. However, for people for whom 
status was made salient the opposite pattern can be seen. There were, however, no 
significant main effects for goal saliency, F(1, 475) = 1.06, p = .305, or advancement, 
F(1, 475) = .439, p = .508.  
Fourth, if the manipulation was effective then it was predicted that participants in the 
status goal salient action advanced condition would report significantly greater feelings 
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of progress than participants in other conditions. A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was 
conducted, therefore, to explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on levels 
of progress. The interaction was, however, non-significant, F(1, 475) = .16, p = .690. 
There were no significant main effects for goal saliency, F(1, 275) = .12, p = .735, or 
advancement, F(1, 475) = .23, p = .634.  
Overall these results indicate that the manipulations were not effective.  
5.5.3. Main results (investigating original hypotheses) 
It was predicted that participants in the action advanced (list 3) environmental goals 
salient and action not advanced (list 12) status goal salient conditions would express 
significantly stronger intentions to be pro-environmental in future. The former group 
were expected to show positive spillover, while the later were expected to desire to 
compensate. A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted, therefore, to explore the 
impact of goal saliency (environment vs status) and advancement (list 3 vs list 12) on 
levels of pro-environmental intention. The interaction was non-significant, F(1, 475), = 
.36, p = .548. Furthermore, there were no significant main effects for either goal 
saliency, F(1, 475) = .03, p = .867, or advancement, F(1, 475) = .63, p = .430. No 
evidence of positive spillover or compensation was found.  
Similarly, it was predicted that participants in the action advanced (list 3) environmental 
goals salient and action not advanced (list 12) status goal salient conditions would 
express significantly stronger intentions to think about how their actions would affect 
the environment. A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact 
of goal saliency and advancement on levels of pro-environmental intention. The 
interaction was non-significant, F(1, 475) = 2.58, p = .109. There were no significant 
main effects for either goal saliency, F(1, 475) = 2.14,  p = .144, or advancement, F(1, 
475) = 2.14, p = .440.  
Again, it was predicted that participants in the action advanced (list 3) environmental 
goals salient and action not advanced (list 12) status goal salient groups would express 
significantly stronger preferences for car eco-features. The former group was expected 
to show positive spillover, while the later was expected to show evidence of 
compensation. Unfortunately, these effects were not found. A 2x2 between subjects 
ANOVA conducted to explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on strength 
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of  preference for car eco-features found the interaction to be non-significant, F(1, 475) 
= .68, p = .411. There were no significant main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 475) = .08, 
p = .774, or advancement, F(1, 475) = .001, p = .980. 
It might be expected that some participants would express stronger preferences for 
status features (e.g., participants in the action advanced status primed condition). A 2x2 
between subjects was, therefore, conducted to investigate whether there were any 
differences between conditions.  The interaction was non-significant, F(1, 475) = .1.81, 
p = .180, and there were no significant main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 475) = .18, p 
= .680, or advancement, F(1, 475) = .37, p = .545. 
Table 5-2 Descriptive statistics (2 levels of advancement) 
  Goals Salient 
  Environmental Status 
Condition Measure Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N 
List 3 
(Advanced) 
Commitment 5.43 (1.25) 113 5.08 (1.34) 132 
Progress 4.84 (1.31) 113 4.83 (1.35) 132 
Positive affect  25.57 (7.86) 113 24.99 (7.96) 131 
Negative affect 14.50 (6.00) 113 14.33 (5.30) 131 
Intention reduce impact 4.91 (1.35) 113 4.86 (1.38) 132 
Considering impacts 5.11 (1.37) 113 4.70 (1.49) 132 
Car eco preference 4.98 (1.48) 113 5.05 (1.38) 132 
Car status preference  3.01 (1.29) 113 3.12 (1.26) 132 
Age 28.06 (12.60) 113 27.58 (10.73) 132 
Materialism 58.98 (9.93) 113 58.23 (9.73) 132 
List 12 (Not 
advanced) 
Commitment 5.12 (1.31) 109 5.23 (1.40) 125 
Progress 4.73 (1.33) 109 4.82 (1.33) 125 
Positive affect 25.40 (8.33) 108 25.67 (8.91) 125 
Negative affect 14.56 (5.85) 108 14.87 (6.13) 125 
Intention reduce impact 4.73 (1.37) 109 4.83 (1.46) 125 
Considering impacts 4.79 (1.42) 109 4.81 (1.52) 125 
Car eco preference 5.08 (1.41) 109 4.94 (1.36) 125 
Car status preference  3.24 (1.29) 109 3.04 (1.30) 125 
Age 26.94 (11.47) 108 27.74 (11.63) 125 




5.5.4. Re-running the analyses (with revised hypotheses) 
It was found that 126 participants or 53.84% of the action not advanced condition 
actually succeeded in listing 12 pro-environmental behaviours (as outlined above). The 
resulting analyses suggest that the manipulation of advancement was unsuccessful. For 
example, only one interaction was found and the effect size was small.  For this reason 
the decision was made to divide the participants into 3 groups as follows. All 126 
participants who completed listing 12 pro-environmental behaviours were coded as 1 
(highly advanced in goal pursuit), all 103 participants who did not succeed in listing 12 
pro-environmental behaviours were coded as 2 (not advanced in goal pursuit), and 
finally all 245 participants in the action advanced (list 3) condition were coded as 3 
(advanced in goal pursuit). This variable will be referred to as Advancement-3levels. 
Tests were repeated to ensure that the new groups did not differ in terms of materialistic 
values, age and sex. A 2x3 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to explore the 
impact of goal saliency and advancement on reported levels of materialistic values. The 
interaction was non-significant, p = .268.  There were no significant main effects for 
goal saliency, p = 520, or Advancement-3levels, p = .830.  A 2x3 between subjects 
ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of goal saliency and advancement on 
participants’ age. The interaction was non-significant, p = .543.  There were no 
significant main effects for goal saliency, p = 647, or Advancement-3levels, p = .766.  
Neither did participants differ significantly by sex (male and female) within the goal 
salient conditions, 𝜒2(1, n = 477) = .25, p = .620, or the Advancement-3levels, χ2(2, n = 
472) = 1.36, p = .506.   
It was predicted that participants who has succeeded in listing 12 pro-environmental 
behaviours would respond in a similar manner to participants in the action advanced 
(list 3) group. However, as these participants had achieved a more challenging task it 
was thought that they may report relatively higher levels of positive affect and show 
more pronounced licensing and compensating effects (e.g., higher reported intention 











Asked to list 12 Highly Advanced 
(listed 12, expected 
high positive affect) 
High commitment inferred 
Positive spillover  
(+ → +) 
High progress inferred 
Negative spillover  
(+ → −) 
Not advanced (did 
not list 12, expected 
negative affect) 
Low commitment inferred 
Negative spillover  
(− → −) 
Progress inferred 
Compensation  
(− → +) 
Asked to list 3 Advanced (listed 3-
11 actions, expected 
positive affect) 
Commitment inferred  
Positive spillover  
(+ → +) 
Progress inferred  
Negative spillover  
(+ → −) 
 
Commitment to reducing environmental impact: first a 2 (goal prime: environment or 
status salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to 
investigate participants’ level of commitment to reducing their environmental impacts. 
The goal priming x advancement interaction was not statistically significant, F(2, 468) 
= 2.36, p = .096. There was a significant main effect for Advancement-3levels F(2, 468) 
= 6.12, p = .002; however, the effect size was small (ηp
2 = .03). Post-hoc comparisons 
using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for the failure to list 12 actions 
group (not advanced) (M = 4.90, SD = 1.34) was significantly different to the succeeded 
in listing 12 group (very advanced) (M = 5.48, SD = 1.19). The list 3 group (action 
advanced) did not differ significantly from the highly advanced (p = .232 and not 
advanced groups (p = .067). The main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 468) = .088, p = 
.766 did not reach significance. These results suggest 1) that goal saliency had no effect 
on goal construal and 2) that participants who succeeded in listing 12 actions inferred 
significantly higher goal commitment than participants who had been unable to list 12 
actions (positive spillover). 
Progress towards being environmental: Next, a 2 (goal prime: environment or status 
salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to 
investigate participants’ level of perceived progress to date in reducing their 
environmental impacts. The goal saliency x Advancement-3levels interaction was not 
statistically significant, F(2, 468) = .26, p = .772.  Again, there was a significant main 




.03). Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for 
failure to list 12 actions group (not advanced) (M = 4.48, SD = 1.27) was significantly 
different to the succeeded in listing 12 group (very advanced) (M = 5.08, SD = 1.29). 
The list 3 group (action advanced) did not differ significantly from the highly advanced 
and not advanced groups. The main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 468) = .29, p = .593, 
did not reach significance. Again, these results suggests that the manipulation of goal 
saliency was ineffective and that the study only succeeded in manipulating perceptions 
of goal progress, with the highly advanced group, reporting significantly greater 
perceptions of progress.  
5.5.5. Main results (with revised hypotheses) 
It had been predicted that participants in the environment salient action advanced 
condition along with participants in the status salient action not advanced condition 
would report significantly higher levels of pro-environmental intention and interest in 
being pro-environmental in the future. Two items were used to assess intention. These 
are analysed separately.  
Intention: A 2 (goal prime: environment or status salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ reported level of intention to 
reduce their impacts on the environment. The interaction effect between goal saliency 
and Advancement-3levels was not statistically significant, F(2, 468) = .57, p = .564. 
There was a statistically significant main effect for Advancement-3levels, F(2, 468) = 
3.42, p = .034; however, the effect size was small (ηp
2 = .01). Post-hoc comparisons 
using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for failure to list 12 actions 
group (not advanced) (M = 4.56, SD = 1.30) was significantly different to the succeeded 
in listing 12 group (highly advanced) (M = 5.04, SD = 1.38). The list 3 group (action 
advanced) did not differ significantly from the very highly advanced (p = 867) and not 
advanced groups (p = .137). The main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 468) = .07, p = .790, 
did not reach significance. Once more there was a significant main effect for 
advancement F(2,468) = 3.42, p = .034 with a small size (ηp
2 = .01). Again, participants 
who succeeded in listing 12 actions reported significantly higher intentions to be pro-
environmental (positive spillover). 
Considering environmental impacts: A 2 (goal prime: environment or status salient) x 3 
(Advancement-3levels) between subjects ANOVA exploring participants’ plans to think 
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about how their actions will affect the environment was conducted. The interaction 
effect between goal saliency and Advancement-3levels was not statistically significant, 
F(2, 468) = 1.79, p = .169. There was a statistically significant main effect for 
Advancement-3levels, F(2, 468) = 5.18, p = .006; however, the effect size was small 
(ηp
2 = .02). Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score 
for failure to list 12 actions group (not advanced) (M = 4.50, SD = 1.34) was 
significantly different to the succeeded in listing 12 group (highly advanced) (M = 5.11, 
SD = 1.46). The list 3 group (action advanced) did not differ significantly from the very 
advanced (p = .450) and not advanced groups (p = .060). The main effect for goal 
saliency, F(1, 468) = .54, p = .463, did not reach significance. Once again, a positive 
spillover effect is suggested as participants who succeeded in listing 12 pro-
environmental behaviours report significantly greater intentions to consider their 
environmental impacts in future.  
Preference for car eco-features in a purchasing decision: Next the main hypotheses 
were tested which were that: 1) participants in the environment salient action advanced 
conditions would show positive spillover as indicated by a stronger preference for car 
eco features; 2) that participants in the environment salient action not advanced 
condition would show negative spillover as indicated by a weaker preference for car 
eco-features; 3) that participants in the status salient action advanced condition would 
show compensation (i.e., balancing) by having a weaker preference for car eco features; 
and 4) that participants in the status salient action not advanced condition would show 
compensatory behaviour by having a strong preference for car eco features. These 
hypotheses were not supported by the data.   
A 2 (goal prime: environment or status salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ preference for car eco features. The 
interaction effect between goal saliency and Advancement-3levels was not statistically 
significant, F(2, 468) = .19, p = .827. There was no significant effect for Advancement-
3levels, F(2, 468) = 2.10, p = .124. There was also a no significant main effect for goal 
saliency, F(1, 468) = .03, p = .861. 
Car status features: Participants’ preference for car status features were also assessed 
using a 2 (goal prime: environment or status salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) 
between subjects ANOVA.  The interaction effect between goal saliency and 
Advancement-3levels was not statistically significant, F(2, 468) = 1.31, p = .272. There 
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was no significant effect for Advancement-3levels, F(2, 468) = .72, p = .489. There was 
also no significant main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 468) = 1.02, p = .312. 
Table 5-4: Descriptive statistics (advancement 3 levels) 
  Goals Salient 
  Environmental  Status  
Condition Measure Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N 
List 12 
(complete) 
Commitment 5.38 (1.16) 65 5.59 (1.23) 61 
Progress 4.98 (1.22) 65 5.18 (1.37) 61 
Positive affect 25.65 (7.97) 65 28.28 (8.48) 61 
Negative affect 14.12 (5.77) 65 13.84 (4.82) 61 
Pride 2.40 (1.16) 65 2.57 (1.18) 61 
Guilt 1.48 (.81) 65 1.39 (.71) 61 
Intention reduce impact 4.92 (1.34) 65 5.16 (1.43) 61 
Considering impacts 5.03 (1.33) 65 5.20 (1.59) 61 
Car eco preference 5.25 (1.32) 65 5.13 (1.34) 61 
Car status preference 3.18 (1.18) 65 2.85 (1.15) 61 
Age 25.83 (10.74) 65 28.07 (10.94) 61 




Commitment 4.88 (1.29) 41 4.92 (1.38) 62 
Progress 4.46 (1.36) 41 4.48 (1.21) 62 
Positive affect 25.63 (8.70) 41 23.03 (8.72) 62 
Negative affect 15.27 (6.11) 41 15.69 (6.92) 62 
Pride 2.34 (1.09) 41 2.03 (1.24) 62 
Guilt 1.76 (1.16) 41 1.61 (.86) 62 
Intention reduce impact 4.61 (1.24) 41 4.53 (1.34) 62 
Considering impacts 4.54 (1.43) 41 4.47 (1.29) 62 
Car eco preference 4.82 (1.55) 41 4.79 (1.32) 62 
Car status preference 3.30 (1.48) 41 3.13 (1.34) 62 
Age 28.00 (12.07) 41 27.69 (12.45) 62 
Materialism 59.49 (9.76) 41 56.73 (11.31) 62 
List 3  Commitment 5.43 (1.13) 113 5.08  (1.34) 132 
Progress 4.84 (1.31) 113 4.83 (1.35) 132 
Positive affect 25.57 (7.86) 113 24.99 (7.96) 131 
Negative affect 14.50 (6.00) 113 14.33 (5.30) 131 
 (continued over page) 
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(continued from previous page)  
Pride 2.10 (1.07) 113 2.18 (1.18) 131 
Guilt 1.42 (.68) 113 1.50 (.96) 131 
Intention reduce impact 4.91 (1.35) 113 4.86 (1.38) 132 
Considering impacts 5.11 (1.37) 113 4.70 (1.49) 132 
Car eco preference 4.98 (1.48) 113 5.05 (1.38) 132 
Car status preference  3.01 (1.29) 113 3.12 (1.26) 132 
Age 28.06 (12.60) 113 27.58 (10.73) 132 
Materialism 58.98 (9.93) 113 58.23 (9.73) 132 
 
5.5.6. Exploring the role of affect 
Based on the literature it was been expected that mood would underlie the impact of 
feedback on goal pursuit (in this case whether participants were led to infer that they 
were advancing towards environmental goals or not). Participants in the action 
advanced conditions were predicted to report significantly higher levels of positive 
affect, while participants in the not advanced conditions were predicted to report 
significantly higher levels of negative affect. The prediction for positive affect only was 
supported by the data. 
Positive affect:  Participants’ reported feelings of positive affect were assessed using a 2 
(goal prime: environment or status salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) between subjects 
ANOVA. This found a significant interaction effect between goal saliency and 
Advancement-3levels, F(2,467) = 3.02, p =  .050, although the effect size was small (ηp
2 
= .01).  A plot showing the interaction indicated that participants in the Status goals 
salient condition who succeeded in listing 12 pro-environmental actions appeared to feel 
considerably more positive than other participants. There was a statistically significant 
main effect for Advanced-3levels, F(2, 467) = 3.11, p = .050. Post-hoc comparisons 
using the Bonferroni test revealed that the group who succeeded in listing 12 actions 
were significantly different (M = 26.92, SD = 8.92) to the group that failed to list 12 
actions (M = 24.07, SD = 8.76). There was no main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 467) = 
.05, p = .824.  As before these results suggest that participants who inferred that they 
were advancing towards pro-environmental goals (i.e., those who succeeded in listing 
12 actions) reported significantly higher positive affect. Interestingly, however, it 
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appears that participants in the status goal salient (rather than the environmental) 
condition who listed 12 actions felt particularly positive. 
Negative affect: Participants’ reported feelings of negative affect were also assessed 
using a 2 (goal prime: environment or status salient) x 3 (Advancement-3levels) 
between subjects ANOVA.  The interaction effect between goal saliency and 
Advancement-3levels was not statistically significant, F(2, 467) = .12, p = .885. There 
was no significant effect for Advancement-3levels, F(2, 467) = 1.95, p = .143. There 
was also no significant main effect for goal saliency, F(1, 467) = .00, p = .982. 
5.5.6.1. Exploring the role of affect as a mediator 
It had been expected that mood would underlie the impact of feedback on goal pursuit 
(in this case whether participants were led to infer that they were advancing towards 
environmental goals or not). Pride and guilt were, therefore, investigated as mediators 
of the relationship between level of advancement (completed vs not-completed among 
participants asked to list 12 actions) and intention to act pro-environmentally using the 
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012). The decision was taken to focus exclusively on the 
participants asked to list 12 behaviours and to exclude those asked to list only 3 
behaviours. The reason for this was that the participants who listed only 3 actions 
(action advanced) did not differ significantly on any of the assessed measures compared 
with not advanced and highly advanced groups. It was also decided to focus on 
intention to be pro-environmental rather than preference for car eco features because: 1) 
this measure seems to be problematic (see section 5.6) and b) earlier analysis of this 
measure found no significant differences between conditions using this measure (see 
section 5.5.5). 
The following paragraphs will present a series of 4 simple mediation analyses. As this 
thesis research has focused on pride and guilt the role of these emotions as potential 
mediators of intention will be considered in some detail. In addition, because Fishbach 
et al. (2006) and Fishbach et al. (2010) look at positive and negative affect more 
generally two further mediation analyes will be conducted to investigate whether similar 
findings emerge. 
Pride: First, a simple mediation analysis was conducted to establish whether the 
relationship between advancement and strength of pro-environmental intention was 
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mediated by pride. Advancement was dummy coded (1 = list 12, 0 = fail to list 12). As 
can be seen in Figure 9 and Table 5-5, participants who succeeded in listing 12 pro-
environmental behaviours reported feeling higher levels of pride (a = .28), and 
participants who felt more pride expressed stronger intentions to be pro-environmental 
in future (b = .13). A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect 
(ab = .04) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples was entirely above zero (.00 to .10).26 
There was evidence that advancement influenced intention independent of its effect on 
pride (c′ = .31, p = .018). 
Guilt: A second simple mediation analysis was conducted to establish whether the 
relationship between advancement and strength of pro-environmental intention was 
mediated by guilt. As before, advancement was dummy coded (1 = list 12, 0 = fail to 
list 12). As can be seen in Figure 10 and Table 5-6, participants who succeeded in 
listing 12 pro-environmental behaviours reported feeling lower levels of guilt (a = -.27). 
However, there was no significant relationship between participants who experienced 
more guilt and stronger intentions to be pro-environmental in future (b = .06). A bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = -.02) based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples contained zero (-.07 to .01). There was evidence that 
advancement influenced intention independent of its effect on guilt (c′ = .36, p = .006). 
In short, guilt was not found to mediate pro-environmental intention. 
As previous studies within this thesis had looked at pride and guilt specifically the 
results for these items are have been presented in some detail. However, as Fishbach et 
al. (2006) and Fishbach et al. (2010) focus on positive and negative affect more 
generally, the analyses were repeated with the complete measures of positive and 
negative affect of which pride and guilt were single scale items.  The same patterns 
were found to emerge, positive but not negative affect mediated pro-environmental 
intention.   
Positive affect: Participants who listed 12 pro-environmental behaviours reported 
higher positive affect (a = .35). There was a significant relationship between positive 
affect and stronger intentions to be pro-environmental in future (b = .27). A bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = .09) based on 10,000 
                                                 
26 Before rounding to 2 decimal places the lower confidence interval was .0021 and the upper confidence 
interval was .1028. 
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bootstrap samples was entirely above zero (.03 to .20). There was evidence that 
advancement influenced intention independent of its effect on positive affect (c′ =.25, p 
= .047). Further details for this analysis can be seen in Table 5-7. 
Negative affect: Participants who listed 12 pro-environmental behaviours reported 
lower levels of negative affect (a = -.27). There was no significant relationship between 
negative affect and stronger intentions to be pro-environmental in future (b = .03). A 
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = -.01) based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples was included zero (-.06 to .02). There was evidence that 
advancement influenced intention independent of its effect on negative affect (c′ =.35, p 
= .007). Further details for this analysis can be seen in Table 5-8. 
 
Figure 9: Simple mediation for the presumed influence of pride 
 
 




Table 5-5. Simple Mediation: Pride on pro-environmental intention 
 Consequent 
Mediator (Pride)  Y (Intention) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (Advancement) a .28 .13 .036 c′ .31 .13 .018 
M (Pride)  - - - b .13 .06 .045 
Constant i1 -.06 .10 .528 i2 -.19 .09 .049 
  
R2 = .02 
  
R2 = .048 
F(227) = 4.44, p = .036  F(227) = 4.44, p = .036 
 
Table 5-6. Simple mediation: Guilt on pro-environmental intention 
 Consequent 
Mediator (Guilt)  Y (Intention) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (Advancement) a -.27 .13 .045 c′ .36 .13 .006 
M (Guilt)  - - - b .06 .06 .337 
Constant i1 -.19 .10 .059 i2 -.21 .10 .032 
  
R2 = .02 
  
R2 = .034 
F(227) = 4.08 , p = .045  F(226) = 4.02 , p = .019 
 
Table 5-7.  Simple Mediation: Positive affect on pro-environmental intention 
 Consequent 
Mediator (Positive Affect)  Y (Intention) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (Advancement) a .35 .14 .012 c′ .25 .13 .047 
M (Positive affect)  - - - b .27 .06 < .001 
Constant i1 -.16 .10 .114 i2 -.15 .09 .099 
  
R2 = .03 
  
R2 = .11 
F(227) = 6.37, p = .012  F(227) = 14.03, p = <.001 
 
Table 5-8. Simple Mediation: Negative affect on pro-environmental intention 
 Consequent 
Mediator (Negative Affect)  Y (Intention) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (Advancement) a -.27 .14 .051 c′ .35 .13 .007 
M (Negative affect)  - - - b .03 .06 .608 
Constant i1 -.17 .10 .102 i2 -.20 .10 .037 
  
R2 = .02 
  
R2 = .03 




Following on from Studies 3 to 5 which looked into whether participants would balance 
conflicting goals and Study 1 which considered the influence of affect (guilt and pride), 
Study 6 focused on how goal construal may influence whether compensating or 
licensing is seen. 
The design of Study 6 was based on research by Fishbach et al. (2006) and Fishbach et 
al. (2010) into how positive and negative feedback can motivate goal pursuit (see 
Section 5.3 for details). Fishbach et al. (2010) propose that positive feedback is only 
effective in motivating goal pursuit where it signals an increase in goal commitment, 
whereas, negative feedback is only effective where it signals a lack of progress. 
Fishbach et al. (2010) further propose that whether positive feedback is inferred to 
signal progress or commitment depends what goal is salient at the time feedback is 
received. The present study (Study 6), presented in this chapter closely followed the 
study design of Fishbach et al. (2006). Superordinate goals were manipulated by 
presenting participants with advertisements that either promoted environmental 
sustainability (conservation goals) or status (materialistic goals). Feedback on goal 
advancement was provided by asking participants to either list 3 or 12 pro-
environmental actions undertaken in the last 6 months.  
In light of the fact that listing 12 pro-environmental actions was a task which many 
participants were able to complete the decision was taken to divide the sample into three 
groups, namely: participants who succeeded in listing 12 actions (highly advanced), 
participants only asked to list 3 actions (advanced) and participants who failed to list 12 
actions (not advanced). 
The revised predictions were that:  
1. Participants able to list 12 pro-environmental actions and for whom 
environmental goals were salient would infer positive goal advancement (high 
commitment) and show positive spillover, as would, participants asked to list 3 
actions. In contrast, participants unable to list 12 actions were expected to infer 
negative goal advancement (low commitment) and show negative spillover. 
2. Participants able to list 12 pro-environmental actions and for whom status goals 
were salient were predicted to infer positive goal advancement (high progress) 
and show negative spillover, as were, participants asked to list 3 actions. In 
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contrast, participants unable to list 12 actions were expected to infer negative 
goal advancement (low progress) and compensate. 
Mediation analyses supported two hypotheses by Fishbach et al. (2006) and Fishbach et 
al. (2010). Where environmental goals were salient (i.e., as a result of the listing 
exercise)27 and where participants inferred positive advancement towards environmental 
goals (by being able to list 12 actions), greater levels of pride and positive affect were 
reported which in turn mediated pro-environmental intention. In short, participants who 
experienced stronger feelings of pride and positive effect, having being able to list 12 
pro-environmental actions, had stronger intentions to be pro-enviornmental. Where 
environmental goals were salient (i.e., as a result of the listing exercise) and where 
participants inferred positive advancement towards environmental goals (by being able 
to list 12 actions), lower levels of negative affect and guilt were reported. As predicted 
by Fishbach and colleagues where environmental goals were salient and positive affect 
was experienced, positive spillover effects were seen (i.e., higher pro-enviornmental 
intentions). Conversely, where pro-enviornmental goals were salient and negative affect 
was experienced, negative spillover effects can be seen. There was no significant 
relationship between participants who experienced more negative affect or guilt and 
stronger intentions to be pro-environmental in future. Perhaps, participants who were 
unable to list 12 actions felt discouraged from further pro-environmental action 
(Fishbach et al., 2006; Fishbach et al., 2010). 
Conceivably, the fact that so many participants were able to list 12 pro-environmental 
actions could help to explain why the participants who listed only 3 actions (action 
advanced) did not differ significantly on any of the assessed measures compared with 
not advanced and highly advanced groups. It may have been the case, for example, that 
listing 3 actions was actually too easy a task and that these participants consequently did 
not feel that they had advanced substantially towards their goal. In contrast, participants 
who had succeeded in the more challenging task of listing 12 actions may have felt that 
they had advanced substantially towards being pro-environmental.  
An unexpected finding from this research was an interaction which showed that 
participants in the status goal salient condition who had listed 12 pro-environmental 
                                                 
27 It appears that the listing exercise made environmental goals salient for all participants. For further 
discussion of this limitation please refer to section 5.6.1. 
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behaviours had significantly higher positive affect than other participants. Positive 
affect was later found to mediate pro-environmental intention. Fishbach et al. (2006) 
would lead us to predict that these participants should have showed licensing effects 
and, therefore, expressed lower intentions to be pro-environmental. While there is no 
obvious explanation for this finding – one potential explanation could be that these 
participants actually reacted against materialistic consumer goals promoted by the 
advertisements. After first reflecting on advertisements which promoted materialistic 
goals, and then second reflecting on the high number of pro-environmental actions 
which they had undertaken, these participants may have seen their own goals and values 
as being in stark contrast to those promoted by the advertisements or indeed by society 
at large. 
5.6.1. Limitations 
The results of this study strongly suggest that the while goal advancement was 
successfully manipulated goal saliency was not. For example, the manipulation checks 
on the progress and commitment measures found no interaction between goal saliency 
and advancement. Instead, the manipulation checks showed that participants who 
succeeded in listing 12 actions felt greater commitment and progress. The data, 
therefore, provides evidence of positive spillover as opposed to compensation.  
Participants who were able to list 12 pro-environmental actions seemed encouraged to 
continue being pro-environmental. 
One explanation for the failure to manipulate goal saliency is as follows: by asking all 
participants to list pro-environmental actions, the study made environmental 
sustainability salient in both experimental conditions (status and environmental). For 
example, the effects of describing advertisements showing status goods may have been 
neutralised as participants moved onto the listing task and focused on how their own 
actions had benefited the environment. Arguably, therefore, the manipulation of goal 
advancement could have overridden the goal saliency exercise, making environmental 
sustainability salient to all participants, including those, in the status condition. If this 
was the case then the experiment effectively had only one condition (environmental 
priming) with three levels (highly advanced, advanced and not advanced). It may be for 
this reason that the data are supportive of just one of hypotheses. In short, where pro-
environmental goals are salient and participants infer that they are advancing in pursuit 
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of their pro-environmental goals positive spillover is seen (e.g., stronger pro-
environmental intentions). The absence of evidence of compensation could arguably be 
attributed to ineffectiveness of the goal saliency manipulation, particularly as, 
compensation was only predicted to occur in the status goals salient action not advanced 
condition. It may be possible to address this limitation in future studies by switching the 
order of the tasks. For instance, participants could complete the listing exercise 
(advancement manipulation) first and then evaluate the advertisements (goal saliency 
manipulation).  
A further potential limitation with the study was that the main dependent measure was 
participants’ preference for eco-features when considering buying a new car. An 
ANOVA found no significant differences or interactions between groups with regard to 
car eco-features. One reason for this could be that many features which would reduce 
the negative environmental impacts of a car (e.g., break energy regeneration and stop 
start systems) would also feature on luxury status cars. It may also be the case that 
features such as break energy regeneration are not particularly associated with reducing 
negative environmental impacts. Similarly, although a conventional car may have eco-
features these may be insufficient for it to be perceived as being a pro-environmental 
option. Better measures to assess preferences for more pro-environmental products 
could be used. For example, participants could be asked to choose between a luxury 
sports car and an electric vehicle or between organic cotton clothing and designer but 
non-organic clothing.  
5.6.2. Concluding remarks  
Unfortunately, due to limitations in study design it was not possible to test all the 
hypotheses set out at the start of Study 6, including, the hypothesis regarding when 
compensation would occur. However, the available findings from Study 6 are in line 
with Study 4 (see 4 4.2).  In Study 4 it was found that people who imagined recycling 
subsequently expressed higher levels of positive affect (e.g., pride) and levels of 
motivation to be pro-environmental in future. Similarly, participants in Study 6 who 
reflected on their pro-environmental behaviours and who listed 12 actions were more 
motivated to be pro-environmental in future. The findings from all the studies presented 







6. Chapter 6: Main discussion  
6.1. Introduction 
The thesis set out to investigate whether compensatory beliefs could explain why 
engaging in one pro-environmental behaviour decreases the likelihood of someone 
engaging in a subsequent pro-environmental behaviour (Truelove, Carrico, Weber, & 
Raimi, 2014). Compensatory beliefs have largely been studied in relation to health goals 
where they have been found to cause self-regulatory failures by allowing people to 
justify acting in a manner that is counter to their expressed goals and values.  
Specifically, evidence suggests that people resolve conflict between goals (e.g., to lose 
weight vs. to indulge in tasty foods) by reasoning that they can indulge now and 
compensate for any negative consequences at another time (Rabiau, Knäuper, & 
Miquelon, 2006). Unfortunately, in cases where people fail to follow through with the 
compensatory behaviour or where their beliefs are inaccurate, compensatory beliefs 
have been found to be a cause of slow or unsuccessful goal attainment (e.g., Kronick, 
Auerbach, Stich, & Knäuper, 2011).  
The current research applied the concept of compensatory beliefs to environmental 
behaviours in order to investigate whether compensatory beliefs are used in relation to 
environmentally significant behaviours. This research also investigated whether or not 
the use of CGBs is related to attempts to overcome feelings of dissonance caused by 
acting (or intending to act) in environmentally detrimental ways. It was hypothesised 
that the endorsement of compensatory green beliefs may account (at least in some part) 
for the intention-behaviour gap, whereby, people’s expressed pro-environmental goals 
and values do not map onto their behaviours (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). This was 
investigated using hypothetical scenarios and pledged behaviours.  
Chapter 1 identified a number of outstanding issues and questions that have been 
addressed by the empirical work presented in this thesis: 
 Do people use compensatory beliefs to licence engaging in environmentally 
detrimental behaviours? 




 Do compensatory beliefs provide a useful framework for understanding why 
people face difficulties in achieving their pro-environmental goals? 
Section 6.2 explains how the research presented in this thesis addressed the questions 
presented above. Finally, the chapter will conclude by outlining some potential 
limitations of this research and some avenues for future research in this area. 
6.2. What did the thesis find concerning compensatory green beliefs? 
Answering the three questions 
As evidence of compensation was found (see studies 1-3 in particular), this section will 
begin by exploring the nature of compensatory beliefs within an environmental domain. 
Section 6.2.1 will argue that compensatory beliefs should be seen within a broader 
framework of justifications for environmentally detrimental actions. Section 6.2.2 will 
then compare and contrast compensatory beliefs within health and environmental 
domains. It will be argued that compensation within an environmental domain is part of 
the same mechanism as moral licensing. The question of whether compensatory beliefs 
are a useful framework for understanding environmentally detrimental behaviours will 
be addressed within the wider discussion about the nature of compensatory beliefs.  
6.2.1. Do people have CGBs, and, if so, what is their nature? 
This section outlines how the research presented in this thesis addresses the first two 
questions. In looking for evidence for the presence and use of compensatory beliefs, this 
research found that compensation was just one of a variety of strategies people 
employed to justify environmentally detrimental actions to the self and to others. For 
example, participants in Study 1 reported employing a range of strategies to protect 
themselves against unpleasant thoughts or feelings of guilt and dissonance. For instance, 
participants appealed to low perceived behavioural control (“what can I do?”), made 
social comparisons (e.g., “they aren’t doing anything so why should I?”), and/or 
appealed to perceived risks or higher loyalties (e.g., the impact of abstaining from air 
travel to business, family relations etc.) (Gifford, 2011).   
In addition to these justifications Study 1 also provided insights into the evocation and 
use of CGBs. For example, Study 1 highlighted how people use compensation both to 
resolve guilt and to maintain their image of themselves as moral people. This finding, 
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points to the motivational roots of compensatory beliefs within the environmental 
domain (i.e., emotional and reputation management). Study 1 also points to the potential 
importance of morality in the promotion of pro-environmental behaviour as suggested 
by the Norm Activation and Value-Belief-Norm models of pro-environmental 
behaviour.  Furthermore, Study 1 provided insights into how participants appealed to 
past or on-going pro-environmental behaviours arguing that, within their lifestyle as a 
whole, they struck a balance between minimising environmental harm and maximising 
personal benefits. This finding suggests that compensation within the environmental 
domain is done in a holistic rather than a piecemeal fashion. It is arguably the case that 
general and holistic compensatory beliefs better facilitate the exploitation of 
uncertainties concerning the relative costs and benefits of individual actions, thus, 
making it easier for people both to resolve their environmental guilt and to appear pro-
environmental to others. 
In an effort to identify and better understand the use of compensation within an 
environmental domain, this research also presented a range of experimental work which 
explored the relationship between affect and compensation.  Study 1 had indicated that 
guilt was a potential trigger for compensatory-style justifications. This relationship 
between guilt and compensation was further investigated by Study 2. In Study 2 it was 
found that participants who thought about their negative environmental behaviours felt 
guilty. Again, participants generated compensatory-style justifications (see section 
3.4.2). Participants in the guilt condition expressed stronger pro-environmental 
intentions than participants in the pride condition. However, further analyses showed 
that while guilt predicted pro-environmental intentions it did not predict willingness to 
volunteer (pledged behaviour). Taken together the findings of Studies 1 and 2, suggest 
that simply forming or endorsing a compensatory belief (or intention) can help to 
resolve guilt, potentially resulting in a gap between intention and behaviour (Kollmuss 
& Agyeman, 2002; Rabiau et al., 2006). This is particularly, likely to be of concern 
where guilt is resolved through retrospective compensatory beliefs (see Study 1). Study 
4 found that people who imagined recycling reported significantly greater feelings of 
pride and intentions to act pro-environmentally. Furthermore, they acted pro-
environmentally in response to the free-choice vignettes. Building on these findings 
Study 6 explored the relationship between perceived advancement towards goals, affect 
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and pro-environmental intention. It was found that positive affect and pride mediated 
intentions to be pro-environmental in future but that negative affect and guilt did not.  
The question is raised as to whether it is positive and negative affect in general or pride 
and guilt in particular which are most important in influencing engagement with pro-
environmental behaviour. The literature indicates that both positive and negative 
emotions can influence pro-environmental behaviour. For example, feeling happy or 
optimistic has been found to be an important predictor of green product purchases 
(Koenig-Lewis, Palmer, Dermody, & Urbye, 2014).  Pride and guilt, however, have 
been identified as particularly important emotions in relation engaging in pro-
environmental behaviour (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Bissing-Olson, Fielding, & Iyer, 
2016). This is because these emotions have been found to generally guide moral and 
pro-social behaviours. Pride and guilt can also be seen as ‘self-conscious’ emotions 
because these feelings are broadly based on individuals’ own appraisals of their 
behaviour and standards of what is right or wrong (Bissing-Olson et al., 2016; Tangney 
& Mashek, 2007). These emotions are, therefore, arguably particularly likely to be 
associated with licensing, and compensating effects.  
In light of the perceived importance of pride and guilt in relation to pro-environmental 
behaviour recent research by Bissing-Olson et al. (2016) focuses explicitly on these 
emotions. Bissing-Olson et al. (2016) used an experience sampling design to examine 
how pride and guilt relate to daily engagement in pro-environmental behaviours. 
Ninety-six students recorded: a) their engagement in specific pro-environmental 
behaviours and b) their feelings of pride and guilt in relation to these behaviours. This 
was done four times per day for three consecutive days. Importantly, Bissing-Olson et 
al. (2016) found that while pride about acting pro-environmentally was positively 
related to subsequent engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, guilt was not. (It 
should be noted that this effect of pride was only evident in people who perceived more 
positive pro-environmental descriptive norms.) These findings are broadly in line with 
those reported in this thesis. In short, it appears that pride in particular and positive 
affect more generally are important in motivating (and sustaining) pro-environmental 
behaviour (Bissing-Olson et al., 2016).   
A further question is raised as to whether the manipulation of affect needs to be 
environment-specific (i.e., associated with the same context) or whether a separate 
manipulation of affect might have the same effect.  For example, whether someone who 
145 
 
felt proud after raising money for the ‘Help the Aged’ charity (an altruistic act) would 
be more or less likely to then act pro-environmentally if given the opportunity.  Work 
by Miller and Effron (2010) and Mazar and Zhong (2010) broadly suggests that 
behaviours that make one feel moral in general can have licensing effects and that these 
can be cross-domain (e.g., feeling licensed to lie or steal after buying an eco-product). 
Building on this, research by Meijers (2014) suggests that licensing effects within the 
environmental domain are moderated by environmental self-identity.  Meijers (2014) 
found, for example, that participants with a weak green identity were less likely to 
report pro-environmental intentions after imaging purchasing eco-friendly shoes than 
after imagining purchasing conventional shoes. In contrast participants with strong 
green identities were unlikely to show these licensing effects.  Research within this 
thesis (e.g., study 5) also indicates that strength of green identity is an important factor 
in determining the consistency of engagement with pro-environmental behaviours. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that licensing effects are unlikely within identity 
relevant contexts (Meijers, 2014).  Arguably, therefore, a separate manipulation of 
affect (e.g., pride resulting from donating to a charity for the elderly) would probably 
result in a subsequent pro-environmental behaviour but only among participants with 
stronger green identities.  
6.2.2. Methodological challenges and advances in measuring licensing and 
compensation 
While there was evidence of compensating and licensing from both the qualitative and 
experimental studies, results were not entirely consistent and the studies had a number 
of limitations. Study 2, for example, only offered one opportunity for participants to 
compensate and the behaviour offered was potentially conceived of as being relatively 
difficult (time pledged to volunteering for a conservation charity). Study 3, therefore, 
attempted to address these limitations by offering participants multiple opportunities to 
compensate across a series of hypothetical scenarios. Study 3 also further investigated 
results from Study 1 which suggested that morality may be an important motivator for 
pro-environmental behaviour. The design of Study 3 was, therefore, based on the 
compensatory ethics model of  Zhong, Ku, Lount, and Murnigham (2010) which 
indicated that people work to strike a balance between acting ethically and acting in 
self-interest. The findings of Study 3 supported this model – with participants “flip-
flopping” (i.e., alternating) between more and less pro-environmental decisions (once 
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the extent of their green identity was controlled for). Study 3, therefore, found some 
evidence that participants were striking a balance between maximising personal gain 
and minimising environmental harm (i.e., licensing and compensating). The results of 
the remaining studies, however, did not replicate the compensating and licensing pattern 
seen in Study 3 but rather suggested that participants tended to act consistently. In 
should be noted, however, that to the extent that the manipulation of goal saliency in 
Study 6 was unsuccessful, it was difficult to test many of hypotheses made, including 
those regarding compensation. 
Other attempts to replicate moral licensing effects have had similarly mixed results. For 
example, Blanken, van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and Meijers (2015) conducted three high 
powered experiments in an attempt to replicate the moral licensing effect found by 
Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009). For example, Blanken, van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and 
Meijers (2015) conducted three high powered experiments in an attempt to replicate the 
moral licensing effect found by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009). The original study 
by Sachdeva et al. (2009) found that participants who wrote about their positive 
personal traits donated significantly less to charity and were less cooperative than 
participants who had reflected on their negative traits. However, the first two replication 
attempts conducted by Blanken, et al. (2015) did not confirm the original results and the 
third found some evidence of moral cleansing but not of licensing.  
The “moral cleansing effect” (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) describes cases where a 
positive behaviour becomes more likely after recalling a past negative behaviour. Moral 
cleansing can, therefore, be seen as the opposite pattern to licensing (where after 
recalling a prior positive behaviour a person is more likely to act negatively). Arguably, 
compensation within an environmental domain can be seen as a form of moral 
cleansing, whereby, having recalled an environmentally detrimental behaviour someone 
feels morally deficient and is, therefore, motivated to perform a pro-environmental 
behaviour. The results of the replication studies by Sachdeva et al. (2009) suggest that 
in order to replicate moral licensing and compensating (or cleansing) effects high 
powered experiments are required. 
In support of this claim that high powered experiments are required, a meta-analysis 
conducted by Blanken, van de Ven, and Zeelenberg (2015) of 91 studies comparing a 
licensing condition with a control condition found that the magnitude of the licensing 
effect was small (Cohen’s d of 0.31). This means that studies may require large samples 
147 
 
in order to draw reliable conclusions about licensing effects on moral behaviours. The 
meta-analysis further indicated that published studies tended to report larger effects of 
moral licensing than unpublished studies. In short, it appears that the lack of evidence of 
compensating and licensing effects in Studies 4 to 6 may be representative of findings 
more generally within this field.  
Very few studies have considered how moral choices evolve over a series of scenarios 
(Barque-Duran, Pothos, Yearsley, & Hampton, 2015; Zhong et al., 2010). Recent 
research by Barque-Duran et al. (2015) is, therefore, highly relevant to this thesis. These 
authors investigated moral choices across a series of scenarios to explore whether 
“balancing vs. consistency” would be maintained over time (as measured by what the 
authors termed a “zig-zag” pattern). Because recent research on moral dynamics 
suggests that outcome-based mind-sets (termed a “consequentialist” worldview) versus 
rule-based mind-sets (termed a “deontological” worldview) moderate the impact of an 
initial (un)ethical decision on the likelihood of subsequently behaving ethically, Barque-
Duran et al. (2015) investigated the extent to which these mind sets are maintained over 
time. 
Barque-Duran et al. (2015) report two main findings: 1) that moral balancing was not 
maintained over time and 2) that moral consistency could be maintained, but only if the 
mind-set was re-enforced by repeating the manipulation at each stage of the experiment. 
In short, the authors found that if the manipulation of mind set and recall was only 
included at the start of the experiment there was a quick regression to neutral 
performance (i.e., data trended to the middle of the 7-point scale) meaning that the “zig-
zag” pattern was only observed at the first stage of the experiments. Some, albeit, 
unsustained evidence of balancing effects was, therefore, observed. 
Barque-Duran et al. (2015) suggest that using a 7-point scale may have been 
problematic in looking for a “zig-zag” pattern. This is because using a scale rather than 
a binary response (e.g., ethical vs unethical response) provided participants with an 
opportunity to establish a balance between moral and selfish motives by selecting 
options from the middle of the scale. Furthermore, selecting the midpoint of the scale 
would, arguably, be an easier way for participants to compensate than seeking to 
balance out more extreme moral responses.  While, Barque-Duran et al. (2015) interpret 
participants’ tendency to opt for the middle response options as indicating a preference 
for achieving a “middle ground”, an alternative explanation of their findings might be 
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that participants opted to take a compensatory approach to decision-making. Similarly, 
Zhong et al. (2010) also used a scale to measure the ethicality of participants’ choices. 
This resulted in the concern that the post-hoc results of Zhong and colleagues’ first 
study could have been a function of regression to the mean. This would lead to initial 
extreme deviations gravitating to an overall mean in subsequent choices. Zhong et al. 
(2010) opted to manipulate participants’ first choice in Study 2 to guard against 
regression to the mean. In contrast, as Studies 3 to 5 in this thesis used a binary measure 
regression to the mean was not considered as an issue. 
The findings by Barque-Duran et al. (2015) are interesting because, while only Study 3 
in this thesis succeeded in identifying “flip-flopping” patterns, these patterns were 
maintained overtime. Studies 4 and 5 found a positive relationship between responses 
over time, suggesting that participants made morally consistent choices across the 
scenarios. The novel approach used in Studies 3 to 5 of looking at sequential decision-
making and also using a binary variable, therefore, make a contribution both to the 
methodology used to look for licensing effects and also to the current debate on moral 
balancing. In short, using a binary variable deprives participants of opting for some kind 
of middle ground and forces them to make a choice that is clearly more or less ethical. 
However, the fact that findings still did not consistently support the notion that 
preceding actions license, or are compensated for by, subsequent action means that there 
is only equivocal evidence for compensation and licensing in this environmental 
domain. 
It should be noted that studies on sequential decision-making have tended to focus on 
relatively short periods of time. This could problematic if moral balancing effects tend 
to occur over longer time frames than are generally studied in experimental research 
(Barque-Duran et al., 2015). One recent exception to this is research by Hofman, 
Wisneski, Brandt, and Skitka (2014). These researchers conducted a study where 1252 
adults in the United States and Canada were randomly signalled five times per day on 
their smartphones for three days and asked to indicate whether they had committed, 
were the target of or had learned about an (im)moral event. Licensing effects were 
found. Committing a moral act earlier in the day was associated with a greater 
likelihood of subsequently acting immorally and a decreased likelihood of subsequently 
undertaking a moral act. Research from this thesis also suggests that it may be more 
productive to look for compensating and licensing effects over longer time periods. 
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Participants in Study 1, for instance, took a relatively long term view arguing that their 
previous and on-going (habitual) pro-environmental actions would cumulatively 
balance out those aspects of their lives that were less pro-environmental.  
A potential reason why compensation and licensing effects were found in Study 3 but 
not in Studies 4 and 5 relates to perceived social pressures and to participants’ self-
identities. In Study 3, for example, participants came in person to undertake a pro-
environmental study where an experimenter was present. Participants’ perceptions of 
the expectations of the experimenter (e.g., that they should act pro-environmentally) 
coupled with the fact that younger people tend to be less consistently ethical (see Sidani, 
Zbib, Rawwas, & Moussawer, 2009) could have resulted in these participants flip-
flopping between more and less pro-environmental behaviours – an effect that was not 
seen in the subsequent studies that were run online (Studies 4 and 5).  Participants in 
Study 3, for example, had a mean age of 19.19 (SD = 1.35) and were, therefore, younger 
than participants in Study 4 (M = 23.94, SD = 6.63) and Study 5 (M = 38.38, SD = 
11.92). Further work needs to be undertaken to explore these potential explanations.  
To summarise, there is evidence that people do employ compensations to justify (to 
themselves or to others) environmentally detrimental actions. Evidence of compensation 
was found using qualitative (Study 1) and also experimental methods (Studies 1 to 3 in 
particular). The results of Studies 4 and 5, however, are more difficult to interpret and 
tend to suggest an overall preference for consistency rather than licensing and 
compensating. There are a variety of potential reasons (e.g., social factors) why Studies 
4 and 5 did not replicate the “flip-flopping” pattern observed in Study 3 which could be 
explored in future research.  
6.2.3. Do compensatory beliefs provide a useful framework for understanding 
why people face difficulties in achieving their pro-environmental goals? 
In the health domain, compensatory beliefs have been argued to provide a useful 
framework for understanding why people face difficulties in achieving their goals. This 
research posed the question of whether the same is true in the environmental domain. 
This section will outline the similarities and differences between compensation in the 
two domains.  
The research presented in this thesis suggests that there are some important factors in 
common between compensation in the two domains. First, in line with the health 
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literature the present research found that dissonance (e.g., guilt) prompted compensatory 
justifications and intentions (e.g., Study 2) (Rabiau et al., 2006) but that these did not 
necessarily translate into compensatory actions (e.g., guilt did not predict pledged 
behaviour in Study 2) (Taylor, Webb, & Sheeran, 2014). Furthermore, as expected, 
participants with “middling” (i.e., moderately strong) green identities showed more 
inconsistent behaviour (“flip-flopping”) than participants with relatively weak or strong 
green identities (Study 5) (Rabiau et al., 2006). Thus, the extent to which people 
identified with the goal of being pro-environmental influenced their environmental 
decision-making (see also Studies 4 and 5) with participants who more strongly 
identified with environmental goals being more consistently pro-environmental in their 
decision-making (Meijers, 2014; Rabiau et al., 2006). In short, it seems that participants 
generally had a preference for acting consistently with the exception of the “middling” 
greens who were conflicted (i.e., torn between acting pro-environmentally and in self-
interest) (Bem, 1967; Festinger, 1957).  
Furthermore, just as inaccurate compensatory health beliefs or a failure to undertake the 
planned compensatory action increases risk to the individual of failing to achieve their 
health goal – inaccurate compensatory green beliefs are likely to limit individuals’ 
progress in being more sustainable (Kaklamanou, Jones, Webb, & Walker, 2015; 
Rabiau et al., 2006). For example, Study 1 and 2 (participants’ comments) suggest that 
people believed that relatively low cost and low (positive) impact behaviours (e.g., 
recycling) could compensate for higher (negative) impact but nonetheless desirable 
behaviours (e.g., car use, air travel or meat consumption) (Bin & Dowlatabadi, 2005). 
Additionally, as predicted by Rabiau et al. (2006), Study 1 found evidence that 
participants were reluctant to closely scrutinise the validity of their compensatory 
beliefs. These findings, therefore, suggest that compensatory beliefs are maladaptive to 
the extent that they may be inaccurate and facilitate the licensing of negative 
environmental impacts which are not fully off-set and which inhibit the rate of 
behavioural change (Kaklamanou et al., 2015). 
There are, however, also some potentially important differences in the nature of 
compensation in health and environmental domains. Health behaviours, for example, 
have costs and benefits that are directly experienced by the individual (e.g., weight 
loss). In contrast, while there is a direct cost to acting pro-environmentally there is 
usually no direct benefit to the individual. In fact, the benefit is likely to be both 
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spatially and temporally removed. For this reason, pro-environmental behaviours can 
also be seen as pro-social or moral behaviours (Nisbet & Gick, 2008). Arguably, 
therefore, the efforts made by individuals to strike a balance between maximising 
pleasure while minimising environmental harm can be seen as akin to moral licensing 
and cleansing effects (Rabiau et al., 2006; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). For example, the 
belief that compensation is possible could license environmentally detrimental action(s). 
Participants in Study 1, for example, argued that their habitual pro-environmental 
behaviours would compensate for their environmentally detrimental behaviours.  In 
short, such compensatory beliefs legitimise environmental harm. Furthermore, to the 
extent that individuals experience guilt about their environmental impacts they may be 
motivated to undertake compensatory (“cleansing” or “off-setting”) behaviours (e.g., 
Studies 2-5) in an attempt to balance out the negative impacts of their behaviour. 
Another potential difference between compensation in health and environmental 
domains (which again may make environmental compensation more akin to moral 
licensing) was the role of compensatory justifications in maintaining green credentials. 
In short, compensatory justifications were found to be used as a form of reputational 
“damage control” (Joosten, van Dijke, van Hiel, & De Cremer, 2013). By drawing 
attention to their environmental credentials, participants in Study 1 felt that they could 
continue to appear green even while continuing to undertake environmentally 
detrimental actions. Furthermore, when participants in Study 2 were asked to list their 
behaviours that harmed the environment they went beyond the experimental protocol 
and also listed examples of pro-environmental behaviours. These examples appear to 
have been provided by participants in an attempt to defend their green credentials and 
allow their harmful behaviours to be construed in a broader context (Miller & Effron, 
2010). 
To summarise, just as compensatory beliefs have been found to inhibit or slow the 
adoption of healthier behaviours, they can also be seen as a threat to the adoption of 
more pro-social and pro-environmental behaviours. In answer to the question posed in 
Chapter 1, the framework of compensatory beliefs can, therefore, provide a useful lens 




6.3. Limitations and future directions 
The studies reported in this thesis have a number of potential limitations, one of which 
is that measures of real or actual behaviour were not used. For example, Study 2 used 
pledged behaviour (volunteering), Studies 3 to 5 used hypothetical scenarios and Study 
6 used preferences (hypothetical car purchase). To the extent that hypothetical decisions 
do not have real behavioural costs (e.g., time, difficulty) it might be expected that the 
intention-behaviour gap would be smaller with hypothetical behaviours than with actual 
behaviours. That is, in cases where there is no real difficulty in acting, we would expect 
people to be more likely to act (or make decisions) in accordance with their intentions. 
Experiments with actual behavioural measures may have been more likely, therefore, to 
detect licensing and compensating effects. Nonetheless, Study 3 did succeed in 
identifying patterns suggestive of compensating and licensing effects and participants’ 
willingness to volunteer in Study 2 was still low even though it was just a pledged 
behaviour. Furthermore, there is some assurance from the fact that the meta-analysis 
conducted by Blanken et al. (2015) showed no significant differences between actual 
and hypothetical behaviours in licensing.  
Nonetheless, potential differences between responses to hypothetical scenarios and 
more realistic situations would be worth investigation in future studies. For example, a 
more naturalistic sequential decision-making task could include asking participants to 
engage in an online shopping task. Participants could be asked to choose between either 
buying more expensive but environmentally friendly goods or buying lower cost and 
less environmentally friendly goods. It would be expected that participants who felt “in 
credit” in terms of past pro-environmental behaviours would feel licensed to select the 
cheaper but more environmentally detrimental goods, while those participants who felt 
“in deficit” would show a preference for the more expensive but environmentally 
benign goods. 
Another potential limitation in Studies 3 to 5 is that the dependent variables were binary 
(i.e. participants had to choose between two options). Again, this could be seen as 
somewhat crude and unrealistic. However, having binary variables was helpful in 
setting up a dilemma (e.g., between indulgence and restraint); the idea being that 
participants would be forced either to make a personally costly but environmentally 
beneficial decision or a personally beneficial but environmentally costly decision. It was 
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not possible to do both. It was anticipated that participants would try and strike a 
balance between maximising pleasure and minimising harm by “flip-flopping” between 
more and less pro-environmental decisions across the scenarios. While including a 
Likert scale might have provided a more sensitive measure there were good reasons for 
using a binary variable (see detailed discussion in section 6.2.2).   
A number of studies reported in the present thesis found evidence that participants acted 
consistently, rather than using positive actions to compensate for and/or license more 
negative actions. For example, participants in Study 6 who succeeded in listing 12 pro-
environmental actions reported higher levels of general positive affect and also pride 
than participants who had failed to list 12 actions. Furthermore, it was found that 
general positive affect and also pride were mediators between perceived progress in 
being pro-environmental and intentions to be pro-environmental in future. In short, 
participants who listed 12 pro-environmental actions participants felt positive and this in 
turn motivated them to be pro-environmental in future (positive spillover). Similarly, 
participants who imagined recycling in Study 5 appeared to be more motivated to 
engage in future environmental behaviours.  
The findings of Studies 5 and 6 suggest moral re-enforcement effects such as found by 
Young, Chakroff, and Tom (2012). Young and colleagues found that participants who 
were asked to reflect on good deeds subsequently donated significantly more to charity 
than participants who had recalled bad deeds. Interestingly, this effect was even stronger 
among participants who were not asked to recall whether their deed had been observed 
by someone else. Young et al. (2012) propose that when people are primed to see 
themselves as good for goodness’ sake (e.g., rather than to gain public credit) they may 
be motivated to undertake further good deeds. Insofar as pro-environmental behaviours 
can also be seen as moral, altruistic or pro-social, similar effects may have occurred as a 
result of asking participants to reflect on pro-environmental actions.  
Future research could further investigate ways to re-enforce moral or in this case, 
specifically, pro-environmental behaviours. For example, participants could be asked to 
read a short text about the importance of pro-environmental action and then complete 
some sentences such as:  “Virtuous people take time to benefit the environment by …” 
“Someone who recycles could be seen as moral because …” In contrast participants in a 
control condition could be asked to read a short piece of neutral text (e.g., instructions 
about assembling shelves).  These participants could then complete sentences about the 
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tools required for the task (e.g., “the most appropriate tool with which to drive in the 
nails would be a …”). Following this, participants could be given the opportunity to a) 
indicate their intentions to benefit the environment in future and b) donate some money 
to a pro-environmental organisation of their choosing. At the end of the experiment, 
participants could be offered a small sum to thank them for giving up their time to 
participate in the research. The participant would be invited to leave some money in an 
envelope (along with instructions as to which charity they would like to donate to) on 
the desk on their way out. It could be hypothesised that participants who reflected on 
the morality of being pro-environmental would be motivated to express stronger pro-
environmental intentions and also donate more to charity. 
A related way of encouraging more consistent engagement in pro-environmental 
behaviours would be through what have been termed “social labelling techniques” 
(Meijers, Noordewier, & Avramova, 2014). Social labelling is a way of encouraging 
individuals to take a certain self-view in an effort to influence their subsequent action(s) 
(Allen, 1982; Bem, 1967). For example, providing someone with the social label: “You 
are a pro-environmental person”, may lead them to see themselves as “pro-
environmental” and behave accordingly.  There is, in fact, already some evidence that 
social labelling may be effective in promoting a green identity. Cornelissen, Dewitte, 
Warlop, and Yzerbyt (2007) prompted participants to make a pro-environmental 
decision (e.g., to choose a more environmentally-friendly television). Participants were 
then provided with information that enabled them to construe their behaviour as 
attributable to their personal values. Subsequently these participants more likely to 
choose other sustainable products.   
Green identity also emerged as a significant predictor of pro-environmental decision-
making in the studies reported in this thesis. For instance, Study 3 only found the “flip-
flopping” patterns in participants’ responses when green identity was controlled for. 
Furthermore, when green identity was added to the regression models in Study 4 and 
Study 5, behavioural history was no longer a significant predictor of current decisions. 
It would be interesting to repeat the sequential decision-making tasks both with and 
without social labelling techniques and to compare the level of flip-flopping seen. It 
would be hypothesised that participants in the social labelling condition would act more 
consistently (i.e., flip-flop less).   
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The findings of this thesis research suggest that strategies which provoke feelings of 
environmental guilt are likely to elicit undesirable responses including compensatory 
justifications (e.g., Studies 1 and 2) and to lower motivation to engage in pro-
environmental actions (e.g., Study 4). In contrast, this research suggests that strategies 
which lead participants to reflect on their contributions to helping the environment and 
which make them feel positive also seem to increase motivations to do more to be pro-
environmental. Study 6, for example, showed that the effects of perceived 
environmental goal advancement on intentions to be pro-environmental in future were 
mediated by positive affect but not by negative effect. This finding that negative effect 
(e.g., guilt) appeared to discourage engagement in being pro-environmental was to some 
extent, unexpected because the literature suggests that feelings of guilt should motivate 
reparative acts (e.g., Bamberg & Möser, 2007). However, it is exactly when people 
experience uncomfortable feelings of guilt that we should expect them to employ 
cognitive strategies such as compensatory beliefs (Rabiau et al., 2006).  
Future research could fruitfully investigate the most effective strategies for making 
people feel positive about their environmental behaviours without enabling them to feel 
licensed to relax in their pursuit of environmental goals. Strategies could include the 
moral re-enforcement and social labelling techniques (as discussed above) and also 
reflective (e.g., such as used in Study 1) or imaginative exercises (e.g., Study 4). For 
example, Study 4 found that simply imagining recycling increased participants’ levels 
of positive affect and intention to be more pro-environmental in future. In light of this 
future research could adapt techniques used in imagined contact studies (see Medeady, 
Crisp, & Hopthrow, 2013) or employ strategies such as perspective taking (e.g., 
imagining personally experiencing the negative consequences of climate change) (Pahl 
& Bauer, 2013). 
6.4. Conclusions  
This research set out to investigate whether people do use compensatory beliefs to 
license engaging in environmentally detrimental behaviours and, if so, to discover more 
about the nature and extent of compensatory beliefs within an environmental domain. 
One main finding of this research was that participants did hold compensatory beliefs 
(Study 1). Another main finding of this research was that compensatory green beliefs 
were general, cumulative and based on habitual behaviours, making them differ 
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somewhat in nature from the measure of green compensation by Kaklamanou et al. 
(2015). This research further highlighted a number of similarities and differences 
between compensation within the health and environmental domains. As with health 
compensation, compensatory green beliefs were associated with managing unwelcome 
feelings of dissonance such as guilt. Interestingly participants also emphasised the role 
of compensation in reputation management (i.e., appearing pro-environmental to 
others).  
Most importantly, this research made several findings concerning the effects of 
compensatory green beliefs on decision-making. The experimental studies conducted 
for this thesis research build on the compensatory belief model (Rabiau et al. 2006), 
finding evidence that individuals who are conflicted do attempt to balance competing 
demands (in this case between self-interest and environmental concern). The 
experimental work also found evidence in support of the compensatory ethics model 
(Zhong et al. 2010) as participants in Study 3 “flip-flopped” between more personally 
beneficial but environmentally detrimental and personally detrimental but 
environmentally beneficial choices across a series of scenarios (although in Studies 4-5, 
green identity appeared to be more important in decision-making than previous choice). 
The findings of this research allow for a number of concrete suggestions concerning the 
direction of future research in this area. Taking into account the findings a number of 
suggestions for improving the measurement of compensation and licensing can be 
made. It seems fair to suggest that: 
1. because effect sizes are small, high powered experiments are required to fully 
understand the nature and extent of compensating and licensing effects; 
2. that participants should be allowed to respond freely to moral dilemmas as 
opposed to having their responses forced (see Chapter 4); 
3. that using dichotomous response options to explore moral balancing effects is a 
promising avenue for future research and; 
4. that looking at sequential decision-making over longer periods of time may be a 
more effective strategy in detecting “balancing” effects.  
Finally, the findings of this research suggest some important lessons for those interested 
in promoting pro-environmental behaviour. Overall, the results from this thesis suggest 
that compensatory beliefs can be seen to constitute yet another strategy to reduce 
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feelings of environmental guilt – resolving dissonance by denying that any conflict 
exists. The belief that previous or planned pro-environmental behaviours can 
compensate was found to license environmentally detrimental behaviours. Somewhat 
ironically, it appears that such strategies are used because people care about the 
environment and feel distress that they are contributing to environmental problems. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that engagement in pro-environmental behaviour can 
be promoted by reflecting on or imagining the positive feelings associated with 
undertaking pro-environmental behaviours. Moreover, these findings cast doubt on the 
efficacy of strategies which provoke negative affect (e.g., guilt) and elicit defensive 
responses such as compensatory beliefs and justifications rather than behaviour change.  
To conclude, this research, found evidence of compensatory green beliefs and provided 
insights both into how people think and feel about their environmentally detrimental 
actions. Finally, this thesis provided insights into the kinds of strategies which may be 







Appendix One: Compensatory Green Belief Scale 
Participants were asked to rate how closely each statement reflected their own personal 
beliefs using a 5-Point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree”.  Below are the scale instructions and items presented to participants: 
 “Below are a series of beliefs that people may hold about energy, water, transport and 
the environment. Please read each sentence carefully (out loud) and rate how closely the 
statement reflects YOUR own beliefs by marking the appropriate box. Since we all 
believe different things, there are no right or wrong answers.” 
1. Not using a dishwasher can compensate for taking longer showers. 
2. Walking to the supermarket can compensate for buying highly packaged food. 
3. Having a water butt can compensate for using the oven. 
4. Limiting your household water consumption can compensate for not better 
insulating your home. 
5. Not driving a car compensates for flying on holiday. 
6. You do not need to worry about which country your food comes from if you use 
energy efficient appliances in the home. 
7. It is okay to leave the lights on if you use low energy light bulbs.  
8. It is okay to have lots of electrical items if you turn them off when not in use.  
9. If you mostly eat in-season produce, then it is okay to sometimes eat out-of-season 
produce.  
10. It is okay to drink bottled water if you limit the number of car journeys that you 
make. 
11. Flying abroad can be made up for by being a vegetarian (i.e. not eating meat). 
12. Not driving a car compensates for not recycling. 
13. If you have a low flush toilet then it is okay to use more water in other ways.  




15. Using public transport on some occasions can compensate for using the car on other 
occasions. 
16. Composting food waste can make up for buying imported food. 
17. Recycling compensates for driving a car.   
18. If you have energy efficient electrical equipment, then it is okay to leave it on 
standby. 
19. It is okay to leave goods turned on if they are modern and efficient.  




Appendix Two: Materials for Study 2 
Survey materials and study debrief 
Green Identity (with distractor items): The 4 item measure of green identity (Whitmarsh 
& O'Neill, 2010) with distractor items is provided below. Responses were recorded 
using a 5-point Likert Scale with neither agree nor disagree as the midpoint. The items 
from Whitmarsh and O'Neill (2010) are indicated by an asterisk. 
Do you agree or disagree that: 
 I would be embarrassed to be seen as having a healthy lifestyle 
 I think of myself as someone who is very concerned with environmental issues* 
 I want my family and friends to think of me as someone who has a healthy 
lifestyle 
 I think of myself as an environmentally friendly consumer* 
 I want my family and friends to think of me as someone who is concerned about 
environmental issues* 28 
 I think of myself as someone who is very concerned with health issues 
 I would be embarrassed to be seen as having an environmentally friendly 
lifestyle* 
 I think of myself as someone who eats healthily 
Measure of intention to “do more to help the environment”. Responses were recorded 
on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by very untrue of me and very true of me. The 
midpoint was labelled as “neutral”. A number of distractor items were included which 
related to health and helping others. 
 I intend to eat more healthily 
 I intend to drink more water     
 I intend to do more to help the environment      
 I intend to take more exercise  
 I intend to do more to help other people 
 
                                                 
28 The negative wording (“I would not want”) of the original item was removed because it was thought 








Analyses of participants following the experimental protocol 
In Section 3.4.2 it was stated that a total of 47.01% of participants did not strictly adhere 
to the experimental protocol. For this reason the analyses were repeated with all (i.e., 
25) participants in the guilt condition who had followed the protocol and a random 
sample of 25 participants from the pride condition who had also adhered to the protocol. 
As the only significant differences found were between the experimental conditions the 
control condition was not included in these additional analyses. The results support 
those reported in the main results section. An independent-samples t-test was conducted 
to compare guilt scores for the pride and guilt conditions. There was no significant 
difference in scores for the guilt condition (n = 23, M = 1.57, SD = .73) and the pride 
condition (n = 24, M = 1.21, SD = .59; t(45) = 1.84, p = .072, two tailed) (equal 
variances not assumed). Furthermore, an independent-samples t-test to compare pride 
scores for the pride and guilt conditions found no significant differences in scores for 
the guilt condition (n = 23, M = 2.57, SD = 1.20) and the pride condition (n = 24, M = 
2.17, SD = 1.09; t(45) = 1.19, p = .239, two tailed). An independent-samples t-test 
comparing levels of intention to be more pro-environmental in future supported earlier 
findings in that there was a significant difference in scores for the guilt condition (n = 
22, M = 5.00, SD = 1.07) and the pride condition (n = 24, M = 4.21, SD = 1.07; t(44) = 
2.34), p = .024, two tailed). Finally, an Independent t-test found no significant 
differences in terms of hours donated between the guilt condition (n = 5, M = 8.20, SD = 








Appendix Three: Materials for Studies 3-5 
Vignette evaluation form 
Story: Bags 
Although you have purchased a number of reusable 'bags for life' you realise 
when you get to the checkout that you have left them in your car which is just 
outside the store. There is a queue of people behind you waiting to be served. It 
is your weekly shop meaning that you will need to take quite a lot of disposable 
plastic bags unless you go to the car to get your reusable bags. 
  
Which of the following would you do? (Please circle an option) 
 Option 1: Go to the car to get the reusable bags. 
 Option 2: Use the disposable plastic bags at the checkout. 
1. How easy was it to understand the story? (Coded 4 = very easy and 1 = very 
difficult) 
Very easy Somewhat easy  Somewhat difficult Very difficult 
    
 




2. How easy was it to understand the response options? (Coded 4 = very easy and 1 
= very difficult) 
Very easy Somewhat easy  Somewhat difficult Very difficult 
    
 





3. How believable was the story? (Coded 4 = very believable and 1 = very 
unbelievable) 
Very believable  Somewhat believable Somewhat  un-believable Very unbelievable  
    
 




4. How believable were the response options? (Coded 4 = believable and 1 = very 
unbelievable) 
Believable  Somewhat believable Somewhat  un-believable Very unbelievable  
    
 




5. How pro-environmental were the response options? (Coded 1 = un-













     
Second 
option  
     
 
6. Please evaluate each response option in terms of how personally costly you 
think it would be (e.g. in terms of inconvenience caused, monetary cost, time 
taken). (Coded 1 = not costly and 4 = very costly) 
 Not  costly Somewhat costly Quite a bit Very costly   
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First option     
Second option      
 





Study 3: Ten vignettes exploring sequential pro-environmental 
decision-making   
As you read each of the stories, please take a little time to imagine yourself in the 
situation described. Even if you have never experienced the situation before, try to 
imagine yourself in it. 
After reading each story you will need to make a decision. Remember, that you have the 
opportunity to do EITHER of the options which are presented.  
Please answer as honestly as possible. There are no right or wrong answers. 
a) You are studying Environmental Conservation at a university in the UK. You 
have been given the opportunity to attend a training course assessing the 
environmental impact of different activities. The course is in France and you 
know that it’s a great opportunity to develop your professional skills. You have 
a limited budget and after some research you find that it is more expensive to 
travel by train than by plane. However, flying will result in significantly more 
carbon emissions than rail travel. You are aware that flying will cause greater 
damage to the environment; but flying will save on travel costs and enable you 
to afford nicer food and accommodation while you are away. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Travel by train. 
 Travel by plane. 
b) Your New Year’s resolution was to get fit.  As a result, you have just been for a 
long walk in the countryside. However, it rained hard for the last two hours and 
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you are now feeling cold and wet. You think it would be nice to have a long hot 
shower. However, you know that having a long shower will cause more damage 
to the environment than having a short shower because it will use more water. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Have a long shower. 
 Have a short shower. 
c) You find your job stressful and enjoy shopping for leisure at the weekends. You 
particularly enjoy treating yourself to new clothes.  However, you have recently 
been made aware that the clothing industry is not very sustainable and, thus, that 
by shopping for leisure you are contributing to the sustainability problem. 
Cotton, for example, is one of the most pesticide intensive crops in the world 
and many discarded clothing items end up in landfill. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Buy from second hand clothes shops (e.g. vintage shops). 
 Continue to shop as usual. 
d) In your garage you find a number of unused tins of emulsion (paint) that were 
left over from when you recently decorated your house. You no longer want the 
emulsion and it is taking up valuable storage space. You notice that the tins have 
a label stating that you need to allow the emulsion to set solid before it is 
disposed of with the general waste. This can be done quite easily by adding 
some sand which is something that you happen to already own. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Take time to locate and travel to a community paint recycling program. 
 Throw the unused paint away once it has solidified. 
e) You realise that the gas central heating has been left on at a high temperature all 
weekend while the house has been empty. Not only has this cost you money but 
it has also wasted a lot of gas.  You will easily be able to afford the bill but you 
still feel annoyed because you know that heating uses more energy in the home 
than any other activity. 
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Which of the following would you do? 
 Invest time in reading through the complex boiler manual in order to re-set 
the temperature and timing settings. 
 Continue as usual. 
f) You have had family members come to visit. As a result you have more waste to 
dispose of than usual. You have been storing the materials that can be recycled 
(e.g., cardboard, tins, plastic bottles, and glass) but these are taking up valuable 
space in your kitchen. Your recycling bin is full and you cannot fit in the 
remaining bags of plastic, glass and paper. There is, however, some space in the 
general disposal bin but this will mean that the recyclable materials will be sent 
to landfill. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Store the recycling until the next recycling collection. 
 Put the recycling in the general disposal bin. 
g) You have invested in energy saving light bulbs for your house and have replaced 
all of the old-style light bulbs with the new more efficient ones. However, the 
person you live with keeps forgetting to turn lights off at night. In your opinion 
it is wasteful to leave the lights on unnecessarily but continuing to challenge this 
person’s behaviour could cause tension and there are probably more important 
issues to worry about. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Insist that lights are turned off at night. 
 Ignore this problem for now. 
h) You buy fresh fruit each week but most of it gets thrown away because it is not 
eaten soon enough.  You are aware that this not only wastes money but also 
damages the environment.  Your friend suggests that you cook the damaged or 
overripe fruits or use them to make smoothies. However, as someone who works 
long hours you wonder whether you will have the time. 
Which of the following would you do? 
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 Use the damaged/overripe fruit in other ways. 
 Continue to dispose of the fruit as usual. 
i) You have a young family and two of your children still wear nappies. You have 
made the decision to purchase disposable nappies rather than reusable ones 
because it's one less thing to worry about. You think that using disposable 
nappies will save you time on laundry and give you more time in which to relax 
and be with your family.  However, you notice that you have to dispose of a lot 
of nappies each day. As a result you do a quick search on the internet and 
discover that each baby uses more than 4,000 nappies before they are potty 
trained and that each nappy will take over 200 years to naturally degrade. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Start using reusable nappies. 
 Continue using disposable nappies. 
j) Although you have purchased a number of reusable 'bags for life' you realise 
when you get to the checkout that you have left them in your car which is just 
outside the store. There is a queue of people behind you waiting to be served. It 
is your weekly shop meaning that you will need to take quite a lot of disposable 
plastic bags unless you go to the car to get your reusable bags. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Go to the car to get the reusable bags. 
 Use the disposable plastic bags at the checkout. 
Study 4: Vignettes (imagined recycling scenarios)  
As you read each of the following stories, please take a little time to imagine yourself in 
the situation described. Even if you have never experienced the situation before, try to 
imagine yourself in it.    
After reading each of these stories you will be asked to make a choice. Remember, that 
you have the opportunity to do EITHER of the options which are presented. 
Please answer as honestly as possible. There are no right or wrong answers. 
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a) In your garage you find a number of unused tins of emulsion (paint) that were 
left over from when you recently decorated your house. You no longer want the 
emulsion and it is taking up valuable storage space. You notice that the tins have 
a label stating that you need to allow the emulsion to set solid before it is 
disposed of with the general waste. This can be done quite easily by adding 
some sand which is something that you happen to already own. You mention the 
paint to someone who informs you that rather than throwing the paint away you 
could take it to a paint re-use centre where it will be re-distributed. You look 
into this and find that going to the re-use centre involves a long bus journey to 
the far side of town, carrying all the paint. However this would prevent the paint 
being wasted. 
Which of the following would you do?    
 Put sand in the paint and then throw it away once it has solidified 
 Travel to the paint re-use centre 
b) You find your job stressful and enjoy shopping for leisure at the weekends with 
your friends.  You are all interested in fashion. You particularly enjoy treating 
yourself to new clothes.  However, you have recently been made aware that 
cotton is one of the most pesticide intensive crops in the world. The clothing 
industry is therefore causing environmental damage and by shopping for leisure 
you are contributing to this problem. You find that it is possible to buy organic 
cotton which is grown in a more environmentally friendly way but that this is far 
more expensive and the range of designs is more limited. 
Which of the following would you do?    
 Buy non-organic cotton 
 Buy organic cotton 
c) You have a young family and two of your children still wear nappies (diapers). 
You have made the decision to purchase disposable nappies rather than reusable 
ones because it is one less thing to worry about. You think that using disposable 
nappies will save you time on laundry and give you more time in which to relax 
and be with your family.  However, you notice that you have to dispose of a lot 
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of nappies each day. As a result you do a quick search on the internet and find 
an official report which states that that each baby uses more than 4,000 nappies 
before they are potty trained and that each nappy will take over 200 years to 
naturally degrade. The report also provides you with information on how to 
clean re-usable nappies with minimal harm to the environment. Using re-usable 
nappies will be better for the environment but will involve far more work for 
you. 
Which of the following would you do? 
 Use re-usable nappies 
 Use disposable nappies 
Study 5: Similar and dissimilar vignettes   
As you read each of the stories, please take a little time to imagine yourself in the 
situation described. Even if you have never experienced the situation before, try to 
imagine yourself in it.  
After reading each story you will need to make a decision. You have the opportunity to 
do either of the options which are presented.  
Please respond to the information given in each story and note that in these vignettes, 
you have no restrictions on your budget, so there are no negative consequences of 
spending money.  
Please answer as honestly as possible. There are no right or wrong answers. 
a) Imagine that you are planning a journey to your work place. You own a bicycle 
and a car and live 11km (7 miles) from your work place. There is a good cycle 
route between your home and work. Today the weather is bad so your cycle ride 
will be very cold and wet. However, you can get showered at work once you 
arrive. Otherwise you could drive to work, and there is no indication that there 
will be any traffic jams. Cycling would be better for the environment but 
considering the bad weather driving would be more pleasant.  
Which of the following would you do? 
 Travel by car 
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 Travel by bicycle 
b) Imagine that you are planning a journey to go and see friends for lunch.  You 
don’t intend to drink and you own a car, meaning that you have the option of 
driving into town and parking in the restaurant car park. Alternatively, you could 
catch the bus which would involve a five minute walk to the bus stop from your 
house. When you look through the window, however, you see that it is raining 
and windy outside. Taking the bus would be better for the environment, but 
considering the weather driving would be more pleasant.  
Which of the following would you do? 
 Travel by car 
 Travel by bus 
c) Imagine that you are at home after work and that you are planning a journey to 
the shops. You need to buy some bread and milk so that you have something for 
breakfast tomorrow, because you won’t have time to buy anything in the 
morning. There is a local shop.  The walk to the local shop is safe and it is still 
light outside, but you are feeling tired after a long day at work. The bus doesn't 
stop near the shop and there isn't a good cycle route. However, you own a car 
and have the option of driving and parking outside the shop. Altogether, a return 
journey in the car to the shop would take around 6 minutes, while a return 
journey on foot would take around half an hour. Walking would be better for the 
environment but considering how tired you feel driving would be easier.  
Which of the following would you do? 
 Travel by car 
 Travel on foot 
d) Imagine that you are planning a journey for a meeting in another city, 
approximately 71km (44 miles) away. You own a car and have the option of 
driving and there is no indication that you will encounter any traffic jams. If you 
drive the journey will take approximately one hour and fifteen minutes from 
door to door. If you take the train your journey will be approximately 20 minutes 
longer because you will need to cycle to the station. Whichever option you 
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choose (car or train) will not cost you any money because your employer will 
refund your travel expenses. Taking the train would be better for the 
environment, but considering the extra time needed to travel to the station, 
driving would be easier.  
 Which of the following would you do? 
 Travel by car 




Appendix Four – Study 6: Piloting images 
 M SD 
Dior (bag): Status goods 5.17 1.83 
Dior (bag): Environment 1.17 0.41 
Dior (watch): Environment 1.00 0.00 
Dior (watch): Status   6.00 0.89 
Louis Vuitton (bag): Environment 1.17 0.41 
Louis Vuitton (bag): Status   4.50 1.87 
Louis Vuitton (Kate Moss): Environment 1.00 0.00 
Louis Vuitton (Kate Moss): Status 5.50 2.07 
Channel (Audrey Tautou): Environment 1.33 0.82 
Channel (Audrey Tautou): Status  6.00 1.10 
WWF (trophy woman): Environment 6.17 0.75 
WWF (trophy woman): Status 1.83 0.98 
Greenpeace (woman): Status  1.17 0.41 
Greenpeace (woman): Environmental 6.67 0.82 
WWF (endangered beauty): Environment 5.83 1.60 
WWF(endangered beauty): Status goods  1.83 1.33 
Channel (Audrey Tautou): Environment 1.17 0.41 
Channel (Audrey Tautou): Status  5.67 1.51 
Vivienne Westwood: Environment 3.67 1.97 
Vivienne Westwood: Status goods  5.67 1.86 
WWF (woman rainforest): Environment  5.50 2.26  
WWF (woman rainforest): Status  1.00 0.00 
Gucci (man): Environment 1.17 0.41 
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Gucci (man): Status  5.67 1.97 
Yves St Laurent (man): Environment 1.17 0.41 
Yves St Laurent (man): Status  5.83 1.94 
Ralph Lauren (Blue Polo): Environment 1.00 0.00 
Ralph Lauren (Blue Polo): Status  6.00 1.10 
TAGHeur (Golfer): Environment 1.00 0.00 
TAGHeur (Golfer): Status  5.33 2.34 
WWF (Fishman): Environment 6.67 0.82 
WWF (Fishman): Status 1.17 0.41 
WWF (Trophy Man): Environment 5.67 1.51 
WWF (Trophy Man): Status   2.17 2.40 
WWF Mounted head: Environment 6.17 1.60 
WWF (Mounted head): Status  1.17 0.41 
Greenpeace (man): Environment 6.67 0.52 
Greenpeace (man): Status  1.17 0.41 
Audi (cat):  Environment 1.17 0.41 
Audi (cat): Status   4.67 1.97 
VW (owl): Environmental  2.17 0.98 
VW (owl):Status  5.17 1.72 
VW (Goat): Environment 1.83 0.98 
VW (goat): Status  4.67 1.51 
MIT (Rhino): Environment 2.50 1.38 
MIT (rhino): Status   3.67 2.07 
MIT (Horse): Environment 1.33 0.52 
MIT (horse): Status   5.50 1.38 
Hyundai (dog): Environment 2.17 1.94 
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Hyundai (dog): Status  3.33 1.21 
Endangered Animal Trust (dead bird): Environment  6.50 0.84 
Endangered Animal Trust (dead bird): Status   1.17 0.41 
WWF (Polar bear):Environment 6.00 2.00 
WWF (Polar bear): Status   1.33 0.82 
 BUND (time running out): Environmental  6.00 1.55 
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